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Abstract 
My thesis is that the say-show distinction is the basis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy in both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and 
the Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
Wittgenstein said that the Investigations should be read in conjunction 
with the Tractatus. To understand the Tractatus we must understand the say-show 
distinction: the principle that "what can be shown, cannot be said". A correct 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy will explain the significance of the 
say-show distinction for the Investigations. I evaluate three available readings of 
the say-show distinction which fail to meet this challenge. 
I argue that Wittgenstein's main purpose throughout his career was to 
replace traditional philosophy with an alternative conception of philosophy, which 
can only be understood through the say-show distinction. The Tractatus and the 
Investigations are different attempts to present the same conception of philosophy. 
I describe how, in both cases, they present a distinctive account of the nature of 
philosophical problems, the appropriate methods of philosophy, the end result of a 
philosophical task and the overall aim of philosophy. 
I argue that my interpretation provides a correct view of the significant 
continuities and discontinuities between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The 
failure of the Tractatus was not a flaw in the conception of philosophy presented 
in it, nor a flaw in the say-show distinction. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein failed 
properly to implement his proposed conception of philosophy, as he remained in 
the grip of traditional philosophical presuppositions. The Investigations presents 
the same conception of philosophy, but freed from the presuppositions of the 
Tractatus. The say-show distinction remains the basis of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy in the Investigations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Content 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Introduction 
Exegetical Strategy 
Context 
Chapter Summary 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I outline my argument, discuss my exegetical strategy and set my 
thesis in the context of current philosophical debates. 
My project is motivated by two related concerns. I believe that 
Wittgenstein challenged traditional conceptions of philosophy and proposed an 
important alternative. I also believe that philosophers have not fully understood 
the role and significance of the say-show distinction. In this work I aim to 
demonstrate that the distinction is of central importance to Wittgenstein's thought, 
not only in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, but also in the Philosophical 
Investigations. My thesis is that the say-show distinction is the basis of 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. 
A brief outline of my argument is as follows: Wittgenstein's main aim 
throughout his career was to replace traditional philosophy with an alternative 
conception of philosophy. In the Tractatus, the say-show distinction is the basis 
for this new conception. The failure of the Tractatus was not a flaw in the 
conception of philosophy, nor a flaw in the say-show distinction. In the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein failed to properly implement his proposed conception of philosophy, 
as he remained in the grip of traditional philosophical presuppositions. The 
Investigations presents the same conception of philosophy, but freed from the 
presuppositions of the Tractatus. The say-show distinction remains the basis of 
the conception of philosophy in the Investigations. 
My thesis is important for the following reasons: it challenges and corrects 
prevalent misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's thought. It provides a fruitful way 
of understanding the relationship between the two main stages of his career - the 
Tractatus and the Investigations - and accounts for both continuity and 
1 
Ch. 1: Introduction 
discontinuity in the development of his thought. In addition to its significance as a 
work of exposition, this thesis presents a conception of philosophy which may 
subsequently be judged on its own merits. I plan to employ and defend this 
conception of philosophy in future research projects by applying the aims and 
methods to contemporary philosophical problems. 
2 Exegetical Strategy 
My project is primarily exegetical, insofar as my task is an exposition of 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, rather than an evaluation or a defence. 
As exegesis it is supported textually and aims for internal coherence, but, like any 
interpretation, it cannot claim unconditional superiority over alternative 
interpretations. Here I make explicit my exegetical strategy so that it wil l be clear 
whether the difference between my interpretation and those of other 
commentators is due to our different hermeneutic commitments or whether we 
agree on our interpretative strategy but have a substantial disagreement about the 
text. 
I have chosen to concentrate on the Tractatus and Investigations, rather 
than consider the entire corpus of Wittgenstein's writing. This is appropriate due 
to constraints of space, but also for good exegetical reasons. Wittgenstein 
laboured over the presentation of his ideas and was on the whole reluctant to make 
his notes public. Of his unpublished material we can only be confident that he 
wished the Investigations to be published posthumously and, even so, he 
considered part one to be more satisfactory than part two. He published only two 
works of his own philosophy during his lifetime - the Tractatus and "Some 
Remarks on Logical Form". There are significant differences in his attitude 
towards these two works. The Tractatus was the only book that he approved for 
publication during his lifetime and he assisted with the editing process. At the 
time of publication he believed it was successful. In the case of the article he 
withdrew his endorsement of the views even before it was published. His view of 
the article was that it was totally worthless,1 but the Tractatus was not a failure in 
1 In a letter to the Editor of Mind dated 12th April 1933 he called it a weak article. (Philosophical 
Occasions p. 156) and told his friends that it was worthless (Op. Cit. p.28). 
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the same way. When the Investigations was published Wittgenstein wrote in the 
preface that it should be read in conjunction with the Tractatus: 
It seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones 
together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast 
with and against the background of my old way of thinking. (PI Preface 
p.viii) 
I believe that a correct interpretation of the Investigations is one that can account 
for the relationship between the Tractatus and Investigations. Wittgenstein's ideas 
can be properly understood using these two texts, without the need for additional 
material; however I include references to his published notes, personal 
correspondence and reports of conversations where they illuminate a point that 
already has textual basis in the Tractatus or Investigations. 
Wittgenstein's discussions of a range of philosophical issues have become 
highly influential contributions to philosophy of logic and language, philosophy of 
mind, epistemology and even metaphysics. Although studies of his treatment of 
these issues are very important, I believe that it is necessary to understand his 
work on particular problems via an overview of his conception of philosophy. I 
use the phrase 'conception of philosophy' to encompass several related ideas 
including views about the nature of philosophical problems, the appropriate 
methods of philosophy, the end result of a philosophical task and the overall aim 
of philosophy. Although his discussions of particular philosophical concerns are 
valuable and indicate issues that he felt deserved treatment, these discussions are 
best seen as illustrations of his conception of philosophy, rather than his primary 
concern. Instead I believe that Wittgenstein's main aim throughout his career was , 
to offer a replacement for traditional conceptions of philosophy and it is the task 
of my interpretation to present a clear account of his new conception of 
philosophy, rather than interpret his treatment of particular problems. Furthermore 
I believe that Wittgenstein's work on particular problems cannot be paraphrased 
without loss, but his overall conception of philosophy can be described. It should 
2 According to Elizabeth Anscombe, "Wittgenstein used to say that the Tractatus was not all 
wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you 
the right time"(Anscombe 1959, 78). 
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be possible to describe what Wittgenstein was attempting to do without treating 
this description as a substitute for working through each philosophical problem in 
its own right. A major challenge for any commentator is to give an account of 
Wittgenstein's ideas without distortion from oversimplification or systematisation. 
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations the presentation of 
Wittgenstein's ideas is inextricably connected to his conception of philosophy - I 
take very seriously the idea that the text is more than a mere container for 
philosophical content. However, although the texts offer great potential to explore 
different stylistic and hermeneutic issues, I do not want fascination with the texts 
to overshadow the important issue - namely Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy. Wittgenstein wanted the presentation of his ideas to reinforce his 
view of philosophy, but unlike some recent commentators of his work, I do not 
believe that he presented his ideas in a way that requires an ingenious mode of 
interpretation. When a reader understands his conception of philosophy, it will be 
a straightforward matter to appreciate why the ideas are presented as they are in 
the texts. My proposal is that a proper appreciation of the role of the say-show 
distinction in the Tractatus and Investigations wil l make it easier to read the texts 
and help us to gain a better understanding of his ideas through the style in which 
they are written. 
One of the reasons why Wittgenstein's philosophy is so difficult to 
understand is because it differs from traditional philosophy. This has been a major 
cause of misinterpretations. Problems arise i f the Tractatus and Investigations are 
interpreted from the standpoint of traditional philosophy. In particular it is easy 
for interpreters to beg the question against his challenge to traditional philosophy 
when their rejection of his challenge is based on the very presuppositions that he 
attempts to criticise. Although the texts do not require an ingenious hermeneutic 
strategy, effort is required to understand the books on their own terms, from an 
internal standpoint. This involves a simple hermeneutic circle, insofar as we must 
understand how the texts are to be read by reading the instructions in the text. In 
other words we must pay attention to what Wittgenstein says in the texts about his 
own philosophy and his own style of presentation and appreciate the comparisons 
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he makes between his philosophy and traditional philosophy. When I discuss 
available literature I concentrate on commentators who have used these 
considerations to understand the Tractatus and Investigations and I omit or 
criticise commentators who read the texts without taking account of 
Wittgenstein's instructions. In effect I use this hermeneutic strategy as a 
benchmark for deciding which commentators to discuss in my thesis. I do not 
omit commentators simply because they are unsympathetic to Wittgenstein's 
views, but I do omit them i f their lack of sympathy for his project means that they 
systematically misinterpret his views. 
I believe that Wittgenstein needed to present his ideas in a way that would 
distinguish them from the traditional format of philosophical writing. His texts do 
not present ordinary ideas through an unusual mode of presentation. Instead the 
revolutionary character of his ideas demands an appropriately unusual 
presentation. His intention was to give his text a physiognomy that matched his 
ideas. However, he was not entirely satisfied with any of his attempts to publish 
his work. The prefaces to both books contain remarks indicating that he felt the 
expression of his ideas was unsatisfactory but he did not have the resources to 
improve this. The task of interpretation is in part to understand what Wittgenstein 
felt that he had conveyed successfully and what he felt that he had not. 
Although I aim to be sympathetic to Wittgenstein's intentions my primary 
concern is to extract a robust account of his philosophy. I endeavour to make a 
contribution to current and future philosophical understanding, rather than a 
contribution to literary criticism, history of ideas or biography. My interpretation 
highlights connections and ideas that Wittgenstein himself may not have explicitly 
considered, so it may not be appropriate to claim that it was his intention to 
express these views, but nonetheless it is appropriate to attribute these views to 
him. The task of exegesis is compounded as it involves not simply an 
interpretation of a text, but interpretation of the changes in Wittgenstein's thought 
over time. For this reason it is not a simple matter of prioritising what 
Wittgenstein thought or intended, because his views about the Tractatus changed. 
I hope to make sense of what Wittgenstein thought he had achieved when he 
I discuss these considerations in more detail in chapter 2. 
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wrote the Tractatus, and what he subsequently believed was the problem with the 
Tractatus. This is unashamedly an interpretation from a contemporary perspective 
- it takes into account the assumption that the Tractatus is flawed and looks back 
at the Tractatus from a post-Investigations vantage point. Many aspects of 
Wittgenstein's thought change over the course of his career, including certain 
aspects of his conception of philosophy, however I argue that his central ambition 
and fundamental ideas were constant. It makes sense to emphasise this in order to 
convince philosophers who have no interest in Wittgenstein exegesis that they 
should appreciate the force of his central ideas and not be distracted by other less 
significant debates. 
The most obvious obstacle for my thesis is the fact that the say-show 
distinction is not explicitly mentioned in the Investigations. My exegetical 
strategy to deal with this is as follows: we know that the Tractatus is crucial for 
understanding the Investigations, so i f I can demonstrate that the say-show 
distinction is crucial for understanding the Tractatus it follows that the say-show 
distinction is also crucial for understanding the Investigations. The task then 
remains to establish whether the say-show distinction is important for the 
Investigations because it is rejected or because it is retained, but either way the 
significance of the say-show distinction for the Investigations is still not 
appreciated by most commentators. My thesis corrects this neglect and in doing so 
provides a valuable new interpretation of the Investigations. 
3 Context 
There have already been many attempts to offer groundbreaking interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, including several recent publications that have not yet 
reached wide circulation, and are in the early stages of critical review.4 
Nonetheless my interpretation fulfils a need that is significant and insufficiently 
explored. With only a few exceptions, all of which are discussed in this thesis, 
recent interpretations have dealt either with the Tractatus or with the 
4 E.g. Eli Friedlander (2001), Matthew Ostrow (2002). 
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Investigations, rather than both.5 In what follows I demonstrate that interpretations 
which do give an account of the relationship between the two texts have not 
provided an adequate interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy -
one which includes the role of the say-show distinction properly understood.6 In 
particular, my interpretation combats the common view that the failure of the 
Tractatus is the result of the incoherence of the say-show distinction. 
My view is that the common inclination to treat the say-show distinction 
as a substantive doctrine is the main reason that philosophers assume it to be 
incoherent. It has also led to speculation that Wittgenstein was committed to 
numerous unworkable metaphysical doctrines. I see this as one instance of a more 
general problem, which is that many interpretations assume the importance of 
Wittgenstein's work to be his contribution to specific philosophical disputes. 
Widespread misunderstanding of his central aims has led philosophers to attribute 
doctrines and theories to Wittgenstein - such as realism, anti-realism, linguistic 
idealism, solipsism, logical atomism, behaviourism and a host of other substantive 
positions, (see Hacker 2002, 4). Such misunderstanding is symptomatic of the fact 
that, although Wittgenstein's aim was to introduce a revolutionary conception of 
philosophy, the revolution has still not occurred. It is assumed that Wittgenstein's 
contribution to philosophical debates is in the form of doctrines and theories 
because his work is still read from the standpoint of traditional philosophy. A new 
interpretation is needed which wil l indicate why Wittgenstein's philosophy needs 
to be read from an entirely different standpoint i f it is to have the revolutionary 
effect that is long overdue. 
I have claimed that Wittgenstein offers an alternative to the traditional 
conception of philosophy. Although he does not explicitly use this term, he did 
suggest: "one might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of 
the subject that used to be called "philosophy" (Blue and Brown Books p.28). 
Used very loosely 'traditional philosophy' could simply mean any philosophy that 
differs from Wittgenstein's conception so further description is needed to make 
the claim informative. Rather than attempt to provide a strict definition which 
5 E.g. Oswald Hanfling (1989), Michael Hodges (1990). Interpretations which do deal with both 
include Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.) (2000). 
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categorises the widely divergent features of various philosophical practices, I will 
illustrate my point with a live example. David Oderberg has recently called for a 
return to what he calls "philosophical traditionalism", claiming that "philosophical 
traditionalism can be seen as both a state of mind and a set of doctrines" 
(Oderberg 2002, 42). A sample from his manifesto for philosophical 
traditionalism includes the following requirements for philosophy in general: 
The possibility of arriving at distinctively philosophical truths; the 
possibility of using systematic a priori reasoning to arrive at those truths; 
the role of philosophy not simply to arrive at this or that truth, but at the 
correct system of philosophical truth. (Oderberg 2002, 42) 
This is only one example of the type of philosophy targeted by Wittgenstein. Not 
all traditional philosophers would accept Oderberg's faith in an a priori 
methodology, but although they may disagree with his methodological principles, 
many would subscribe to his aims. Traditional philosophy aims to solve problems 
by adding philosophical truths to a body of knowledge. Of those who do not agree 
that philosophy can aim at distinctively philosophical truths many would believe 
that the answers to philosophical problems are to come from scientific truths. Few 
would imagine that there can be a distinctively philosophical enterprise that is not 
in the business of discovering truths. 
A particularly distinctive feature of traditional philosophy is the belief that 
philosophical problems can be solved when we come to know something that we 
do not presently know. Another way of describing this is the idea that problems 
are solved by explaining what we know in terms of something that we do not 
know, for example explaining personal identity in terms of quasi-memory, rather 
than ordinary memory. Although many philosophers may reject this type of 
explanation it is usually because they refuse to accept speculative metaphysical 
postulates - for example quasi-memory, possible worlds and qualia. However 
they do accept that philosophy needs to make true claims and offer new 
information that will solve the problems. Much of contemporary philosophy in 
anglo-american universities is marked by the demand that the explanations should 
be commensurate with the findings of natural science, hence although it is often 
6 E.g. K.T. Fann (1969), John Koethe (1996), Dale Jacquette (1998). 
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not acceptable to postulate philosophical truths about non-empirical entities, it is 
perfectly acceptable to think that the solution to philosophical problems wil l be 
materialist or reductionist discoveries and in principle accessible to science. In 
contrast to presuppositions such as these about the task of philosophy, 
Wittgenstein proposes a conception of philosophy which offers methods for 
treating philosophical problems which do not involve theories, doctrines and true 
claims, whether empirical or a priori. 
In particular one of the most important features of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy, properly understood, is that it establishes a distinction 
between philosophy and science. The debate surrounding the relationship between 
philosophy and science is not addressed in my thesis, but my conclusions have 
significance when considered in this wider context. Contemporary philosophy is 
dominated by approaches that do not accept a distinction between philosophy and 
science, such as Cognitivism and Quine's Naturalised Epistemology. A clear 
statement of such a view is made by Keith Lehrer: 
We contend that the distinction between philosophy and theoretical 
science is a bogus distinction, whether viewed historically or 
systematically. (Lehrer 1990, 7) 
A robust account of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy wil l strengthen 
resistance to the view that philosophical enquiry is ultimately reducible to 
scientific enquiry. It will show that philosophy has distinct aims and methods. 
There is also potential to pursue the idea that the methods of philosophy should be 
closer to the model of literature than science - although this also forms no part of 
my argument in this thesis. 
Some critics of Wittgenstein have argued that he offers only a negative 
philosophy - a philosophy that is quietist and defeatist. I f Wittgenstein's ideas are 
to gain wider influence it is important to counter such criticism by demonstrating 
that his is also a positive philosophy, although it involves no substantive 
doctrines, whether empirical or a priori. I do not offer an explicit defence against 
these criticisms in this thesis, but instead lay the groundwork for such a defence 
by providing a robust account of his positive conception of philosophy. My 
account of his work will establish that, in both the Tractatus and the 
9 
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Investigations, the outcome of a philosophical task and the overall aim of 
philosophy are positive achievements, not merely negative and deflationary. 
4 Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 2, I give a neutral exegesis of the Tractatus and the Investigations. 
This is an exposition of the main ideas with minimal interpretation or 
commentary. I then identify the aspects that demand special consideration, 
particularly the internal guidelines for how the texts are to be understood. This 
lays the groundwork for my critical discussion of commentators' readings in 
chapters 3 and 4 and for my own interpretation in chapters 5 to 7. 
In Chapter 3, I evaluate available interpretations of the say-show 
distinction in the Tractatus. I argue that the most common type of interpretation is 
incorrect because it treats the say-show distinction as a doctrine, albeit a special 
type of ineffable doctrine. I also criticise the opposing type of interpretation on the 
grounds that it treats the say-show distinction as a pseudo-doctrine. I argue that 
the most promising type of interpretation is one that attempts to treat the say-show 
distinction as an elucidation, rather than a doctrine or pseudo-doctrine. 
In Chapter 4, I evaluate available interpretations of the say-show 
distinction in the Investigations. Using the interpretations from Chapter 3, I 
consider in each case whether commentators believe that the say-show distinction 
is retained or rejected in the Investigations. I argue that only an interpretation that 
treats the distinction as elucidatory can successfully claim that the distinction is 
retained in the Investigations. I concede that i f one accepts the view that the say-
show distinction is a doctrine or pseudo-doctrine, then there is a strong case to say 
that the distinction is rejected, or has no role, in the Investigations. 
In Chapter 5,1 present my own interpretation of the say-show distinction 
in the Tractatus. Against the idea that the distinction is a doctrine or pseudo-
doctrine I argue that the distinction has an elucidatory role. I develop a more 
comprehensive account than the available elucidatory interpretation, by 
demonstrating that the distinction is the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy. 
10 
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In Chapter 6,1 discuss why Wittgenstein claimed in the Investigations that 
the Tractatus contained "grave mistakes". I argue that the say-show distinction 
was not a grave mistake in the Tractatus and that Wittgenstein did not reject the 
Tractarian conception of philosophy. I argue that he considered the failure of the 
Tractatus to be its reliance upon certain traditional presuppositions, and that these 
mistakes were exposed and dispelled in the Investigations. 
In Chapter 7,1 present my interpretation of the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the 
Investigations is fundamentally the same as his conception in the Tractatus. In 
both cases the say-show distinction is the basis for this conception. 
In Chapter 8, I sum up my argument and consider some implications for 
further study, either by myself or by others. These include the following projects: 
an application of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy to contemporary 
problems; a defence of his conception of philosophy against opposing 
conceptions, particularly the prevailing trend towards scientism; a clarification of 
the similarities and differences between philosophy and science and between 
philosophy and literature; a historical study of the influences that may have 
contributed to Wittgenstein's say-show distinction and a historical study of the 
influence that the distinction has subsequently had on other philosophers. 
11 
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Chapter 2: The Tractatus and the Investigations 
Content 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Introduction 
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
The Philosophical Investigations2 
Desiderata 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I give an exegetical overview of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations. The task is made difficult by 
stylistic features of Wittgenstein's texts. The remarks of the Tractatus are spare 
and aphoristic, so any attempt to paraphrase them risks distortion by adding ideas. 
The remarks of the Investigations are dense and unsystematic, so any attempt to 
summarise them risks distortion by omitting ideas and creating a false impression 
of order. My aim is to present the texts in as neutral a way as possible, 
summarising the main features of the texts, following the original order of 
remarks where possible, and keeping my own commentary to a minimum. At this 
stage I do not focus on the issue of the say-show distinction, nor do I interpret the 
texts in the light of Wittgenstein's remarks for understanding the text. Indeed one 
aim of this chapter is to identify those features of the texts which any 
interpretation should be expected to address. These considerations, summed up as 
desiderata in the final section, will provide the reader with a basis for comparing 
available interpretations with each other, in chapters 3 and 4, and with my own 
interpretation in chapters 5 to 7. 
2 The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
The stated aim of the Tractatus is "to draw a limit to thought, or rather - not to 
thought, but to the expression of thoughts" (TLP Preface p.3). This limit - the 
limit between propositions with sense, and nonsense - will be used to show that 
1 I follow conventional referencing for the remarks of the Tractatus by using TLP followed by the 
number of the remark e.g. TLP 4.1212.1 use the Pears & McGuinness translation unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 I use the same format as the Tractatus, in a departure from conventional referencing, for the 
remarks of the Investigations. I use PI followed by the number of the remark e.g. PI 109, rather 
than the customary notation of a paragraph mark e.g. § 109. 
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the problems of philosophy are posed because "the logic of our language is 
misunderstood" (TLP Preface p.3). To this end, the seven main propositions of the 
Tractatus give an outline for an account of language - an account of what can and 
cannot be said in propositions with sense: 
The world is all that is the case. (TLP 1) 
What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs. (TLP 2) 
A logical picture of facts is a thought. (TLP 3) 
A thought is a proposition with a sense. (TLP 4) 
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An 
elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself). (TLP 5) 
The general form of a truth-function is [p, X> N © ] . This is the general 
form of a proposition. (TLP 6) 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. (TLP 7) 
As a brief overview, the seven remarks build up into an account of language in the 
following way: the world consists of facts. Facts are existing states of affairs. 
Facts can be 'pictured'. That a fact can be pictured means that it can be thought. A 
thought is a proposition with sense. A proposition can represent its sense i f it is a 
truth-function of elementary propositions. The general form of a truth-function is 
the essence of all propositions - what all propositions with sense have in common 
- hence it is the general form of the proposition. We are not able to say anything 
with signs that do not have general prepositional form; when we are tempted to do 
so, we must instead remain silent. This is why Wittgenstein says that the whole 
sense of the book can be summed up as: "what can be said at all can be said 
clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 
Preface p.3). 
I now look at each of the seven major propositions in turn and discuss in 
more detail what Wittgenstein says about language and philosophy. With the 
exception of TLP 7, Wittgenstein follows each of the major propositions with a 
series of remarks that comment on the major proposition. The remarks are 
numbered to indicate their relative importance. For reasons of space I deal mainly 
with the higher numbers (e.g. 2.1, 2.2) and, for convenience, I use a collective 
term, e.g. 'the 2.1s' to include a particular remark (e.g. TLP 2.1) and all the 
remarks that are comments on that remark (e.g. TLP 2.11,2.12,2.13). 
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"The world is all that is the case" (TLP 1). 
The Is are a much shorter section than the others (with the exception of TLP 7 
which consists of a single remark). Whereas other sections contain anything 
between 70 and 150 remarks, the Is contain only seven. 
The Is introduce an important distinction between facts and things, a 
distinction which indicates the significance of logical form. We are told elsewhere 
that objects (things) make up the substance of the world (TLP 2.021), but the 1.1s 
state that the world does not consist of things, it consists of facts (TLP 1.1). This 
point hinges on the word "all" in the first remark - the requirement for totality is 
crucial because, as we shall see, a totality of objects cannot constitute a world, 
whereas a totality of facts can. The requirement for totality rests on Wittgenstein's 
conception of logical form. We know that facts are in logical space (TLP 1.13). 
We learn elsewhere that when a particular place, or possibility, in logical space is 
determined, then at the same time it reveals something about the rest of logical 
space (TLP 3.42). This is why the notion of totality is important in the Is - that 
the world consists of the totality of facts in logical space means that it does not 
just consist of all that is the case, but at the same time it determines all that is not 
the case (TLP 1.12). I f the world were the totality of things, then there would be 
no role for logical space. A list of all existing things would reveal nothing about 
the possibility of other non-existing things. Whereas a list of all the facts that are 
the case reveals the facts that are possible, but are not the case (TLP 2.05) - this is 
the significance of the totality that logical form provides. 
"What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs" (TLP 2). 
Although the Is say that the world is the totality of facts they leave open the 
question what is a fact? In TLP 2 Wittgenstein gives the first formulation: a fact is 
"the existence of states of affairs". Almost 80 remarks follow this statement, 
which fall into three sections. TLP 2.01-2.063 describe how objects combine to 
form possible facts (states of affairs). The 2.1s state that we 'picture' facts, and 
the 2.2s state that pictures of facts have logical form in common with facts. 
Throughout the 2s Wittgenstein emphasises the role of logic - particularly the 
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idea that logic deals with what is essential, rather than what is accidental (TLP 
2.0121). 
Wittgenstein tells us that a state of affairs is a combination of objects (TLP 
2.01). Objects (things) make up the substance of the world (TLP 2.021) - they 
give it both form and content (TLP 2.025). The form of the world is the possibility 
of objects combining with one another in different structures (TLP 2.033). The 
form is essential and unalterable (TLP 2.026 & 2.0271). The content of the world 
is the existing states of affairs (facts) (TLP 2.05), which are accidental and 
changing. In other words form is the possible combinations of objects, and content 
is the existing combinations of objects. But, as we saw above, logical form means 
that when certain possible combinations exist in reality, others do not exist (TLP 
2.06). Hence the world is all that is the case and determines all that is not the case 
(TLP 1.12): "the sum total of reality is the world" (TLP 2.063). 
We are not told what objects are, but we learn that the important difference 
between objects and states of affairs is determined by logical form. Objects are 
simple (TLP 2.02) whereas states of affairs have structure (TLP 2.032). As form is 
the possibility of structure (TLP 2.033) objects cannot represent logical form, 
except when they are configured in a state of affairs. 
The world has been discussed thoroughly - it consists of simple objects, 
which are combined in existing states of affairs (facts) and the possibility of 
objects occurring in states of affairs is logical form. Now Wittgenstein turns from 
discussing the world to discuss how we 'picture' the facts of the world. 
The 2.1s and 2.2s discuss pictures. A picture is made up of elements. We 
are not told what these elements are, only that they are related in a determinate 
way (TLP 2.14). As with objects, this is because the elements are secondary to the 
structure (TLP 2.0122) - where the possibility of structure is logical form (TLP 
2.033). This is why "every picture is at the same time a logical one" (TLP 2.182). 
Logical form gives pictures a certain relation to reality (TLP 2.223). A picture 
must have something in common with reality in order to depict reality (TLP 2.17), 
what it has in common is logical form - "i.e. the form of reality" (TLP 2.18). This 
is because a picture represents a possible state of affairs, it does not determine 
whether the state of affairs pictured exists or not. This means that a picture is 
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independent of its truth or falsity (TLP 2.22). This also indicates that logico-
pictorial form tells us nothing about what exists - it only enables us to compare 
our pictures with reality, and thereby say something about what exists. 
" A logical picture of facts is a thought" (TLP 3). 
We have learned that facts can be pictured and that every picture of a fact has 
logico-pictorial form. Now Wittgenstein tells us that i f a fact can be pictured, this 
means it can be thought - it is thinkable (TLP 3.001). He then gives a detailed 
account of how a thought finds expression in a proposition with sense. 
In 3.001-3.05 Wittgenstein discusses thought. In the case of pictures, a 
picture represents a possible state of affairs, a true picture represents an existing 
state of affairs and a false picture represents a non-existing state of affairs. Now 
we see that a thought is a picture that represents a possible state of affairs, a true 
thought is a picture that represents an existing state of affairs and a false thought 
is a picture that represents a non-existing state of affairs. Wittgenstein told us that 
the world is the totality of existing states of affairs, so we can see why he says that 
the picture of the world is the totality of true thoughts (TLP 3.01). In the next 
section he wil l claim that the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural 
science (TLP 4.11), but first he must explain how thoughts are related to 
propositions. 
So far Wittgenstein has taken us from facts to pictures and from pictures to 
thoughts. Now he takes us from thoughts to propositions. In the 3.1s Wittgenstein 
discusses the idea that "in a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be 
perceived by the senses" (TLP 3.1). This point rests on a distinction that is 
discussed in the 3.3s: the fact that a proposition is both a sign and a symbol. 
Insofar as the proposition is perceptible it is a propositional sign (TLP 3.11), but 
insofar as the proposition is the expression of a thought, it is a symbol: " I call any 
part of a proposition that characterises its sense an expression (or symbol)" (TLP 
3.31). 
A proposition with sense is the expression of a thought, when the thought 
is a picture that represents a possible state of affairs. A true proposition [is an 
expression of a thought that is a picture that] represents an existing state of affairs. 
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A false proposition [is an expression of a thought that is a picture that] represents 
a non-existing state of affairs. 
In the 3.2s Wittgenstein talks about the correspondence between the 
elements of a proposition and the objects of a thought. Although he leaves the 
objects of thought unspecified, the elements of a proposition are 'simple signs' or 
'names' (TLP 3.202). A name represents an object (TLP 3.22) when "the 
configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple 
signs in the propositional sign" (TLP 3.21) this only occurs when the thought and 
the proposition share logical form. 
In the 3.3s Wittgenstein emphasises the order of dependence that is 
implicit in the previous remarks. A name has meaning only in the context of a 
proposition with sense (TLP 3.3). This parallels a previous point - just as an 
object only counts as an object in the context of a situation (TLP 2.0121), words 
only count as words when they appear in propositions (TLP 2.0122). This order of 
dependence is a reminder that logical form is primary: the possibility of structure 
is more important than the elements in the structure. The 3.3s also introduce the 
important new distinction between sign and symbol. Signs are what can be 
perceived of a symbol (TLP 3.32) and they are arbitrary (TLP 3.322). The symbol 
is what is essential: it is the underlying sense, given by logical form (TLP 3.344). 
This distinction is important, firstly because philosophical confusions can be 
caused by looking at the sign rather than the symbol (TLP 3.324). Secondly, the 
idea that the symbol rather than the sign is essential (TLP 3.31) is connected to the 
idea that the essence of all propositions with sense can be expressed as the general 
form of a proposition (TLP 3.312). 
In the 3.4s Wittgenstein returns to the importance of logical form, just as 
he did in the discussion of states of affairs and the discussion of pictures in the 2s. 
He makes the same point as before - that when a proposition determines a place 
in logical space "the force of the proposition reaches through the whole of logical 
space" (TLP 3.42). 
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" A thought is a proposition with a sense" (TLP 4). 
In the Is Wittgenstein stated that the totality of facts is the world. Now he can 
state that the totality of propositions is language (TLP 4.001). As we saw in the 
Is, the reference to 'totality' hinges on the idea of logical form. Language and 
world share logical form. The Is, 2s and 3s describe the relation between 
language and world. Now, in the 4s, Wittgenstein uses the account of language he 
has outlined to discuss various problems that arise through misunderstandings of 
language. He also talks explicitly about the role of philosophy and the say-show 
distinction. 
Included in TLP 4.001-4.0641 is a discussion of the idea that a proposition 
with a sense, a thought, a logical picture and a fact are all equivalent because, 
although they have different elements, they all share the same logical form: "they 
are all in a sense one" (TLP 4.014). It is not the elements, whether names or 
objects, that are essential to the sense, it is the logical form. In the 4.1s we learn 
that logical form can be shown but cannot be said. For this reason the formal 
properties of objects and facts - logical properties and relations - cannot be said 
in language but are shown in language. 
The 4.1s discuss the relation between propositions and reality (the 
existence and non-existence of states of affairs). Here we look at what is actually 
the case and not the case. The 4.2s deal with how sense is first determined by 
what is possibly the case (possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of 
affairs). In the 4.1s Wittgenstein claims that the role of philosophy is not to state 
true propositions, i.e. not to say what is actually the case, as this is the work of the 
natural sciences. The role of philosophy is to clarify propositions, i.e. to make 
clear what it is possible to say in propositions that have sense. 
The 4.2s break propositions down into basic units of sense: elementary 
propositions. We looked at how names are arranged to form a proposition, now 
we look at the way elementary propositions are combined to produced sense. Each 
elementary proposition represents a possibility and when several truth-
possibilities are combined they represent a complex sense. The 4.3s discuss the 
truth-possibilities of elementary propositions and the 4.4s discuss truth-conditions 
of truth-possibilities of elementary propositions. 
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In the 4.4s Wittgenstein discusses the notions of tautology and 
contradiction (TLP 4.46-4.4661). He claims that "propositions show what they 
say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing" (TLP 4.461). 
When Wittgenstein reaches the 4.5s the background material has been put 
in place: in the Is and 2s he discussed objects in states of affairs. In the 3s he 
discussed pictures of states of affairs (thoughts), in the 4s he discussed the 
perceptible expression of thoughts (propositions). Now he is in a position to offer 
a positive account of the limits of what can be said. Wittgenstein proposes to give 
an account of the most general propositional form - in other words the necessary 
and sufficient criterion for something's being a proposition in any sign language. 
It will be the underlying form of any possible expression of sense, and anything 
that has the general propositional form will express a sense (TLP 4.5). In this way 
the general propositional form wil l determine once and for all the limits of what 
can be said in propositions with sense. 
"A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An 
elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself)" (TLP 5). 
The 5s are where Wittgenstein develops his account of general propositional form. 
This is the largest section of the Tractatus - totalling 150 remarks. It is a tightly 
constructed logical argument which builds up from elementary propositions to the 
general form of a proposition. 
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (TLP 5); thus 
elementary propositions are truth-arguments of propositions (TLP 5.01). Whereas 
elementary propositions are independent of one another (TLP 5.134), complex 
propositions share truth-grounds with one another (TLP 5.11). We can see this by 
looking at the internal relations between the structures of propositions (TLP 
5.131). Wittgenstein introduces the notion of an 'operation' as a way of giving 
prominence to the internal relations between the structures of propositions (TLP 
5.21); an operation is "what has to be done to the one proposition to make the 
other out of i t" (TLP 5.23). An example of an operation is negation (TLP 5.2341). 
Operations do not say anything (TLP 5.25), instead they show the difference 
between the forms of propositions (TLP 5.24 and 5.241). A truth-function is the 
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result of a series of operations (truth-operations) which takes one or more 
elementary propositions as bases (TLP 5.234). So, propositions are the result of 
truth-operations on elementary propositions (TLP 5.3). 
Wittgenstein introduces truth-operations as a step on the way to the 
general form of a proposition - he gives a single operation that can produce every 
truth-function when applied successively to elementary propositions (TLP 5.5). 
This is an indication that the general form of a proposition is essentially 
concerned with the internal, logical relations between propositions, again an 
emphasis on logical form. Right from the beginning, Wittgenstein made it clear 
that every thing that counts as a picture has logical form in common with what it 
depicts. It is therefore consistent with this position that the general form of a 
proposition will be based on his conception of logical form. 
"The general form of a truth-function is [p, N (4 ) ] . This is the general form 
of a proposition" (TLP 6). 
The general form of a proposition takes the set of all elementary propositions (p); 
then takes a selection of those elementary propositions as a variable then 
negates all the values of that variable N(^). See (TLP 5.501 and TLP 5.502). The 
result of this operation on elementary propositions wil l be a new proposition, but 
the point is that this proposition can be used as a base for the operation to be 
repeated any number of times. Given the totality of elementary propositions and 
this most general principle we can determine every possible proposition. Thus, 
every proposition is represented by the general form of a proposition: every 
proposition is the result of a series of operations on a selection of the totality of 
elementary propositions. Furthermore, i f something is not represented by this 
operation then it is not a proposition. This is how the general form of a 
proposition determines the limits of what can be said. Following TLP 6, the 6s 
discuss numerous implications which result i f we accept this formula as the 
general form of a proposition. 
In the 6.1s we are told that i f we accept the general form of a proposition 
then the propositions of logic are not really propositions - they say nothing (TLP 
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6.11) as they have no content (TLP 6.111). They do not picture possible states of 
affairs. 
In the 6.2s we are told that the propositions of mathematics are also not 
propositions - they do not express a thought (TLP 6.21). 
In the 6.3s we are told that many so-called 'laws' do not have a priori 
necessity, as the only necessity is logical necessity (TLP 6.37 & 6.375). The laws 
of causality, induction and conservation, for example are not laws about the 
world, they are laws about descriptions of the world (TLP 6.34). 
The 6.4s explore the implications of the idea that, i f we accept the general 
form of a proposition, then all propositions are of equal value (TLP 6.4). I f this is 
correct then there can be no propositions of ethics or aesthetics (TLP 6.42 & 
6.421) because these propositions would have to represent a higher value than 
other propositions. 
The 6.5s look at the implications of the general form of the proposition for 
philosophy. This section returns to the point Wittgenstein made in the Preface, 
when he said that one of his achievements was to show "how little is achieved 
when [the problems of philosophy] are solved" (TLP Preface p.4). The role of 
philosophy is to clear up misunderstandings of the logic of language. The 6.5s 
show that the problems of philosophy vanish because the general form of a 
proposition lets us see that in such problems once the confusion has been seen, 
then there is simply nothing to be said. The problem is that, i f this conclusion is 
true, it apparently creates self-reflexive incoherence. The remarks of the Tractatus 
appear to be propositional signs, but in fact they do not have general propositional 
form and hence do not picture a possible state of affairs. This means that the 
remarks of the Tractatus are nonsense. I f the remarks are nonsense then 
Wittgenstein's expression of his account of language is nonsense. TLP 6.54 
appears to be an admission of this paradox. 
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7). 
The final remark of the Tractatus has a different character to the previous major 
remarks. It does not add anything to the theory of language, but appears to ask us 
to choose silence rather than speak nonsense. The self-reflexive paradox created 
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by propositions 1-6 should remind us that Wittgenstein's initial warning was that 
this book "is not a textbook" (TLP Preface p.3). The question then arises: how are 
we to understand this book? 
3 The Philosophical Investigations 
The Investigations has two parts (PI 1 to PI 693 and PI I to PI XTV) the latter in a 
less revised state. There is debate amongst commentators about whether the 
material from part two should be treated as part of the whole. I make reference to 
points in part two where they help to clarify remarks made in part one. 
Wittgenstein tells us that in the Philosophical Investigations, his thoughts are 
presented as an "album" of "remarks" (PI Preface p.vii), and that he would like 
these remarks "to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI Preface p.viii). 
These points go some way to explaining his unusual style of writing. It is further 
explained when we look at his approach to philosophy. Most of his remarks about 
his own philosophy are clustered in PI 89-133, although some appear elsewhere in 
the text. We learn that his work brings together a collection of philosophical 
investigations from a 16 year period (PI Preface p.vii). He tells us that the general 
type of investigation he undertakes is "a grammatical one" (PI 90). This type of 
investigation has characteristic aims and methods which he describes, but mostly 
demonstrates through examples. His warning that "the series of examples can be 
broken o f f (PI 133) is a reminder that he wishes others to have thoughts of their 
own. There are methods for dealing with problems to be learnt from the 
Investigations, but not a doctrine to be received. 
(In giving all these examples I am not aiming at some kind of 
completeness, some classification of psychological concepts. They are 
only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when he encounters 
conceptual difficulties.) (PI p.206) 
The aim of the book is not merely to showcase Wittgenstein's philosophical 
achievements. It is to teach others "how to pass from a piece of disguised 
nonsense to something that is patent nonsense" (PI 464). 
A characteristic feature of the Investigations is that it does not just contain 
the author's voice. Instead, many of the numbered remarks are effectively a 
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dialogue between Wittgenstein and interlocutors. As a consequence many 
statements in the text do not present Wittgenstein's opinion, but are examples of 
the confusions that Wittgenstein calls the "raw material" of philosophy, namely 
"what we are 'tempted to say'" (PI 254). This is indicated in each case by phrases 
like: " I want to say . . ." (PI 452) "perhaps you wil l say . . ." (PI 184). 
Wittgenstein says that his investigations cover many subjects: "the 
concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations 
of mathematics, states of consciousness and other things" (PI Preface p.vii). In the 
following sections I use this list as subject headings, to look at how these subjects 
are dealt with by Wittgenstein as examples of philosophical confusion and 
misunderstanding. He gives voice to the philosophical problems, then deflates or 
dissolves them. In each case he shows that the answers we give to the problems 
are nonsense and the resolution lies in a different place - in a perspicuous 
representation of grammar. 
Meaning 
According to Wittgenstein, a certain "general notion of the meaning of a word 
surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision 
impossible" (PI 5). In other words, philosophy suffers from confused assumptions 
about meaning which make it difficult to dissolve problems in the philosophy of 
language. The general notion of meaning he refers to is a 'picture' of the essence 
of language which assumes that "every word has a meaning. This meaning is 
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands" (PI 1). The 
opening part of the Investigations (approximately PI 1-65) critically explores this 
picture. Wittgenstein does this in three ways: he unpacks the ideas that this picture 
leads us to have about meaning, e.g. that "words in language name objects" (PI 1), 
that "every word in language signifies something" (PI 13) and that "a name ought 
really to signify a simple" (PI 39). At the same time he uses a variety of methods 
to undermine these ideas and reveal them to be confusions. E.g. in the above 
examples, he undermines the idea that every word names an object (PI 26-7), that 
every word signifies (PI 10-15) and that reality is composed of simples (PI 46-50). 
Also at the same time he uses examples to encourage us to look and see how 
23 
Ch.2: The Tractatus and the Investigations 
meaning works in language e.g. that a word has "a family of meanings" (PI 77) 
and "for a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 
'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" 
(PI 43). 
To disperse the 'fog' generated by the general notion of meaning, 
Wittgenstein's main method is to "study the phenomena of language in primitive 
kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and 
functioning of words" (PI 5). These primitive kinds of application are what 
Wittgenstein calls "language-games" (PI 7). When Wittgenstein proposes to 
"apply the method" he says "let us consider a language-game for which this 
account is really valid" (PI 48). 
Throughout the Investigations Wittgenstein returns to the issue of meaning 
at various points, ending with a reminder - the final remark of the Investigations -
that "nothing is more wrongheaded than calling meaning a mental activity!" (PI 
693). 
Propositions 
The opening remarks of the Investigations (PI 1-20) are about words and 
meaning. The difference between words and sentences, and the issue of sense, 
first arises in PI 20. It appears that words have meaning and sentences have sense 
(PI 39), but a sign, such as 'R' can function as either a word or as a sentence 
depending on the context (PI 49). The point Wittgenstein makes is that in the case 
of sense, just as with meaning, we should look to the use a sign has in our 
language (PI 20). There is a multiplicity of different types of sentences (PI 23) 
because they fu l f i l a variety of different roles in our language. 
In PI 65 he gives voice to an objection - that his approach is unsatisfactory 
because it fails to ful f i l the most important task, namely to identify the general 
form of a proposition and the essence of language: "what is common to all these 
activities and what makes them into language or parts of language" (PI 65). This 
had been the task of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's response is to deny that such a 
task is needed: 
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Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am 
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes 
us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in 
many different ways. (PI 65) 
Wittgenstein's discussion of propositions follows on from this remark and forms a 
rough cluster of remarks between PI 65 and PI 137. His main point is that 
different types of language use are related by a "family resemblance" (PI 67) and 
it is in virtue of this that we call them all 'language' (PI 65). "What we call 
'sentence' and 'language' has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the 
family of structure more or less related to one another" (PI 108). 
Wittgenstein diagnoses the sorts of misunderstanding that has led 
philosophers to assume that propositions have mysterious characteristics: 
One person might say "a proposition is the most ordinary thing in the 
world" and another: "a proposition - that's something very queer!" and the 
latter is unable simply to look and see how propositions really work. The 
forms we use in expressing ourselves about propositions and thought stand 
in his way. (PI 93) 
To avoid this sort of mistake, which fails to see the ordinary use of words like 
'proposition', Wittgenstein proposes a method that can be used for other 
philosophical problems as well: 
When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", " I " , 
"proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words 
back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116) 
In PI 134-137 Wittgenstein conducts a short investigation into the notion of the 
general form of a proposition. While the proposition "this is how things are" had, 
perhaps in the Tractatus, been treated as an important discovery about the essence 
of language (PI 134), now Wittgenstein reveals that the remark has a meaning 
only insofar as it can be used as an ordinary sentence (PI 134). It has no special 
status as a philosophical claim because it has no application in our language: "to 
say that this proposition agrees (or disagrees) with reality would be obvious 
nonsense" (PI 134). Having revealed that this philosophical claim is merely a 
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confusion, Wittgenstein reminds the reader that we already have "a concept of 
what a proposition is, of what we take 'proposition' to mean" (PI 135). 
One of the most important points that Wittgenstein makes about 
propositions is the suggestion that our mistaken conception of propositions is one 
of the confusions that leads to "the subliming of our whole account of logic" (PI 
94). This is the next subject for consideration. 
Logic 
In the opening part of the Investigations, Wittgenstein mentions that the urge to 
specify exactly what counts as a name "springs from a tendency to sublime the 
logic of language" (PI 38). Most of his other remarks concerning logic are 
clustered between PI 81 and PI 133. Wittgenstein investigates the idea that 
philosophers, including himself in the Tractatus, have given accounts of language 
which assume that logic is a "calculus of definite rules" (PI 81). His point is that 
this is a serious misunderstanding: "in philosophy we often compare the use of 
words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone 
who is using language must be playing such a game" (PI 81). 
He simultaneously undermines the idea that rules could possibly function 
in the way that we imagined and shows that we can give explanations without 
such a rigid a conception of rules (PI 82-88). He returns to the subject of rules 
later in the Investigations (PI 198-208); there he demonstrates that any calculus of 
rules can be interpreted in different ways and it is impossible to guarantee the way 
that it wil l be applied in different situations (PI 201). Furthermore he undermines 
the idea that obeying a rule involves a particular mental state. He argues that 
obeying a rule is a public practice, not a private experience (PI 202). After 
dissolving the idea that logic is an ideal set of rules, he asks why we were led to 
imagine that logic must have such an idealised structure: "there seemed to pertain 
to logic a peculiar depth - a universal significance (PI 89); "we want to say that 
there can't be any vagueness in logic" (PI 101). Wittgenstein shows that the 
sublime conception of logic that we construct, based on these misunderstandings, 
is perfect and ideal, but for these very reasons it is utterly irrelevant to our real 
language. 
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We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain 
sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable 
to walk. (PI 107) 
Wittgenstein's point is that the rigour of logic was a picture that "held us captive" 
(PI 115) insofar as the "the crystalline purity of logic, was, of course, not a result 
of investigation: it was a requirement" (PI 107). His critique of logical 
investigation contrasts with own style of investigation which he calls 
"grammatical" rather than logical (PI 90). 
The Foundations of Mathematics 
Although Wittgenstein states that the Investigations deals with this subject, he 
actually says very little about the foundations of mathematics, except his remarks 
on continuing a numerical series in PI 143-155 and PI 185-190. This is possibly 
because most of his ideas on this theme were channelled into Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics. 
Understanding 
The main discussion of understanding is clustered around remarks PI 138-191, 
although Wittgenstein returns to the subject throughout the book. Wittgenstein 
raises the idea that when we understand the meaning of a word we seem to grasp 
the meaning "in a flash" (PI 138). This makes us think that our understanding of a 
word is different to the use of the word extended in time (PI 138). We get the idea 
that understanding is a 'picture' of the meaning present in our minds and then 
pursue the question of how this 'fits ' with the use of the word (PI 139). Thus there 
appear to be two criteria for understanding: the 'picture' in our mind and the 
'application' (PI 141). 
Wittgenstein 'reminds' us (PI 140), that the picture in the mind is 
inessential (PI 141) for two reasons: a word can give rise to several different 
pictures in the mind (PI 140) and the picture can be used in several different ways 
(PI 139). However, when the picture drops out as inessential, "the application is 
still a criterion of understanding" (PI 146). Although, as application is the part 
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that the word plays in the language-game (PI 11), there are many different forms 
that application can take. 
In PI 143 he introduces a language-game, where person B comes to 
understand a formation rule over a period of time and it makes no sense to talk 
about the specific moment where B suddenly understood. This contrasts with the 
language-game in PI 151, where B suddenly understands the law for the sequence 
of numbers at a specific moment. Wittgenstein describes lots of different 
scenarios that would count as understanding, to undermine the mistaken idea that 
"the understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use" (PI 146). 
Our mistake is to imagine "a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by 
means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge" (PI 149). He 
argues that "in the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) 
which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process" 
(PI 154). The problem stems from the fact that philosophers "try to get hold of the 
mental process of understanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser 
and therefore more readily visible accompaniments" (PI 153), when it is precisely 
the visible accompaniments that are the criteria for understanding: "it is the 
circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in 
such a case that he understands" (PI 155). 
States of Consciousness 
The second half of part one is a densely interwoven discussion of various states of 
consciousness. Wittgenstein discusses sensations such as pain and colour 
experience (PI 243-420), and mental states, such as expecting and willing (PI 570-
693). We have already seen that Wittgenstein undermines the pervasive idea that 
meaning and understanding are essentially mental states. In his investigations 
concerning states of consciousness, Wittgenstein's main point is that we are 
tempted to explain phenomena in terms of inner processes: "when we do 
philosophy, we should like to hypostatize feelings where there are none. They 
serve to explain our thoughts to us" (PI 598). But when we look at grammar we 
realise that the idea of the inner process does no work. 
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I f we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 
'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. 
(PI 293) 
In PI 246 Wittgenstein sets up a philosophical problem, "in what sense are my 
sensations private?" He uses this problem to demonstrate that many of the things 
we say about inner states are meaningless. In doing so he appeals to a distinction 
between grammatical and empirical propositions (PI 246-255). In PI 256 
Wittgenstein sets up another related problem: whether it is possible to have "a 
language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can 
understand". He investigates this through language-games (PI 258-264). First he 
asks us to consider an example of a man who keeps a diary of his sensations, 
using the sign "S". The shortcomings of this are made clear. In PI 270 the 
example is modified, to give the sign "S" a use - although now we find that it 
does not have the implications it was originally thought to have. He then uses a 
number of absurd examples (PI 265-268) to show the problems with the idea that 
experiences are private. 
In PI 243-315 Wittgenstein discusses sensations by using pain as the topic. 
In PI 316-342 he uses thinking as the topic. In PI 344-363 he discusses a more 
general list of philosophical problems which are based on misunderstandings of 
private states of consciousness: understanding (PI 348); pain (PI 350); meaning 
(PI 358); thinking (PI 361); calculating (PI 364). The general point he makes is 
that we have a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of mental states which 
causes confusions in all of these areas: 
It looks to us as i f the whole point of communication lay in this: someone 
else grasps the sense of my words - which is something mental: he as it 
were takes it into his own mind. I f he then does something further with it 
as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of language. (PI 363) 
In PI 570-693 Wittgenstein discusses numerous mental states: expecting (PI 572); 
hoping (PI 583); intending (PI 588 and PI 632-660); recognising (PI 602-605); 
conviction (PI 607); willing and voluntary action (PI 611-631); and attention (PI 
665-693). He says that the issue of mental states is often wrongly treated as 
though it requires an empirical investigation: "seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, 
willing, are not the subject of psychology in the same sense as that in which the 
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movements of bodies, the phenomena of electricity etc., are the subjects of 
physics" (PI 571). He insists that we need instead to understand the grammar of 
these states, for example by asking "what counts as a criterion for anyone's being 
in such a state?" (PI 572), where the answer must be something that has an 
application in language, not just a private experience: "an 'inner process' stands in 
need of outward criteria" (PI 580). 
Grammar 
Towards the end of part one, Wittgenstein brings together many of the topics he 
has covered, such as meaning, understanding and rule-following, in a general 
discussion of language (PI 487-569). Central to the subject of language is his 
conception of grammar. 
Early in the Investigations Wittgenstein uses the words grammar and 
language as though they are equivalent: "the word 'number' here shews what 
place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word" (PI 29). By 'language' 
Wittgenstein means "language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI 7); "to 
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI 19); "the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI 23). Moreover, forms of 
life can be said to be "what has to be accepted, the given" (PI p.226). Thus i f 
grammar is equivalent to language, it is language in this broad sense. This broad 
conception is why throughout the Investigations grammar is shown to have two 
aspects. It involves both the appearance and the application of language; both the 
form and the function of words. These two aspects are characterised in one remark 
as surface grammar and depth grammar respectively: "in the use of words one 
might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'" (PI 664). Surface 
grammar is described as "what immediately impresses itself upon us about the use 
of a word [...] the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its 
use - one might say - that can be taken in by the ear (PI 664). Depth grammar is 
the actual use of words, the role they play in our language. 
Unlike the conception of logic that he rejected earlier, Wittgenstein's 
conception of grammar is not a rigid schema of rules which determines what can 
be said in advance of future uses of language. 
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Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to 
fulf i l its purpose, in order to have such and such an effect on human 
beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs. (PI 496) 
The rules of grammar do not dictate how language can be used. The rules of 
grammar describe the function of language: the rules describe grammar. 
According to Wittgenstein, grammar is the application of words, but "the 
application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 84); "the rules of 
grammar may be called 'arbitrary', i f that is to mean that the aim of grammar is 
nothing but that of the language" (PI 497). He knows that someone will object 
that this destroys the rigour of logic "this seems to abolish logic, but does not do 
so" (PI 242). His response is to deflate the idea that this is will make language 
impossible: 
"So does it depend wholly on our grammar what wil l be called (logically) 
possible and what not, - i.e. what that grammar permits?" - But surely that 
is arbitrary! - Is it arbitrary? - It is not every sentence-like formulation 
that we know how to do something with, not every technique has an 
application in our life; and when we are tempted in philosophy to count 
some quite useless thing as a proposition, that is often because we have not 
considered its application sufficiently. (PI 520) 
The Tractatus 
Wittgenstein's conception of language in the Investigations is notably different to 
his earlier account of language in the Tractatus - particularly in terms of the 
central shift from logic to grammar. In the Preface to the Investigations 
Wittgenstein says that on his return to philosophy he was "forced to recognise 
grave mistakes" in what he wrote in the Tractatus (PI Preface p.vii). However, 
rather than merely reject the book he proposes a use for it, namely that his new 
thoughts "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the 
background of my old way of thinking" (PI Preface p.viii). 
Wittgenstein makes a number of explicit references to the Tractatus in the 
Investigations. He compares "the multiplicity of tools in language and of the ways 
they are used [.. .] with what logicians have said about the structure of language. 
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)" (PI 23). Having 
shown that it is "impossible to give an account of any primary element" (PI 46) he 
claims that "my objects (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary 
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elements" (PI 46). He refers to the Tractatus (TLP 5.563) when he describes the 
mistaken view that logic presents "the a priori order of the world: that is, the order 
of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought" (PI 97). He 
uses a remark from the Tractatus about the general form of propositions: "this is 
how things stand" (TLP 4.5) as though it is the voice of his interlocutor, who is 
expressing a particularly tempting misunderstanding. He comments: "that is the 
kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times" (PI 114). 
Elsewhere in the Investigations Wittgenstein makes references to his old 
way of thinking. His 'family resemblance' account of language is a response to a 
challenge from the Tractatus: "you let yourself of f the very part of the 
investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the 
general form of propositions and language" (PI 65). It appears that the list of 
subjects he covers in the Investigations is mainly motivated by what he sees as his 
previous view of language and logic: 
A l l this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained 
greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. 
For it wil l then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to 
think that i f anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is 
operating a calculus according to definite rules. (PI 81) 
Although it is possible to interpret the Investigations without reading it in 
conjunction with the Tractatus, the question of their relationship poses a 
significant challenge to interpreters of his work. This is not simply the case for 
those wishing to examine Wittgenstein's criticisms of the Tractatus, but more 
importantly for those who wish to understand the Investigations "in the right 
light". 
4 Desiderata 
Before outlining the desiderata for interpreting these texts, I first provide a point 
of comparison by mentioning considerations which would ordinarily be important. 
These are considerations which seem appropriate i f the texts are treated as 
ordinary works of philosophy - in what I have called the traditional conception of 
philosophy. A traditionally trained philosopher reading the Tractatus and 
Investigations would attempt to determine Wittgenstein's theory of language, his 
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theory of psychological states and his ontological doctrine. He or she would look 
for the justifications for these theories and probably expect to find a further theory 
which explains the relationship between thought, language and world. The 
arguments could be extracted from the texts as paraphrase, without loss of 
meaning. The propositions would be evaluated for their truth, in order to establish 
the overall soundness of his conclusions. At the very least the theory would be 
assessed for consistency and coherence - in other words a traditional philosopher 
could reasonably expect the theory of language to work when applied to the 
propositions in the texts. Traditional philosophers might also argue that the 
theories need to be seen in the context of a philosophical debate, and attempt to 
show that Wittgenstein's theses refute or support those of other philosophers -
particularly Frege and Russell. 
In contrast to such traditional considerations, the following desiderata are 
considerations which I believe an adequate interpretation of the Tractatus and 
Investigations ought to address. These are required i f we are to understand 
Wittgenstein's texts in terms of his own conception of philosophy, rather than 
from the perspective of the tradition from which he aims to escape. I do not 
defend each consideration here but raise them at appropriate junctures in the 
following chapters and return to the list in the final chapter. 
A good interpretation of either text will appreciate that Wittgenstein 
expressed dissatisfaction with the presentation of his ideas. It wil l take into 
account that Wittgenstein is simultaneously treating philosophical problems and 
introducing a new method for dissolving philosophical problems. It may shed 
light on the issue of why Wittgenstein did not consider it important to discuss the 
work of other historical figures in philosophy, as would normally be expected. 
In addition to these general points, the desiderata specific to an 
interpretation of the Tractatus are as follows: 
1. It wil l give credence to Wittgenstein's claim that "the whole sense of the book 
might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be 
said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" 
(TLP Preface p.3). 
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2. It wil l recognise that the Tractatus is "not a textbook" (TLP Preface p.3) and 
consider why the book might "be understood only by someone who has 
himself already had the thoughts expressed in i t" (TLP Preface p.3). 
3. It will consider why Wittgenstein felt it necessary to present the remarks in an 
idiosyncratic style - with the sequence of remarks numbered in order of 
logical importance. 
4. It will present an account of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the 
Tractatus - both what he took himself to be doing and what he hoped other 
philosophers would do. This will include his remarks about the "correct 
method" for philosophy, the difference between philosophy and science, the 
view that philosophy is an activity not a body of doctrine and that philosophy 
results in clarification of propositions not philosophical propositions. 
5. It wil l explain why Wittgenstein believed that in the Tractatus he had found 
"on all essential points the final solution of the problems [of philosophy]" 
(TLP Preface p.4). 
6. It will explain the significance of the general form of a proposition and 
explain why Wittgenstein felt that his task was to draw a limit to the 
expression of thought (TLP Preface p.4). 
7. It wil l deal with the problems created by TLP 6.54. It needs to explain how the 
Tractatus consists of elucidations, yet the elucidations are to be thrown away 
as nonsense, including the remark that tells us that the elucidations are 
nonsense. 
8. It wil l explain why the Tractatus contains the distinctive claim "what can be 
shown, cannot be said" (TLP 4.1212). It will use the say-show distinction to 
explain why certain notions, such as logical relations and formal concepts, are 
shown but cannot be said. 
9. It wil l be able to explain why Wittgenstein considered the Tractatus a success 
when he published the book in 1920, and why he subsequently claimed " I 
have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first 
book" (PI Preface p.viii). 
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The desiderata specific to an interpretation of the Investigations are as follows: 
1. It will explain why the Investigations can "be seen in the right light only by 
contrast with and against the background of [Wittgenstein's] old way of 
thinking" (PI Preface p.viii). 
2. It wil l explain why "the very nature of the investigation" compelled 
Wittgenstein to present his ideas as an "album" of "remarks" or "sketches" (PI 
Preface p.vii), and why the remarks could not be forced into a single ordered 
sequence. 
3. It will appreciate why Wittgenstein states " I should not like my writing to 
spare other people the trouble of thinking. But i f possible to stimulate 
someone to thoughts of his own" (PI Preface p.viii). 
4. It will be sensitive to the polyphony of the text and consider which of the 
voices, i f any, represent Wittgenstein's own views. 
5. It will present an account of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the 
Investigations - both what he took himself to be doing and what he hoped 
other philosophers would do. This will include his remarks that there are many 
methods not a method; that philosophy must use descriptions rather than 
explanations; that complete clarity will mean that philosophical problems 
completely disappear. 
6. It wil l be able to point out which aspects of the Investigations are in agreement 
with ideas in the Tractatus and which aspects are criticisms of ideas in the 
Tractatus. 
A study of the Tractatus and Investigations may legitimately prioritise specific 
issues; in particular I see it as my task to highlight aspects that have not received 
sufficient attention. The two questions I consider most important are: how should 
we interpret the say-show distinction in the Tractatus? And, how should we 
understand the relation between the Tractatus and Investigations? In my view, i f 
we accept that the say-show distinction is crucial for understanding the Tractatus 
and that the Tractatus is crucial for understanding the Investigations, then the say-
show distinction is crucial for understanding the Investigations. 
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Chapter 3: Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
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2.2 Therapeutic Readings 
2.3 An Elucidatory Reading 
3 Summary and Comment 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I assess three types of reading: Metaphysical, Therapeutic and 
Elucidatory. The notion of a reading is more than just a convenient label for 
grouping commentators who hold similar but not identical views and making 
comparisons between opposing views. I take a reading to be any study of 
Wittgenstein's work which attempts to take into account his own views about 
philosophy and the task of a philosophical work, and therefore attempts to 
understand his work on its own terms. The three readings I discuss here provide 
an interpretation of the role of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus, and 
attempt to use Wittgenstein's work on its own terms, though in different ways. 
The considerations which they address include some of those listed in my 
desiderata, such as the problem of self-refutation - when the text says that the text 
is nonsense in TLP 6.54; and whether to read the Tractatus as a work which 
contains doctrines, or a work which embodies the claim that philosophy is "not a 
body of doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112). The latter is particularly important 
because it indicates whether or not a commentator treats the say-show distinction 
as a doctrine. Standard interpretations of Wittgenstein's work, which do not 
attempt to read the work on its own terms, have no need to call themselves 
'readings' - they simply treat the work as they would any other philosophical text. 
Rather than discuss all the available interpretations of the Tractatus my 
aim is to assess available interpretations of the say-show distinction, so I put to 
one side those interpretations of the Tractatus which do not address the distinction 
- those which ignore it or dismiss it out of hand. Furthermore, my aim is to assess 
interpretations of the say-show distinction, rather than descriptions or uses of the 
distinction. This means that I discuss commentators who give a reasonably 
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detailed account of how the say-show distinction should be interpreted within the 
context of reading the Tractatus, rather than those who comment on, or appeal to, 
the distinction but do not reflect on how the distinction is to be properly 
understood and integrated into the Tractatus. So, my assessment is limited to 
those interpretations of the say-show distinction which are integrated into a 
'reading' of the Tractatus. I discount interpretations which deal with the Tractatus 
independently of the say-show distinction and vice versa. 
2 Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
I first discuss Metaphysical Readings (2.1), which are the dominant way of 
reading the Tractatus. The label was introduced by supporters of Cora Diamond, 
when she identified a common approach in most commentators' readings of the 
Tractatus and targeted this 'family' of readings for criticism. Next I discuss 
Therapeutic Readings (2.2), which are offered as an alternative to Metaphysical 
Readings by Diamond and others. Finally I consider an Elucidatory Reading 
proposed by Marie McGinn (2.3) which aims to offer a 'third way' between the 
Metaphysical and Therapeutic Readings. 
The debate between the Metaphysical and Therapeutic readings is a hot 
topic amongst Wittgenstein scholars at present, and positions are evolving rapidly 
in the light of criticism and counter-argument. The labels I use are not ones all 
commentators still accept. Some now prefer to contrast 'Irresolute readings' with 
'Resolute readings' (Goldfarb 1997, 64) or to speak about "Post-modernist 
readings' (Hacker 2000, 356), 'Austere readings' (Williams 2002) and even 
'esoteric and quietist readings' (Williams 2002). But despite increasingly complex 
refinements and some factional members, the fundamental differences that 
distinguish the main positions can be explained quite clearly and I have chosen to 
retain the titles that were used when the contrast between these readings first 
emerged. The labels only signify that I attribute a certain type of reading to a 
commentator, not that the commentator takes themselves to be offering that type 
of reading. 
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2.1 Metaphysical Readings1 
Metaphysical Readings of the Tractatus characteristically claim the following: 
first Wittgenstein presents (what looks like) an ontological theory, which claims 
that the world consists of simple objects configured in states of affairs. This is the 
condition for the possibility of propositions having sense. Next Wittgenstein 
makes us see that, due to the logical limitations of what can be expressed in 
propositions with sense, the ontological theory is an example of something that 
cannot be said. Finally Wittgenstein asks us to 'throw away' the attempt to state 
theories that cannot be said, and realise that the transcendental or metaphysical 
features of language and reality are things that can only be shown, but cannot be 
said, so we must be silent about them. Included in the category of 'things that can 
only be shown, but cannot be said' are ethics, aesthetics, the logical form of 
reality and the relationship between language and the world. For present purposes, 
there are two significant sub-groups with the general category of Metaphysical 
Readings: some writers claim that Wittgenstein is a metaphysical realist, they 
argue that "what is shown" are features of reality. Other writers treat Wittgenstein 
as a transcendental or linguistic idealist, they argue that "what is shown" are the 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of language or thought.2 The huge 
differences between these groups do not matter here since both share the view that 
the Tractatus has a doctrine of ineffable content even though they disagree what 
that content is. 
Metaphysical Readings of the say-show distinction suppose that 
Wittgenstein believed it to be an important philosophical doctrine. The doctrine 
states that there are metaphysical features of language and reality which cannot be 
1 The list of people who give a Metaphysical Reading includes Bertrand Russell, Frank Ramsey, 
Otto Neurath, Elizabeth Anscombe, Max Black (1964), Sachindranath Ganguly (1968), Norman 
Malcolm (1986), Peter Geach (1976), David Pears (1987), Brian McGuinness (1966 and 1988), 
the Hintikkas (1981 and 1986), Gordon Baker (1988) Peter Hacker (2000 and 2002), Hodges 
(1990), Richard Brockhaus (1991), Hans-Johann Glock (1996) and John Koethe (1996). Not all 
agree to precisely the same reading of the Tractatus, but there is a 'family' of overlapping 
characteristics which the group as a whole shares and which represent a distinctive interpretative 
position. See David Stern (1994, 419) for a clear example. Partial versions of this list are given by: 
McGinn (1999,491), Conant (2000) and Hacker (2000, 357). 
2 Different versions of this idea are found in David Cooper (1991), Bernard Williams (1981) and 
Jonathan Lear (1982). 
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put into words, but language can nonetheless show these features. The claim 
"what can be shown, cannot be said" (TLP 4.1212) is held to commit 
Wittgenstein to a thesis about ineffable truths. "What cannot be said" is the 
ineffable realm beyond the limits of what can be said. The say-show distinction is 
between two types of expression: 'saying' applies to ordinary empirical facts, 
'showing' applies to ineffable metaphysical truths.4 
Thus far it appears that a Metaphysical Reading is simply one that 
proposes that the Tractatus contains a doctrine about ineffable content. However, 
this is not the whole story. Metaphysical Readings also attribute a double aspect to 
the say-show distinction - it is a doctrine about ineffability (about what can only 
be shown, not said) and the doctrine itself is ineffable (it can only be shown, not 
said). Metaphysical Readings are forced into this paradoxical position due to two 
problems. The first problem is that the Tractatus explicitly rejects philosophical 
theorising about metaphysics.5 To avoid this difficulty, Metaphysical Readings 
use TLP 6.54 to argue that the apparent metaphysical views are a 'ladder' to be 
thrown away. Throwing away the explicit metaphysical theory is an 
acknowledgement that we cannot express metaphysical insights in words - they 
are ineffable and show themselves.6 The role of the say-show distinction is thus to 
turn the ordinary metaphysical doctrines into ineffable metaphysical doctrines and 
thereby rescue the Tractatus from incoherence.7 The solution to the first problem 
rests on the say-show distinction, but gives rise to the second problem: i f the say-
show distinction is correct, then one of the things that cannot be said is the say-
3 "What lies beyond the limits of language cannot be asserted in language, but can only be shown" 
(Pears 1971, 51). "The essential structure of reality [...] is something which can only be shown" 
(Pears 1971, 84). "It is thus the world-language links, and these links only, that cannot be said but 
can be shown according to Wittgenstein" (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986, 6). "The 'logical space' of 
the Tractatus is what 'showing' in the Tractatus showed" (Irving Block 1980, 236). 
4 "Showing and saying are language's two forms of expression. Silence in the domain of what can 
only be shown speaks profusely." (Judith Genova 1995, 103). There is a contrast between "the 
nonfactual realm of what is shown or manifested and the realm of the factual" (Koethe 1996, 57). 
"Showing, in my view, thus is a kind of second-rate saying" (Koethe 1996,38). 
5 TLP 6.53. 
6 "One is left holding on to some ineffable truths about reality after one has thrown away the 
ladder" (Hacker 2000, 357). "Philosophy will express clearly what can be said and thereby show 
the limit of thought. This is the same as showing what cannot be said or thought" (Ganguly 1968, 
110). 
7 The say-show distinction is judged to be "a way for Wittgenstein to eat his cake and have it too" 
(Edwards 1985,23). 
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show distinction itself - and most of the Tractatus. In response to this, 
Metaphysical Readings say that, although Wittgenstein cannot put 'what shows 
itself into words, the Tractatus is nonetheless able to convey it - specifically it 
shows it rather than says it. In other words the doctrine of saying and showing is 
not just about ineffable content, it is itself ineffable. This view of the say-show 
distinction is characteristic of Metaphysical Readings. 
A significant merit of Metaphysical Readings is that they place great 
emphasis on the central role of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus} 
However, there are several problems with their conception of the distinction. First 
I summarise Diamond's attack on Metaphysical Readings of the Tractatus; then I 
criticise more specifically the way that Metaphysical Readings interpret the say-
show distinction and explain why I reject this kind of interpretation. 
Although Metaphysical Readings appeal to the framing remarks, Diamond 
claims that they do not take TLP 6.54 seriously enough - instead they 'chicken 
out'. To 'chicken out' is to pretend to 'throw away the ladder', but actually retain 
the idea that you are left holding on to ineffable metaphysical truths, or an 
ineffable vision of reality.9 Diamond describes 'chickening out' thus: 
It looks as though there is this whatever-it-is, the logical form of reality, 
some essential feature of reality, which reality has all right, but which we 
cannot say or think that it has. What exactly is supposed to be left of that, 
after we have thrown away the ladder? Are we going to keep the idea that 
there is something or other in reality that we gesture at, however badly, 
when we speak of 'the logical form of reality', so that it, what we were 
gesturing at, is there, but cannot be expressed in words? (Diamond 1995, 
181) 
Metaphysical Readings throw away some of the nonsensical remarks of the 
Tractatus but keep hold of a metaphysics that can only be shown but not said and 
McGinn claims that they also have the following strengths: they make the Tractatus seem 
profound because "there is something behind his remarks" (McGinn 1999, 496); they diagnose 
why what lies behind Wittgenstein's remarks cannot be said (McGinn 1999, 496); and they give 
the positive idea that we are left able to 'see the world aright' (McGinn 1999, 492). Hacker claims 
that the strength of his own metaphysical reading is that it is true to Wittgenstein's thought - it is 
the real reading, not just an ironic reading (Hacker 2000). 
9 Conant describes an example. Although Brian McGuinness accepts that certain aspects of the 
Tractatus are self-refuting, such as the supposed ontological theory in the opening sections; 
nonetheless he hangs on to the idea that the Tractatus can show ineffable truths about language or 
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a doctrine of saying and showing that can only be shown but not said. Against 
this, Diamond argues: 
'What cannot be said', is not something that is unsayably so. The 
Tractatus, that is, is not an attack on metaphysics as merely unsayable. 
What cannot be thought, cannot be thought and not cheating on that means 
not treating 'cannot be thought' as meaning unsayably so. (Diamond 1995, 
32) 
Defenders of Metaphysical Readings respond by insisting that, even i f the 
criticism is correct, this interpretation nonetheless represents Wittgenstein's view. 
In other words, i f commentators 'chicken out', it is only because Wittgenstein 
himself 'chickened out'. Likewise, i f they attribute an incoherent doctrine of 
saying and showing to Wittgenstein, they are right to do so because Wittgenstein 
himself put forward an incoherent doctrine, albeit unwittingly. To back this up 
they argue that the incoherence of the say-show distinction is something that 
Wittgenstein himself later recognised and which caused him to reject the 
Tractatus.10 
I think that this defence is less convincing than it first appears - not least 
because it does not defend a useful interpretation of the distinction but simply 
justifies interpreting the distinction as a failure. I consider it significant that so 
many defenders of Metaphysical Readings are happy to accept that the say-show 
distinction is unsuccessful; it is a curious feature of this type of reading that it is 
more often used to attack the say-show distinction than to defend it. I think that 
this is because Metaphysical Readings of saying and showing contain a 
presupposition which makes the distinction deeply flawed. The presupposition is 
that the Tractatus should be read as though it is a traditional work of philosophical 
doctrine. This assumption can be traced to the original reception of the Tractatus, 
particularly Russell's influential view that the Tractatus expresses a doctrine of 
ineffable metaphysics. He describes "Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis" as the 
view that "it is impossible to say anything about the world as a whole" (TLP 
ethics: "for McGuinness, even after the edifice of explicit doctrine crumbles, a hidden ghost of 
ineffable doctrine remains hovering over the debris" (Conant 1991a, 339). 
1 0 The latter line of defence is used by Hacker: "the exegetical task is to make sense of his thinking 
what he thought, not to make sense of what he thought, since we have it on his own (later) 
authority that what he thought was confused" (Hacker 2000, 370). 
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Introduction p.xvii). His objection: "after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a 
good deal about what cannot be said" (TLP Introduction p.xxi) is an often 
repeated complaint in the literature and is still treated as a knock-down 
objection.11 
My point is that the assumption that the Tractatus should be read as a 
traditional work of philosophical doctrine drives us onto the horns of a dilemma: 
the say-show distinction must either be a paradoxical, ineffable doctrine, or an 
incoherent doctrine. Both are unpalatable alternatives. I f commentators wish to 
defend the distinction against incoherence by insisting that it is ineffable; they will 
at least be charged with attempting to say what Wittgenstein himself said (or even 
showed) could not be said;12 or worse still, their position will be defeated by 
Diamond's objection. The other alternative is to accept that the distinction is an 
incoherent, self-refuting doctrine - one which should be rejected because it does 
attempt to say what it says cannot be said.13 It should be noted that even though 
these views are opposing theses, they have in common the assumption that the 
say-show distinction is a philosophical doctrine, whether coherent or incoherent, 
which is communicated in some manner by the Tractatus and still retained at the 
end - after the 'ladder' has been thrown away. 
My reason for rejecting all the Metaphysical Readings is that they interpret 
the Tractatus from a standpoint which still retains a traditional conception of 
philosophy. They ignore or dismiss the remarks in the Tractatus that claim that 
genuine philosophy is activity not doctrine, and they consequently assume that the 
text conveys doctrines. Although Metaphysical Readings give a pivotal role to the 
say-show distinction in the Tractatus - usually treating it as the most important 
doctrine in the Tractatus - they do so at the unacceptable price of making the 
doctrine a failure. It will not be possible to look for a positive role for the say-
Hacker's most recent defence of his Metaphysical Reading puts great emphasis on Ramsey's 
famous criticism: "what we can't say, we can't say and we can't whistle it either" (Hacker 2000, 
355). Hacker concludes that Wittgenstein "was indeed, as Ramsey claimed, trying to whistle it" 
(Hacker 2000, 382). 
1 2 Some commentators claim that their commentary shows but does not say what Wittgenstein's 
say-show distinction shows but does not say. E.g. Roy Lemoine (1975) and James Edwards 
(1985). I criticise this approach in Chapter 4. 
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show distinction in Wittgenstein's Investigations unless we first establish that it is 
successful in the Tractatus. We need to look beyond the two alternatives of 
ineffability or incoherence offered by Metaphysical Readings. 
2.2 Therapeutic Readings 1 4 
Therapeutic Readings of the Tractatus typically run as follows: Wittgenstein 
expects the reader to go through the stages described by the Metaphysical 
Readings, first a straightforward ontological theory and theory of language; 
second the realisation that according to the theory of language the metaphysical 
claims cannot be said; third the understanding that metaphysical doctrines 
necessarily have ineffable content, so the say-show distinction is itself ineffable. 
Having reached the third stage, however, there is still one more stage to undergo -
the reader must realise that the idea of metaphysical 'truths' that can be shown but 
not said is nonsensical, and must 'throw away' the temptation to accept this idea. 
The reader then understands that there are no 'unsayable' features of reality 
expressed either by 'showing' or a special type of nonsense, but only sentences 
which say something and nonsensical combinations of words which do not. 1 5 
Therapeutic Readings are not primarily concerned with the say-show 
distinction, but with the issue of sense and nonsense. According to Therapeutic 
Readings, the paradox or incoherence of the supposed doctrine of saying and 
showing is not an indication that Wittgenstein made a mistake in the Tractatus 
that he realised only later. The say-show distinction is simply one of many 
examples of philosophical nonsense of which Wittgenstein aims to cure us - just 
"His theories were good metaphysical theories. Admittedly they made the general metaphysical 
mistake of trying to say what can only be shown. But he claimed that what they tried to say is 
something valid" (Pears 1971, 53). 
1 4 A 'Therapeutic Reading' or 'Therapeutic Strategy' is a label for the family of ideas which 
appear in Diamond's work and the work of her supporters. According to Marie McGinn, the 
principal advocates of a therapeutic strategy along with Diamond are James Conant, Thomas 
Ricketts and Warren Goldfarb (McGinn 1999, 492). According to Ricketts, sympathisers also 
include Peter Hylton, Burton Dreben and Juliet Floyd (Ricketts 1996, 99). The recently published 
The New Wittgenstein (2000) is a collection of articles by commentators who have added their 
support to this position. 
1'According to Conant, at the end of the Tractatus, when we have thrown away the ladder, we are 
left with absolutely nothing, not a nothing that points at something that cannot be said (Conant 
1991, 337). Conant claims that the silence invoked by TLP 7 "is one in which nothing has been 
said and there is nothing to say (of the sort we imagined there to be" (Conant 1992, 216). 
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one rung of the ladder which the Tractatus asks us to throw away. Therapeutic 
Readings give a purely deflationary account of the say-show distinction: the 
notion of a distinction between saying and showing is entirely nonsensical, it 
makes no more sense than a distinction between piggly and wiggly. The only 
significant difference is that a piggly/wiggly distinction is obvious nonsense, 
whereas a say-show distinction appears to have sense and thus generates 
philosophical confusion. 
Therapeutic Readings take Wittgenstein's instructions very seriously. 
Diamond stresses the significance of "the sentences which frame the book, in the 
Preface and the final remarks" (Diamond 1995, 18), particularly TLP 6.54 which 
expresses the idea that the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they are a 
ladder which must be thrown away at the end of the book. According to Diamond, 
i f we take the frame seriously we realise that the important thing is not to 'chicken 
out'. 1 8 A non-chickening out interpretation of the say-show distinction is thus 
entirely deflationary: 
We are so convinced that we understand what we are trying to say that we 
see only the two possibilities: it is sayable, it is not sayable. But 
Wittgenstein's aim is to allow us to see that there is no it. (Diamond 1995, 
198) 
According to Ricketts, the say-show distinction is introduced as a cure for the incoherence of the 
Tractatus, but is then itself revealed to be irredeemably incoherent. "There is no resolution of the 
incoherence of Wittgenstein's rhetoric of saying and showing" (Ricketts 1996, 94). 
1 7 Diamond argues that there are not different logical categories of nonsense - "nonsense sentences 
are as it were internally all the same" (Diamond 2000, 159). However there is a significant 
psychological difference between seeing a nonsensical sentence as nonsense and seeing the 
sentence as though it has sense. We can "distinguish nonsense-sentences by the external 
circumstances of their utterance" (Diamond 2000, 161). Although there is no logical difference 
between the say-show distinction and the piggly/wiggly distinction - they are both nonsense; there 
is a psychological difference - one is treated as though it has sense and the other is not. 
1 8 "What counts as not chickening out is then this, roughly: to throw the ladder away is, among 
other things, to throw away in the end the attempt to take seriously the language of 'features of 
reality'. To read Wittgenstein himself as not chickening out is to say that it is not, not really, his 
view that there are features of reality that cannot be put into words but show themselves" 
(Diamond 1995, 181). Goldfarb dislikes the term "chickening out" so introduces the terms 
'Resolute' and 'Irresolute' to describe readings which do or do not entirely throw away the ladder 
(Goldfarb 1997a, 64). Hence, although Goldfarb and Koethe refer to Diamond's position as a 
Resolute Reading (ibid, and Koethe 1996, 37), this is not equivalent to the term "Therapeutic 
Reading". A Therapeutic Reading is one which takes the aim of the Tractatus to be therapeutic and 
not all Resolute Readings do this. 
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The distinction between saying and showing is simply one more nonsensical 
aspect of the Tractatus that has to be thrown away. She says: "the notion of 
something true of reality but not sayably true is to be used only with the 
awareness that it itself belongs to what has to be thrown away" (Diamond 1995, 
182). 
The strength of Therapeutic Readings is that they can accept everything 
the Metaphysical Readings have to offer, including the conception of the say-
show distinction as an ineffable doctrine about the ineffability of metaphysics, but 
then go on to point out that the final move has yet to be made before the reading 
counts as an understanding of the Tractatus. The final move is that everything 
Metaphysical Readings have to offer must be thrown away. In this way the reader 
is given therapy to cure their philosophical confusion. Throwing away the ladder 
is "the final step in the philosophical journey" (Diamond 1995, 3). 
I turn now to criticisms of Therapeutic Readings.19 Critics such as Peter 
Hacker (2002), Lynette Reid (1998), John Koethe (1996), Meredith Williams 
(2002) and Peter Sullivan (2002) primarily attack the way that Therapeutic 
Readings understand the Tractatus rather than its conception of the say-show 
distinction. Hacker's criticism, which is actually a defence of his Metaphysical 
Reading, is to argue that this type of reading is not sufficiently faithful to the text 
and to Wittgenstein's correspondence.20 Reid and Koethe focus on the objection 
that Therapeutic Readings generate an unacceptable paradox - the text is utter 
nonsense and yet somehow says that it is utter nonsense.21 Defenders of 
Therapeutic Readings have responses to these objections and the debate remains a 
live issue. My specific concern is to discuss how Therapeutic Readings interpret 
the say-show distinction, so I shall first consider the most relevant criticisms 
raised by Marie McGinn, and then introduce further objections of my own. 
1 9 Hacker is a prominent critic, who uses the term 'post-modernist interpretation' instead of the 
Therapeutic Reading label (2000, 360). Koethe also criticises Diamond's position but calls it the 
"Resolute Reading", following Goldfarb (Koethe 1996,37). 
2 0 Hacker sets up what he calls a "pincer movement" of internal and external evidence to object to 
Therapeutic Readings (Hacker 2000, 360ff.). 
2 1 See Reid (1998). Hacker makes a similar point when he argues that Therapeutic Readings are 
"methodologically inconsistent" (Hacker 2000, 360). See also McGinn (1999, 496). Diamond has 
argued that the remarks of the Tractatus should be taken as 'transitional nonsense' (Diamond 
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McGinn is sympathetic to Therapeutic Readings, over Metaphysical 
Readings, but argues that the former are inadequate with respect to their treatment 
of saying and showing. Although Therapeutic Readings take the Preface and TLP 
6.54 far more seriously than Metaphysical Readings, according to McGinn they 
neglect the say-show distinction (McGinn 1999, 496). This criticism is well 
founded. Therapeutic Readings claim that Wittgenstein's primary aim in the 
Tractatus is to cure us of philosophical illness by teaching us to recognise and 
reject nonsense. Diamond and others do not totally disregard the say-show 
distinction, indeed Diamond notes that the say-show distinction is "central" to the 
Tractatus (Diamond 1988, 5). But their deflationary account accords the 
distinction insufficient importance insofar as they treat it as nothing more than one 
among many nonsensical pseudo-doctrines which are to be thrown away. I agree 
with McGinn that it is important to give the distinction a more significant role, 
rather than treat it as nothing more than part of the nonsense that is to be rejected. 
McGinn's main objection is that there is an assumption which is shared by 
both Metaphysical Readings and Therapeutic Readings; and this assumption is a 
false dilemma: 
The metaphysical and therapeutic approaches to TLP offer us the 
unappealing alternative between reading Wittgenstein's remarks as 
nonsense that conveys ineffable truths about the world, and as nonsense 
that conveys nothing whatsoever. (McGinn 1999, 498) 
For my purposes, I restate McGinn's criticism specifically in terms of the say-
show distinction as follows: the two dominant interpretations of the say-show 
distinction present us with a false dichotomy: either the say-show distinction 
entails that there are 'truths' or 'thoughts' that can be shown but not said, in which 
case the distinction is an important philosophical doctrine; or the say-show 
distinction is utter nonsense that must be dispensed with without remainder. In the 
former case we end up with an incoherent notion of something that can be shown 
but not said. In the latter case we end up with saying and showing as nothing more 
than a distinction between piggly and wiggly. McGinn's point is that although 
2000), but even Goldfarb, who endorses her view, admits that this issue poses a "deep difficulty" 
for any Therapeutic reading (Goldfarb 1997, 72). 
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Therapeutic Readings are right to reject the former conception of the say-show 
distinction, they are wrong to imagine that the latter conception is the correct or 
sole alternative. I consider McGinn's own response to this dilemma in the next 
section (2.3). 2 2 
McGinn provides two strong objections: Therapeutic Readings fail to give 
the say-show distinction a central role; and the Metaphysical and Therapeutic 
Readings occupy opposing horns of a dilemma. Now another criticism can be 
made, which links both of these objections and goes a step further. 
The problem, as I see it, is that both Metaphysical and Therapeutic 
Readings start with the same assumption: that the Tractatus is to be read as a 
work of philosophical doctrine. This assumption is the root of the dilemma that 
McGinn has identified. The difference is that Metaphysical Readings claim that 
we should eventually realise that the Tractatus conveys an ineffable doctrine, 
whereas Therapeutic Readings claim that we should eventually realise that it 
conveys a pseudo-doctrine. My point is that both readings start from a standpoint 
that remains wedded to some commitments from traditional philosophy. Both 
ultimately argue that Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is unusual, even radical, 
but they do not read the Tractatus from this standpoint to begin with. Although I 
established that Metaphysical Readings are influenced by the traditional 
standpoint, it does not immediately seem right to say that Therapeutic Readings 
make the same mistake. It appears obvious that Therapeutic Readings support the 
idea that "philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112). 
Specifically they see the activity of philosophy as the therapeutic removal of 
nonsense - including pseudo-doctrines. Using the idiom of 'therapy', Therapeutic 
Readings characterise reading the Tractatus as a process, journey, or series of 
Moore is another commentator who rejects both Therapeutic and Metaphysical Readings. He 
says the Tractatus is not just a "tissue of gibberish" as Therapeutic Readings suggest (Moore 1997, 
152). Instead: "Wittgenstein does believe in things that are beyond representation. In his own 
terminology, there are things that, though they cannot be said, can be shown" (Moore 1997, 152). 
This sounds as though Moore is defending a Metaphysical Reading of the say-show distinction, 
but he is not. Although Moore believes, like McGinn that Therapeutic Readings fail to give a 
sufficiently substantial role to the say-show distinction, he does not accept Metaphysical Readings 
because he accepts Diamond's criticism of that approach: "I want to distance myself from the 
absurdity that the things we are shown are things that can be interpreted as having an 
'inexpressible' content" (Moore 1997, 200). Although Moore develops a version of the say-show 
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changes undergone by the reader. However, this on its own is not sufficient to 
avoid my objection. The point is that, although Therapeutic Readings end up with 
a conception of Wittgenstein's philosophy as an activity, they nonetheless start by 
reading the text as a traditional doctrine. In other words, the final message of the 
Tractatus is that philosophy is an activity (therapy), but to convey this message it 
has to be read first as a doctrine which is then 'thrown away'. So, my objection is 
that, ironically, the Therapeutic Readings are guilty of a type of 'chickening out' -
they take seriously the idea that Wittgenstein sees philosophy as activity rather 
than as doctrine, but do not take seriously enough the idea that Wittgenstein's text 
must be read right from the start as activity not as doctrine. 
This starting point explains why Therapeutic Readings fail to give a 
sufficiently important role to the say-show distinction. Therapeutic Readings 
characterise the different elements of the Tractatus that are thrown away as 
individual 'rungs' of a ladder,23 hence the say-show distinction is just one rung on 
the ladder.24 The say-show distinction has to be first read as a doctrine, then as a 
pseudo-doctrine, then thrown away. Even i f the say-show distinction is the most 
important pseudo-doctrine in the Tractatus, it is still secondary to the final 
therapeutic gesture of throwing away the ladder. In short: the say-show distinction 
is not crucial to the therapeutic activity, instead we get therapy by throwing the 
say-show distinction away. 
To sum up: the merit of Therapeutic Readings is that they take the Preface 
and concluding remarks of the Tractatus more seriously than Metaphysical 
Readings. However, they fail to privilege the role of the say-show distinction in 
the Tractatus. To understand the say-show distinction it is important to treat it as 
more than just "part of the nonsense".25 
distinction which departs from Wittgenstein's texts (and so is not discussed here) his view serves 
to emphasise the need for an alternative to the two main readings of the say-show distinction. 
2 3 E.g. Diamond says that when we see as nonsensical Wittgenstein's remark "about philosophy's 
being able to talk about the self in a non-psychological way" then we "throw away the ladder of 
which it is a rung" (Diamond 1995, 3). 
2 4 Conant says: "the doctrine of ineffable content represents one of the rungs of the ladder the 
reader of the Tractatus must ascend and surmount - and [...] in the end, throw away" (Conant 
1991a, 340). 
2 5 According to Hacker, for a Therapeutic Reading, "the distinction between what can be said and 
what can only be shown but not said is itself part of the nonsense that is to be discarded" (Hacker 
2000,358). 
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2.3 An Elucidatory Reading 
According to McGinn, neither a Metaphysical Reading nor a Therapeutic Reading 
"provides a fully satisfactory resting place" (McGinn 1999, 496). Her own 
Elucidatory Reading aims for synthesis of the two interpretations previously 
considered - she hopes to incorporate the strengths of both and the weaknesses of 
neither (McGinn 1999, 496-7). 
McGinn's Elucidatory Reading is based on Wittgenstein's statement that 
"a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations" (TLP 4.112), and that 
in the Tractatus his "propositions serve as elucidations" (TLP 6.54). Elucidations 
are differentiated from concepts such as explanation and theory (McGinn 1999, 
498); they do not present discoveries or substantial claims (McGinn 1999, 505), 
indeed the activity of elucidation "dispels our sense of a need for philosophical 
explanation" (McGinn 1999, 505). Elucidation is a "critical activity" (McGinn 
1999, 502), specifically an "activity of reflecting on the phenomena of language" 
(McGinn 1999, 504). Elucidations work to "get the reader to look at things in a 
new way" (McGinn 1999, 503), they do not or uncover something hidden but 
"draw our attention to something that lies before our eyes" (McGinn 1999, 501); 
they do not inform us of facts but bring us "to see a certain order in what lies on 
the surface" (McGinn 1999, 502). Once they have served their purpose the 
elucidations become redundant: 
It is in just this sense that Wittgenstein's remarks are to be understood as 
elucidatory: their utility and significance are exhausted by their power to 
get the reader to see something familiar and everyday in a new light. Once 
the change in the reader's perception of pictures has been brought about, 
the remarks drop away, for they have no factual or descriptive content to 
sustain them. (McGinn 1999, 502) 
Elucidations "drop away" because they are used to clarify "something that lies 
open to view" (PI 126, cited in McGinn 1999, 499), and this clarification is 
always for a particular purpose. Once the purpose has been achieved there is no 
further need for the elucidations.26 In the case of the Tractatus, the elucidations 
There is a significant difference here between McGinn's Elucidatory Reading and Therapeutic 
Readings. Both claim that the activity of the Tractatus involves the reader. According to 
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serve to clarify the phenomena of language, and the purpose is to dispel 
philosophical puzzlement. Wittgenstein's aim in the Tractatus is to bring us to 
"recognise how language takes care of itself (Notebooks p.43, cited in McGinn 
1999, 499) - this recognition will dispel "philosophical problems concerning the 
justification of logic and the relation between language and world" (McGinn 
1999, 512).2 7 
McGinn's Elucidatory Reading claims that the opening section of the 
Tractatus, which talks about the world of facts, should not be read as an 
ontological doctrine that explains or justifies language (McGinn 1999, 499); it 
should be seen as a "mythological description" (McGinn 1999, 500) - or 
"material picture of our language" (McGinn 1999, 499). Wittgenstein's opening 
picture sets up a distinction between content, structure and form, and encourages 
us to see a contrast between what is accidental and what is essential (McGinn 
1999, 500). These distinctions are not metaphysical claims about reality, they just 
provide a model that wil l be held up to language for comparison.28 McGinn 
describes how in the next part of the Tractatus Wittgenstein uses the distinctions 
he has introduced to elucidate pictures - first drawing our attention to then-
content and structure (McGinn 1999, 500-501); then bringing us to see that the 
pictorial form of a picture, which is essential, "cannot be the subject of depiction" 
(McGinn 1999, 501). The same distinctions are then used to elucidate 
propositions, through an analogy between pictures and propositions (McGinn 
1999, 503-505); then the analogy between pictorial form and logic is used to 
elucidate logic (McGinn 1999, 507-509); then the distinction between what is 
accidental and what is essential is used to elucidate our conception of scientific 
laws (McGinn 1999, 509-511). By the end of the Tractatus the elucidations can be 
totally thrown away; the reader is left with a transformed, clarified vision of 
ordinary language and philosophical problems will have been dispelled.29 
Therapeutic Readings the reader comes to see that the remarks are nonsense. According to 
McGinn's Elucidatory Reading the reader comes to see a certain order in their language. 
2 7 McGinn claims that it also dispels puzzlement concerning "the relation between thought and 
language" (McGinn 1999, 507) but does not discuss this. 
2 8 McGinn acknowledges that reading the Tractatus this way invites a comparison with the method 
of language-games in the Investigations (McGinn 1999, 499). 
2 9 See (McGinn 1999, 512-513). 
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So how does an Elucidatory Reading interpret the say-show distinction? 
The say-show distinction is central to the 'material picture' that Wittgenstein uses 
to elucidate language. It should be emphasised that this is not to claim that the 
say-show distinction is itself a feature of language - the say-show distinction is an 
elucidation that will 'drop away' when it has changed the way we see language. 
The distinction involves "the relation between what is essential (form) and what is 
accidental (the arrangement of objects in states of affairs)" (McGinn 1999, 493 
fn.9). Once this is recognised it is clear that the Elucidatory Reading of the 
Tractatus has the say-show distinction at its centre. Take, for example, the 
elucidatory comparison between pictures and propositions: this makes us see that 
"the distinction between what is possible and what is essential in language mirrors 
the distinction between what can be pictured and pictorial form" (McGinn 1999, 
504). When we recognise this we see that "whatever is essential to a proposition's 
representing is not something that can be represented in a proposition" (McGinn 
1999, 504-505), in other words "logic belongs to the limit of what can be said in 
language, and not to what is expressible within i t" (McGinn 1999, 505). This is 
not a fact or discovery - it is seeing a certain order in the phenomena of language 
for a particular purpose: 
In the case of logic a whole pattern of order is made apparent to us, in 
which the question of the justification or foundation for logic evaporates. 
It is not that he puts forward a theory of logic, but that we are able both to 
recognise the order he invites us to see in the phenomena, and to see that it 
is an order which brings out the unique status of logic and shows that the 
whole idea of justifying it is unintelligible. (McGinn 1999, 507-508) 
This is only one example, but for an Elucidatory Reading the say-show distinction 
is important throughout the Tractatus. It is used to elucidate language in such a 
way that it brings about a certain order in the phenomena of language, and seeing 
this order means that "philosophical puzzlements concerning the status of logic, 
the relation between language and the world or the relation between thought (the 
mind) and language, 'completely disappear'" (McGinn 1999, 504). 
We can now see how an Elucidatory Reading offers an alternative to the 
false dilemma between Metaphysical Readings and Therapeutic Readings. It 
claims that the Tractatus does not present either a real or a nonsensical thesis 
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about the ineffability of metaphysics and the say-show distinction is neither an 
incoherent doctrine, nor utter nonsense. An Elucidatory Reading agrees with 
Metaphysical Readings that the say-show distinction is the primary focus of the 
Tractatus (McGinn 1999, 496) - it can change the way we see language and, by 
clarifying our vision, dispel philosophical problems. An Elucidatory Reading also 
agrees with Therapeutic Readings that the say-show distinction is entirely thrown 
away (McGinn 1999, 512) but has a different conception of what it is to throw 
away the ladder. Therapeutic Readings claim that we throw away the pseudo-
doctrines of the Tractatus once we have realised that they are nonsense -
throwing away the remarks is the final act of our therapy. The Elucidatory 
Reading claims that the elucidations of the Tractatus are thrown away not because 
we realise that they are nonsense, but because when properly treated as 
elucidations they become redundant. 
Whether or not we agree with other details of McGinn's account, an 
Elucidatory Reading does offer a significant new way of interpreting the say-show 
distinction. The main point is that we do not have to read the distinction as though 
it is either a doctrine or pseudo-doctrine about language. It can instead be seen as 
a tool which has a philosophical purpose. The say-show distinction does not make 
any claims about language, it is a device used to encourage the reader to look at 
language in new ways. But there is a notable weakness with McGinn's 
Elucidatory Reading. By claiming that the Tractatus consists of elucidations and 
the say-show distinction is an elucidation, McGinn misses an opportunity to give 
the distinction an even more central role in the Tractatus. McGinn implies that the 
say-show distinction is one type of elucidation (albeit the most important 
elucidation in the Tractatus). I think it is possible to go further - to argue that the 
process of elucidating is wholly concerned with what shows itself, therefore all 
the elucidations of the Tractatus are concerned with showing rather than saying. 
I f we accept that an Elucidatory Reading could treat elucidation as 
'showing' then this strengthens the role of the say-show distinction in the 
Tractatus. However there remains another problem to address. There is ambiguity 
in McGinn's account of 'elucidation': she does not make it clear when elucidation 
is a noun (used to describe a type of proposition) and when a verb (used to 
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describe a type of activity). Wittgenstein's remarks in the Tractatus are called 
elucidations and their function is elucidation; the say-show distinction is an 
elucidation and its purpose is elucidation. The difference between these is not 
insignificant - to call something an elucidation in the former sense does not entail 
that an act of elucidation has taken place.30 McGinn's claim that there are two 
strands in the Tractatus - elucidations and non-elucidations - misrepresents 
Wittgenstein's project because he intended all of the remarks in the Tractatus to 
be elucidations. McGinn actually means that there are two strands in the Tractatus 
- elucidations that work and elucidations that do not work - but she does not do 
enough to explain why Wittgenstein believed all his remarks to be elucidatory. I 
believe that this is because she does not wholly appreciate the role of the say-
show distinction in his conception of philosophy. 
3 Summary and Comment 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2,1 discussed opposed readings of the Tractatus. According 
to Metaphysical Readings the say-show distinction is a doctrine about ineffability 
and it is an ineffable doctrine. Most Metaphysical Readings say that this means 
the say-show distinction is incoherent. Others claim it is a paradox which is not 
incoherent, but fail to explain how this is so without lapsing into incoherence. 
According to Therapeutic Readings the say-show distinction is an utterly 
nonsensical pseudo-doctrine about ineffability, and the idea that it is a profound, 
paradoxical, ineffable doctrine is the final temptation that must also be thrown 
away. These two interpretations present a false dilemma: either the say-show 
distinction is the paradoxical doctrine that there are 'truths' or a 'realm' that can 
be shown but not said; or the say-show distinction is utter nonsense. One cause of 
this false dilemma is the fact that both readings share a traditional assumption of 
This helps to explain why McGinn's account contains a distinction between two strands in the 
Tractatus: those remarks which are successful elucidations and those which are not. She claims 
that the non-elucidatory remarks are those which express theoretical presuppositions and 
philosophical misconceptions which Wittgenstein later rejected. These include: his "commitment 
to the determinacy of sense, to a logically perspicuous symbolism, to simple symbols, to the 
logical independence of elementary propositions, or to the idea that all logical truths are 
tautologies" (McGinn 1999,498). 
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how to read the Tractatus - namely that it should be read as though it contains 
philosophical doctrines. 
In section 2.3,1 considered an alternative to this false dilemma. McGinn's 
Elucidatory Reading interprets the say-show distinction as an elucidation which 
changes the reader's vision of language and dispels philosophical problems, then, 
once it has served its purpose, it drops away. McGinn's Elucidatory Reading 
treats the say-show distinction as important to Wittgenstein's treatment of a 
central problem in philosophy of language, but does not see the importance of the 
distinction to Wittgenstein's overall conception of philosophy. Hence she does not 
wholly appreciate the revolution needed i f we are to properly understand the 
Tractatus from the standpoint of Wittgenstein's new conception of philosophy. 
In conclusion, none of the available interpretations of the say-show 
distinction are wholly adequate, but lessons can be learned. It is best to see the 
say-show distinction as a tool for a philosophical purpose - an elucidatory device. 
In doing this I think that we can treat the say-show distinction as central to 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method, rather than a feature of language or reality. 
Furthermore, rather than simply claim that the say-show distinction is one among 
many elucidations in the Tractatus, I shall argue that all elucidation is concerned 
with what shows itself but cannot be said, and thus that the method of elucidation 
helps us to solve philosophical problems by seeing language in new ways. 
54 
Ch.4: Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Investigations 
Chapter 4: Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Investigations 
Content 
1 Introduction 
2 Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Investigations 
2.1 Metaphysical Readings 
2.2 Therapeutic Readings 
2.3 An Elucidatory Reading 
3 Summary and Comment 
1 Introduction 
It is my view that i f we are to understand the Investigations in the right light -
which involves reading it in conjunction with the Tractatus - then we cannot 
avoid considering the significance of the say-show distinction for the 
Investigations. A great many commentators say nothing about the say-show 
distinction when reading the Investigations. It is too strong to claim that these 
writers believe there is discontinuity between the Tractatus and Investigations 
with respect to the distinction, or that they believe Wittgenstein rejects the 
distinction in the Investigations, because for them these questions simply do not 
arise. In most cases this is because they do not read the Investigations in 
conjunction with the Tractatus. I f they have a view at all, it is probably that the 
distinction has no relevance or connection with the Investigations. I believe that 
this view offers only a limited interpretation of the Investigations and cannot 
explore the more fruitful avenues which become possible when the say-show 
distinction is taken into account. This is not to pre-judge whether the say-show 
distinction is either retained or rejected in the Investigations. My point is that, 
whether it is retained or rejected, to say that the Investigations has a stance of 
some sort towards the distinction is already to add something worthwhile to our 
understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. 
My aim in this chapter is to consider commentators' views of the 
significance of the say-show distinction for understanding the Investigations. I say 
that a commentator believes that the say-show distinction is 'retained' i f they 
claim that it is in some sense positively defended, retained or affirmed - in other 
words treated as a successful or legitimate distinction, doctrine or device. I say 
that a commentator believes that the distinction is 'rejected' i f they claim that it is 
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in some sense attacked, rejected or denied - treated negatively as an unsuccessful 
or illegitimate distinction, doctrine or device. These general terms may help to 
group commentators for the purposes of discussion, as a way of dealing with the 
problem that writers express their views in very different terms and with different 
emphasis. However, the difference between commentators is sometimes more 
than a matter of emphasis. One task of this chapter is to make these differences 
apparent, but a major difference can be outlined in advance. Any reading of 
Wittgenstein's texts which treats them as works of philosophical doctrine, is to be 
contrasted with any reading which treats the texts as a philosophical activity. A 
commentator who takes the former approach to the say-show distinction in the 
Tractatus is likely to ask questions such as "is the distinction asserted or denied in 
the InvestigationsT', or "is the distinction confirmed or refuted?" In other words, 
the issue that matters is whether the doctrine of saying and showing is retained or 
rejected. In contrast, a commentator who does not treat the distinction as a 
doctrine in the Tractatus wil l ask questions like "is the distinction used or not 
used in the InvestigationsT', or "does the distinction have a function or is it 
redundant?". To say that two commentators both agree that the Investigations 
retains the say-show distinction may be misleading, i f one believes that it is 
doctrine and the other does not. With this caveat in mind I propose that a good 
way to consider commentators' views of the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations is to look at their account of the distinction in the Tractatus, then 
consider what they say, or would say, about the distinction in the Investigations. 
We may then ask which of the readings of the Tractatus wil l best enable us to use 
the say-show distinction to understand the Investigations. 
In the last chapter I discussed available readings of the say-show 
distinction in the Tractatus. Here I ask whether commentators who subscribe to 
each of these readings have a view about the distinction in the Investigations. 
Most commentators who discuss the distinction in the Tractatus give 
Metaphysical Readings. Some of these express no view about its significance for 
the Investigations* but others argue either that Wittgenstein rejects or retains the 
1 E.g. Hanfling (1989) who says a lot about the role of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus, 
but does not mention it when discussing the Investigations. In what follows I only discuss 
commentators who express a view about the say-show distinction in the Investigations. 
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distinction in the Investigations. A growing number of commentators give 
Therapeutic Readings of the distinction in the Tractatus, and McGinn has 
explored the potential for an Elucidatory Reading. Neither of these two readings 
has yet explored the significance of the distinction for the Investigations. In both 
cases I speculate as to what the likely outcome would be i f they did. I argue that: 
i) Metaphysical Readings are best suited to defend the view that Wittgenstein 
rejects the say-show distinction in the Investigations, ii) Therapeutic Readings 
would only be able to defend the view that the distinction is either not at all 
significant or rejected in the Investigations, iii) McGinn's Elucidatory Reading 
would only be able to defend the view that the distinction is retained in the 
Investigations. 
2 Available readings of the say-show distinction in the Investigations 
2.1 Metaphysical Readings 
According to proponents of Metaphysical Readings, Wittgenstein treats the say-
show distinction as a serious doctrine in the Tractatus, albeit a special type of 
'ineffable' doctrine. Some commentators have argued that he also does so in the 
Investigations.2 Others have argued that he rejects the doctrine in the 
Investigations.3 In this section I outline their general arguments schematically, 
then discuss some specific examples in more detail. 
To argue that the say-show distinction is rejected in the Investigations, 
commentators can appeal to two problems with the distinction. First, the doctrine 
of saying and showing cannot be a feature of Wittgenstein's later work because it 
is incoherent in the Tractatus. Not only is a doctrine of the ineffability of 
metaphysics incoherent, but the distinction itself is self-referentially incoherent. In 
short, when applied to itself the say-show distinction is a doctrine that can be 
2 The view that the Investigations retains the say-show distinction is held by, amongst others, 
James Edwards (Edwards 1985, 105 and 1990, 135); the Hintikkas (Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka 
1981, 80 and 1986, 216); Rudolph Haller (Haller 1988, 23-4); David Stern (Stern 1995, 190); 
Jonathan Lear (Lear 1982, 384-5); John Koethe (Koethe 1996, 1); Bernard Williams (Williams 
1981, 163) and Newton Garver (Garver 1989, 89 and 130-1). 
3 The view that the say-show distinction is rejected is held by, amongst others, Peter Hacker 
(Hacker 2000, 95); Norman Malcolm (Malcolm 1986, 65 and Chapter 5, particularly 84); Gordon 
Baker (Baker 1988 112-113); Hans-Johann Glock, (Glock 1996, 262); Ronald Suter (Suter 1989, 
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shown but not said. Dale Jacquette, who claims that the Investigations rejects the 
say-show distinction, highlights this point and concludes: 
The Tractatus loses its grip on the fundamental semantic distinction 
between what can be said and what can only be shown. (Jacquette 1998, 
174)4 
This first argument supposes that, because the say-show distinction is an 
unworkable doctrine, it is highly likely that Wittgenstein himself would have 
recognised this and abandoned the doctrine for that reason. The second type of 
argument does not need to establish the incoherence of the doctrine, it merely 
needs to appeal to the familiar idea that the Investigations would reject any 
philosophical doctrine, especially a metaphysical doctrine, whether it is coherent 
or not. This is Ronald Suter's view: 
The early Wittgenstein thinks that, strictly speaking [metaphysical] truths 
can only be shown, not said. The later Wittgenstein completely rejects this 
conception of philosophy and no longer appeals to his earlier technical 
distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. (Suter 1989, 
3) 
Commentators who accept this line of argument can either claim that there is a 
doctrine in the Investigations that refutes the doctrine of the Tractatus, or they can 
claim that the anti-doctrinal method of the Investigations rejects the doctrines of 
the Tractatus. The former claim is inconsistent with the view that Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy is anti-doctrinal, but is nonetheless defended by numerous 
writers. The latter claim is better at preserving consistency. 
I f we accept any of the Metaphysical Readings of the say-show distinction, 
both of these arguments are valid. It is correct to say that the distinction is an 
incoherent doctrine and it is true that a doctrine about ineffable metaphysical 
truths would be exactly the kind of philosophical nonsense that the Investigations 
would aim to dispel. Many commentators arguing that Wittgenstein rejected the 
3); Simon Glendinning (Glendinning 1998, 84) and Dale Jacquette (Jacquette 1998, 174 and 186-
7). 
4 Elsewhere he says "the semantic distinction between saying and showing [...] is [...] undone" 
(Jacquette 1998, 186); and, there is a "rupture of the saying-showing distinction" (Jacquette 1998, 
187). 
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say-show distinction use a version of both arguments. The strongest advocate of 
this view is Peter Hacker: 
The author of the Tractatus laboured to reveal that the structure of the 
world cannot be described but only shown. The author of the 
Investigations bent his efforts to reveal how what seemed to show itself 
was an optical illusion. (Hacker 1986, 168) 
Hacker has recently published a sustained attack on the idea that the say-show 
distinction has a role in the Investigations (Hacker 2002, Ch.5). His position is 
only convincing i f we accept his interpretation of the say-show distinction in the 
Tractatus. Although I oppose his stance in my own interpretation, I do 
acknowledge that this view - that the say-show distinction is a serious, positive 
doctrine in the Tractatus that is rejected in the Investigations - is most plausible i f 
a Metaphysical Reading is used. 
To defend one of the Metaphysical Readings and argue that the say-show 
distinction is retained as a doctrine in the Investigations as well as the Tractatus, 
commentators must contend with the apparent fact that the distinction is 
incoherent. This might be done in two different ways. First, it can be argued that 
the say-show distinction in the Tractatus is not paradoxical and incoherent, but 
this is a dead-end. Although some commentators make valiant attempts to defend 
the coherence of the distinction, critics are quick to point out that insofar as these 
writers attempt to say what it is that Wittgenstein says cannot be said, their own 
attempts, too, must dissolve into incoherence. One example is Hanfling's 
incredulous reaction to the Hintikka's account: 
Wittgenstein, we are told, adhered throughout his career to the 'ineffability 
of semantics'; and this would prevent him from saying what he really 
thought about language and reality. He cannot tell it; they can! (Hanfling 
1987, 530)5 
In any case, even i f a commentator were to demonstrate that the say-show 
distinction is a coherent doctrine, a further problem remains: the Investigations 
rejects philosophical doctrines. This line of argument seems doomed. 
5 For more details of the Hintikka's argument see footnote 9. 
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Second, it is left to commentators to concede to their opponents that the 
distinction in the Tractatus is an incoherent doctrine, but now claim that the 
Investigations has a non-paradoxical and coherent version.6 Newton Garver 
attempts this: 
Wittgenstein continued to employ basic dichotomies of the dualism [by 
'dualism' Garver means 'the say-show distinction'] of the Tractatus. He 
disguised them, he spurned fixed terminology, he denied them any 
metaphysical foundation, and he insisted that the distinctions might shift 
from here to there; but the distinctions are still present. (Garver 1989, 130) 
Garver's point is that Wittgenstein has to modify the say-show distinction to avoid 
the incoherence of the Tractatus, but that nonetheless the distinction has an 
important role to play in the Investigations. One difficulty with this type of 
argument is how to identify the improved distinction with the incoherent 
distinction in the Tractatus. There is a tension between admitting that there is a 
radical difference between the two doctrines - one is incoherent, the other 
coherent - and yet claiming that they are one and the same distinction.7 Lear has a 
controversial solution to this problem. He argues that the say-show distinction is 
incoherent in the Tractatus because Wittgenstein says something about it. He 
proposes that Wittgenstein still maintains the distinction in the Investigations but 
o 
avoids incoherence by not saying anything at all about it. 
I f the truths of philosophy cannot be said, then one cannot say that they 
cannot be said, for one cannot say what it is that cannot be said. This is the 
self-conscious incoherence of the Tractatus. In the Investigations, 
There is a different, more unusual alternative, to which my objections nonetheless apply. Priest 
argues that Wittgenstein appeals to 'what cannot be said' in both the Tractatus and Investigations, 
but this doctrine is incoherent in both. Priest argues that the say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
is incoherent and that Wittgenstein makes essentially the same mistake in the Investigations even 
though he does not say anything about it: 
Wittgenstein's account of rule-following entails that the major conclusions of his 
skeptical arguments cannot be expressed. The situation is the same as that in the 
Tractatus. But whilst in the Tractatus Wittgenstein chose to make this conclusion 
explicit, in the Investigations he had grown more canny (if Kripke is correct), refusing to 
state the point, and merely hinting at it. (Priest 1995, 234) 
7 This tension is apparent in various commentaries, for example C.A. Van Peursen claims that "in 
Wittgenstein's later work ['showing'] was to become more central and, to a certain extent, even 
sayable" (Van Peursen 1969,46). 
8 Cox and Cox use the same argument, they claim that in Wittgenstein's later work the teaching 
that "the world is ineffable, is hinted at but not said, true to his own dictum of not saying what 
could not be said" (Cox and Cox 1984, 53). They claim that this 'hint' is found in the metaphor of 
"awakening and light and vision as the meaning of genesis or creation" (ibid.). 
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Wittgenstein does not discuss how philosophy can, after all, be said: he 
passes over that subject in silence. The Investigations should, I think be 
seen as an act of pointing. (Lear 1982, 385) 
This argument fails because it faces a dilemma: i f the argument is based solely on 
the claim that Wittgenstein says nothing about the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations, then it has no answer to the counter-argument that this 'evidence' 
equally shows that Wittgenstein abandons the distinction. On the other hand, i f 
Lear provides evidence that the distinction is not incoherent in the Investigations, 
then this attempts to say what Wittgenstein believed could not be said and the 
argument will dissolve into incoherence.9 Edwards, who uses the same line of 
argument as Lear, seems happy to impale himself on the second horn of this 
dilemma. He acknowledges that his own attempt to say what cannot be said is 
necessarily incoherent, but claims that his book nonetheless points to an ineffable 
truth about the say-show distinction in the Investigations: "what is said here about 
Wittgenstein's vision is, paradoxically enough, itself an attempt to show what 
cannot properly be said" (Edwards 1985, 9). 1 0 This approach is unconvincing, and 
should serve as a reductio ad absurdum for this type of interpretation of the say-
show distinction - we should not accept that the distinction grants commentators 
total exemption from ordinary argument and a licence to be correct no matter what 
they say or do not say about the distinction, especially when what they say is 
incoherent. It is acceptable to claim that whatever we say about the distinction is 
incoherent or paradoxical, but it is not acceptable to imagine that the incoherent 
things we say about the distinction show a truth about the distinction. Not least 
9 The Hintikka's claim that Wittgenstein uses the say-show distinction in both the Tractatus and 
Investigations, but argue as follows: 
In his early work, Wittgenstein had spoken freely of many subjects which he 
acknowledged to be unspeakable in the final analysis. He climbed up on a ladder that 
later he discarded - or perhaps transformed into the slippery rope of showing, as 
distinguished from the progress of saying. (Cf. Tractatus 6.54). In contrast it seems that 
the later Wittgenstein deprived himself quite deliberately of the corresponding 
opportunity. (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986, 216) 
It is this argument that was criticised by Hanfling (1987, 530). We should also note that Priest 
agrees that the say-show distinction is present in the Tractatus and Investigations, although not 
discussed in the Investigations - though he concludes that the distinction is incoherent in both 
works, rather than coherent in the Investigations as Lear, Edwards and the Hintikkas believe. 
1 0 Edwards's approach is not unique. Lemoine claims that his own essay is "an attempt to say what 
[Wittgenstein] was trying to show and it must be a failure insofar as it takes Wittgenstein's 
sentences out of context. But insofar as the essay, by proceeding obliquely, is a showing rather 
than a saying, it may be successful" (Lemoine 1975, 43). 
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because this begs the question by assuming that 'showing' communicates 
ineffable content, which is precisely the point at issue. In any case there are better 
alternative approaches that do not require such elaborate conceits. 
Garver, Lear, Edwards, and others still face a fundamental problem. I f 
they defend a Metaphysical Reading and assume that the say-show distinction is 
an incoherent doctrine in the Tractatus then they cannot escape the basic objection 
that the Investigations rejects philosophical doctrines. Edwards makes an 
unsuccessful attempt to escape, by arguing that the say-show distinction is a 
doctrine in the Tractatus, but not a doctrine in the Investigations: "here showing is 
not, as in the Tractatus, a philosophical doctrine; it is a defense against doctrine, a 
way of undercutting the impulse to make philosophical doctrines out of 
everything" (Edwards 1985, 209). This fails because it amounts to the claim that 
the say-show distinction of the Investigations opposes or rejects the say-show 
distinction of the Tractatus. My first objection is that it is difficult to explain how 
two such different ideas are one and the same distinction - as we saw when 
Garver attempted to reconcile an incoherent doctrine with a coherent doctrine. 
This objection could be met by arguing that there has been a development of a 
single idea. And even i f no such development has taken place, it is also possible to 
meet the objection by arguing that Wittgenstein replaces one version of the say-
show distinction with a totally different version. We can make sense of the idea 
that Wittgenstein could call two entirely different notions "the say-show 
distinction", although it would be confusing and perhaps a reason to criticise his 
account. However, my second objection to Edwards's claim is that there is no 
justification to call both ideas "the say-show distinction" in the first place. I f 
Wittgenstein has an explicit doctrine of saying and showing in the Tractatus, but a 
method that opposes all such doctrines in the Investigations, we need explicit 
evidence to be convinced that he also believes the latter idea to be "the say-show 
distinction" - this evidence need only be that he uses that term appropriately in 
the Investigations. However, Wittgenstein does not mention 'showing' or the say-
show distinction anywhere in the Investigations. So, i f the only information we 
have is that Wittgenstein has an idea in the Investigations that totally rejects an 
idea in the Tractatus, then we have no justification to say that both ideas are "the 
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say-show distinction". It makes a lot more sense to say that the method found in 
the Investigations diametrically opposes the Tractarian doctrine - this is exactly 
the point used by those who argue that Wittgenstein rejects the distinction in the 
Investigations. The only difference is that these commentators do not make the 
implausible claim that Wittgenstein's rejection of the Tractarian distinction should 
also be called "the say-show distinction". 
Thus far I have established how difficult it is for commentators with 
Metaphysical Readings of the say-show distinction to argue that the distinction is 
retained in the Investigations. Before we conclude that this line of interpretation 
should be abandoned I will discuss a writer who provides the strongest case for 
the view that I want to reject. My criticism has hinged on two ideas: i) it is highly 
implausible or unjustifiable to say that the distinction is radically different in the 
Tractatus and Investigations yet still be the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations; ii) the Investigations aims to dispel philosophical doctrines or 
theses, so i f the say-show distinction is any type of doctrine, coherent or not, it 
would be rejected in the Investigations. The view I now discuss resists both of 
these points, but I argue that the account is nonetheless unsatisfactory. 
John Koethe argues that 'showing' is a principle that is central to 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, early and late.11 He believes that there is a dual aspect 
to the say-show distinction in the Tractatus: one aspect is rejected by the 
Investigations, but the other is retained (Koethe 1996,43). This is how Koethe can 
argue that the distinction commits Wittgenstein to a flawed metaphysical doctrine 
in the Tractatus, but he uses a non-metaphysical version of showing in the 
Investigations, and yet claim that it is still the same distinction.12 However, even i f 
Koethe evades my first criticism, his account of the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations conflicts with the view that the Investigations rejects philosophical 
doctrines or theories. This is because Koethe denies that view of the 
1 1 "A certain broad principle runs throughout his work, both early and late: language's semantic 
aspects - what a word means, what a sentence says, what its truth conditions are - are shown or 
manifested by its use; but these semantic aspects cannot be described or characterized discursively 
in informative or explanatory ways" (Koethe 1996, 1-2). 
1 2 "Most of the particular semantic and metaphysical claims of the Tractatus stem from doctrines 
he later repudiated [...]. But, I contend, the principle that language's semantic aspects are shown 
by its use or application is already present in an incipient way in the Tractatus and, far from being 
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Investigations. He believes that neither the Tractatus nor the Investigations are 
entirely non-theoretical or anti-theoretical. He claims that the Tractatus contains 
metaphysical doctrines and, although the Investigations is less theoretical than the 
Tractatus, it does contam a constructive vision that involves philosophical 
theorising.14 Koethe does not claim that Investigations contains doctrines, but 
instead something he calls a 'conceptualisation'. According to Koethe 
Wittgenstein's conceptualisation involves a constructive vision of the relation 
between language and world and it is this relation that is shown but not said 
(Koethe 1996,60-67).15 
Although Koethe does not explicitly call the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations a doctrine, and in this respect his account is not a typical 
Metaphysical Reading, it is nonetheless the case that he has a doctrinal conception 
of the say-show distinction. His account of showing commits him to the view that 
what can be shown but not said are contentful ineffable truths, or in his 
terminology 'non-factual' claims. Koethe's claim that the relation between 
language and world is shown in both the Tractatus and Investigations is 
dependent upon the distinction he draws between the factual and the non-factual: 
On my account, the sharp dichotomy between what can be said and what 
must be shown - and its equation with the distinction between meaningful 
language and nonsense - is an artifact or consequence of the picture theory 
of elementary propositions, which the Tractatus articulates in detail and 
which Wittgenstein later abandoned. With its abandonment, the kinds of 
semantic (and mentalistic) claims that the Tractatus construed as 
meaningless are no longer treated as such, though Wittgenstein continues 
to regard such claims as nonfactual and to maintain that what they express 
is shown or manifested by the use of language. (Koethe 1996, 38) 
repudiated, is developed more fully later, freed from entanglement with the earlier doctrines that 
Wittgenstein did come to reject" (Koethe 1996, 2). 
I J "Where the Tractatus went astray was in trying to provide a theoretical articulation of the 
preconditions for all linguistic or mental representation. The later work abandons such theoretical 
pretensions and explores, in a much more concrete way, what a term's or sentence's having a use 
actually involves" (Koethe 1996, 161). 
1 4 "I think it is an exaggeration to regard the methodology of the Investigations as purely 
descriptive, free of anything that might be thought of as philosophical theorising" (Koethe 1996, 
Koethe explicitly aligns his position with the Hintikkas' Metaphysical Reading and against 
Diamond's Therapeutic Reading (Koethe 1996,37). 
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According to Koethe in both the Tractatus and the Investigations, the 'factual' is 
what can be said and the 'non-factual' is what can be shown. Koethe is committed 
to the view that there are properties of the world and language that are shown but 
not said.16 Although Koethe does not claim that the say-show distinction is a 
metaphysical doctrine in the Investigations, his account is unacceptable because it 
does not take seriously enough the idea that Wittgenstein is not constructing 
philosophical theories. The price of accepting Koethe's account is to concede that 
the Investigations is not wholly non-theoretical. Koethe does not, therefore, offer 
a satisfactory account of the retention of the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations. 
To conclude, i f we accept one of the Metaphysical Readings of the say-
show distinction in the Tractatus, then we can strongly defend the view that the 
distinction is rejected in the Investigations. I f we attempt to defend the view that 
the distinction is retained then we wil l be unsuccessful. Concerning such attempts, 
my main point is that any Metaphysical Reading of the distinction will have to be 
modified or distorted to such an extent that it is better not to use that interpretation 
in the first place. A better approach is to look for an alternative interpretation of 
the distinction in the Tractatus and then demonstrate that the same distinction 
applies in the Investigations. We should note that, although we must reject the 
claims of these commentators about how the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations is related to the Tractatus, this does not mean that we should reject 
their account of the say-show distinction in the Investigations altogether.17 Many 
of these commentators have useful or interesting accounts of the role of the say-
1fi 
show distinction in the Investigations. My view is that to give a convincing 
1 6 The list of things that are non-factual and shown but not said include "aspects, properties, states 
of mind and meanings" (Koethe 1996, 113. See also 166). 
1 7 For example, my objection to Edwards should not be taken to indicate that I disagree with him 
that the say-show distinction in the Investigations is "a defense against doctrine, a way of 
undercutting the impulse to make philosophical doctrines out of everything" (Edwards 1985, 209). 
This is a view I endorse in my own reading of the say-show distinction. The difference is that I 
believe that this is the correct way to view the say-show distinction in the Tractatus as well as the 
Investigations. 
1 8 A selection of examples include James Edwards' view that the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations reappears in Wittgenstein's conception of ethics (Edwards 1985, 105); the 
Hintikkas' view that it is found in Wittgenstein's conception of language-games (Hintikkas 1981, 
85); John Koethe's view that it is found in Wittgenstein's notions of aspect seeing (Koethe 1996, 
75) and rule-following (Koethe 1996, 14) and Bernard Williams' view that it is found in 
Wittgenstein's later version of transcendental idealism (Williams 1981, 163). 
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account of the say-show distinction in the Investigations we need to find a version 
that fits both the Tractatus and Investigations. Let us now consider a different 
interpretation of the say-show distinction by asking what proponents of 
Therapeutic Readings would say about the distinction in the Investigations. 
2.2 Therapeutic Readings 
According to Therapeutic Readings, the say-show distinction is simply one of 
many examples of philosophical nonsense from which Wittgenstein aims to cure 
us. It is just the last rung of the ladder which the Tractatus asks us to throw away. 
Therapeutic Readings give a purely deflationary account of the say-show 
distinction: the notion of a distinction between saying and showing is utter 
nonsense, not a profound ineffability doctrine. 
To date there have been no attempts by proponents of a Therapeutic 
Reading to explore whether the distinction has any significance for the 
Investigations.19 However, we can discuss what the outcome of such an attempt 
would be. Therapeutic Readings have a firm commitment to continuity between 
the Tractatus and the Investigations, but do not claim that the say-show 
distinction is a part of this continuity.20 They claim that in the Tractatus and 
Investigations Wittgenstein has the same conception of the aim of philosophy -
the aim is to provide therapy for philosophical illusions and confusions, to see 
nonsense as nonsense. Although the Tractatus uses the say-show distinction to 
realise this therapeutic aim, the aim itself is not dependent upon the say-show 
distinction - a different pseudo-doctrine could have been used instead. Hence 
even i f the Investigations has the same philosophical aim as the Tractatus, it does 
not need to involve the say-show distinction. This indicates that proponents of 
Peter Winch comes closest to doing this. He claims that the say-show distinction is a feature of 
the Investigations (Winch 1969, 14-15). He is also opposed to Metaphysical Readings of the say-
show distinction (Winch 1987, 4-12) - indeed he supports Therapeutic Readings - but he does not 
bring these two ideas together. These two views seem to represent different stages of his career 
and are not held at the same time. 
2 0 See Alice Crary's introduction to The New Wittgenstein for a discussion of the continuity 
assumed by Therapeutic Readings (Crary and Read 2000,1-18). 
2 1 The idea that there is continuity of method as well as aim is not entirely ruled out by proponents 
of Therapeutic Readings. Crary notes that some advocates of a Therapeutic Reading think that the 
Tractatus and Investigations might be unified "to some degree" by method (Crary 2000, 13), but 
this is not the main point of Therapeutic Readings, which is to claim the books are unified by a 
single aim. Even if Therapeutic Readings were to argue that Wittgenstein employs the same 
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Therapeutic Readings wil l have no reason to think that the say-show distinction is 
in any way relevant to the Investigations. 
There is a stronger point of view implicit in Conant's Therapeutic 
Reading. According to Conant the method of the Tractatus is "to offer something 
that has the appearance of a doctrine and then undermine it from within" (Conant 
1995, 298), but: 
When Wittgenstein himself criticises the Tractatus's mode of 
philosophical presentation it is not [.. .] on the grounds that its doctrine is 
flawed, but on the grounds that its method is flawed: it is inherently 
dogmatic - the work cultivates the impression that things are being 
dogmatically asserted. (Conant 1995,297) 
Conant does not explicitly discuss the say-show distinction here, but we can take 
it that the distinction is the main pseudo-doctrine of the Tractatus and the method 
of the Tractatus is to bring the reader to see the doctrine as nonsense, with the aim 
of providing therapy for philosophical confusion. I f this is so, then the implication 
of Conant's claim is that the say-show distinction was counter-productive to the 
aim of the Tractatus because it was too convincing. It was taken to be a dogmatic 
assertion, a genuine doctrine, and in most cases not thrown away by its readers. 
According to this view, the distinction was only created to further the method of 
the Tractatus, but the method was unsuccessful, indeed the say-show distinction 
contributed to the failure of the method. This is why the method was not repeated 
in the Investigations: 
The discipline to which he subjects his later writing is the following: as far 
as possible, avoid the impression that anything is put forward as an 
assertion; avoid anything the reader might seize upon as the doctrine of the 
work. (Conant 1995,299) 
Conant's view thus goes beyond the previous point that the Investigations has no 
reason to address the say-show distinction, it amounts to the point that there is a 
good reason for the Investigations not to address the distinction. 
therapeutic methods in both works there is no indication that they would treat the say-show 
distinction as relevant to that method. The distinction is viewed as simply one example of 
philosophical nonsense that Wittgenstein asks us to throw away. 
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According to Therapeutic Readings, the say-show distinction must be 
completely thrown away at the end of the Tractatus. We should not hold on to an 
ineffability doctrine of saying and showing, so there can be no question of 
whether the distinction has any significance for the Investigations.22 This point 
entails that even i f the say-show distinction is the most important pseudo-doctrine 
in the Tractatus, it must be treated as just one among many examples of 
philosophical nonsense. According to Therapeutic Readings, all nonsense is 
logically equivalent - it is all utter nonsense. In this respect the say-show 
distinction is no different to a manifestly nonsensical theory, such as the 
ontological primacy of simple objects. The only thing that distinguishes these 
doctrines is their psychological appearance.231 think that there is a problem with 
this idea - a problem which casts doubt on the value of Therapeutic Readings. 
As we have seen, Therapeutic Readings emphasise the continuity of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical aim throughout his work, which is to make the reader 
see nonsense as nonsense. I think that the question of the significance of the say-
show distinction for the Investigations highlights a discrepancy in the overall 
interpretation. Consider the following example: according to Therapeutic 
Readings the ontological primacy of simple objects is a pseudo-doctrine in the 
Tractatus that is revealed to be nonsense when the book is read correctly. It is also 
the case that this pseudo-doctrine is revealed to be nonsense in the Investigations. 
The problem is that, i f this pseudo-doctrine is given therapeutic treatment in both 
the Tractatus and Investigations, then why is the say-show distinction, which is a 
more important pseudo-doctrine, not also given attention and revealed to be 
nonsense in the Investigations'? It seems strange that it is omitted from the 
Investigations i f Wittgenstein's aim there is to provide therapy for philosophical 
confusions, and i f the say-show distinction was the most important confusion of 
2 2 When a proponent of a Metaphysical Reading argues that the distinction is an incoherent 
doctrine, it is reasonable for them to ask whether the doctrine could be made coherent, either in the 
Tractatus or in the Investigations. In comparison, when a proponent of a Therapeutic Reading is 
faced with the idea that the distinction is utter nonsense, there would be no point considering 
whether the nonsense could be turned into sense in either the Tractatus or Investigations. 
2 3 Recall Diamond's argument that, although there are not different logical categories of nonsense: 
"nonsense sentences are as it were internally all the same" (Diamond 2000, 159), there is a 
significant psychological difference between seeing a nonsensical sentence as nonsense and seeing 
the sentence as though it has sense. We can "distinguish nonsense-sentences by the external 
circumstances of their utterance" (Diamond 2000, 161). 
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the Tractatus. This criticism has established that Therapeutic Readings need to 
explain why Wittgenstein devotes pages of the Investigations to demonstrating 
that lesser Tractarian pseudo-doctrines are indeed nonsense, but does not mention 
the say-show distinction. Now I argue that the most likely response to this 
challenge will fail. The most appropriate defence for Therapeutic Readings is to 
claim that the distinction was successfully shown to be nonsense in the Tractatus, 
so there is no need to demonstrate that it is nonsense once again in Investigations. 
This response fails because it contradicts Conant's view that the method of the 
Tractatus was unsuccessful and the say-show distinction was not adequately 
revealed to be nonsense. There may be other responses open to proponents of a 
Therapeutic Reading, but the fact that none are currently available is a weakness 
in this interpretation. 
We might wonder i f Therapeutic Readings would accept that the 
Investigations does reject the say-show distinction in some sense. After all, i f we 
apply the philosophical ideas of the Investigations to the pseudo-doctrine version 
of the distinction, it would be rejected as nonsense. This may be true, but it does 
not enable us to use the say-show distinction to enhance our understanding of the 
Investigations. Nor does it mean that there is continuity between the Tractatus and 
Investigations - where continuity might be that they both reveal that the say-show 
distinction is nonsense. There is no continuity because although the Investigations 
would make us see that the say-show distinction is nonsense, it would do so in a 
very different way to the Tractatus - it would involve a different philosophical 
method. Rather than say that the Investigations rejects the say-show distinction, 
all we should say is that it would be impossible to use Therapeutic Readings to 
argue that the distinction is retained in the Investigations. This conclusion 
explains why proponents of Therapeutic Readings have not explored the 
implications of their reading for the say-show distinction in the Investigations. 
I think that the failure of any Therapeutic Reading to support the 
significance of the say-show distinction for the Investigations is an indication that 
this type of interpretation is impoverished. The mistake can be traced to the failure 
to give a central role to say-show distinction in the Tractatus - to take seriously 
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enough the idea that it is important for Wittgenstein's philosophy. I agree with 
Adrian Moore: 
To compare Wittgenstein's later work with the Tractatus [. . .] in such a 
way that a saying/showing distinction arises in the later work, is [...] 
deeply instructive and seminal. (Moore 1987, 490) 
Moore's position lends support to the idea that we must look for an alternative to 
the Metaphysical and Therapeutic Readings. He shares with McGinn the view that 
we must give a central role to the say-show distinction without treating it as 
ineffable metaphysics or empty nonsense. Moore's account is not exegetical, so it 
is McGinn's Elucidatory Reading I consider next. 
2.3 An Elucidatory Reading 
According to McGinn's Elucidatory Reading, the distinction between saying and 
showing is an elucidatory element of the Tractatus (McGinn 1999,498). The say-
show distinction is used as philosophical device to transform our vision of 
language for a particular purpose. After the say-show distinction has elucidated 
our language it is 'thrown away', but only because it has exhausted its use, not 
because it is self-referentially incoherent or a mistaken view which needs therapy. 
What happens when we use the Elucidatory Reading of the say-show 
distinction to explore the significance of the distinction in the Investigations? This 
has not yet been attempted, but I think that McGinn's Elucidatory Reading would 
only support the claim that the say-show distinction is retained in the 
Investigations. McGinn claims that the core elucidations are "central to the whole 
of Wittgenstein's philosophy, early and late" (McGinn 1999, 497). As the say-
show distinction is a core elucidation (McGinn 1999, 498), this means that the 
Elucidatory Reading supports not just continuity between the Tractatus and 
Investigations, but more specifically continuity of the say-show distinction. 
McGinn does not connect these two points and does not make any explicit claims 
about the say-show distinction in the Investigations. 
McGinn's Elucidatory Reading proposes that there is continuity of aim 
and method between the Tractatus and Investigations because both works employ 
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the same elucidatory strategy.24 The elucidatory strategy of the Tractatus involves 
using the say-show distinction to elucidate language - indeed the distinction is the 
most important elucidation in the Tractatus. I f Wittgenstein employs the same 
elucidatory strategy in the Investigations as in the Tractatus then it makes sense 
for the say-show distinction to feature in both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations, although only as an elucidation rather than a theory, explanation or 
doctrine. I f this is the case then the challenge is to develop an account of how the 
say-show distinction is part of the elucidatory strategy of the Investigations. 
McGinn has not yet indicated how this might be done. 
I have sketched a general explanation of why an Elucidatory Reading 
could argue that the say-show distinction is retained in the Investigations. 
However, at another level, McGinn's Elucidatory Reading necessarily entails that 
the distinction is retained. According to McGinn, the Tractatus consists of two 
'strands' - elucidations and non-elucidations. The former are important ideas 
which Wittgenstein re-affirms in his later work. The latter are misconceptions 
which he later rejects. McGinn would probably agree that when Wittgenstein 
wrote the Tractatus he did not deliberately incorporate two 'strands' - one of 
which he knew to be misconceived. Her identification of the two strands is 
therefore based on a post-Investigations reading of the Tractatus. In other words, 
those aspects of the Tractatus which are elucidatory or non-elucidatory have been 
judged to be so from the perspective of the Investigations. Take for example the 
claim that the requirement for the determinacy of sense is a non-elucidatory part 
of the Tractatus - this claim is based on the fact that the determinacy of sense is 
"thrown o f f in the Investigations (McGinn 1999, 497). In the same way, 
McGinn's claim that the say-show distinction is an elucidatory strand of the 
Tractatus means that she has already judged that the distinction is not a 
misconception that the Investigations rejects. In other words, she holds the view 
that the say-show distinction is an elucidation in the Tractatus because she holds 
the view that the distinction is as elucidation in the Investigations, even though 
she does not make the latter point explicit. This has significant implications: we 
2 4 This continuity between the Tractatus and Investigations is even stronger than that assumed by 
Therapeutic Readings, which accept that there is continuity of aim - but claim that the Tractatus 
and Investigations employ different methods to achieve the therapeutic aim. 
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may use McGinn's Elucidatory Reading to argue that the say-show distinction 
features in the Investigations, but it is not possible to use it against this view 
without rendering the reading itself incoherent. 
The claim that Wittgenstein has continuity of method - rather than 
doctrine - in the Tractatus and Investigations is one of the most important 
messages of McGinn's Elucidatory Reading. I believe that adopting this view will 
help me pursue the idea that the say-show distinction is retained in the 
Investigations. McGinn does not attempt to establish that the say-show distinction 
is more than just an elucidation. I f it can be established that the say-show 
distinction is part of Wittgenstein's method, and he has the same method in the 
Tractatus and the Investigations, then we have good reason to think that the say-
show distinction is a feature of both the Tractatus and the Investigations. 
I depart from McGinn's account in arguing that we should not see the say-
show distinction just as an elucidation, but rather the basis of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophical elucidation. This amounts to the claim that the say-
show distinction is fundamental to Wittgenstein's method, not just an important 
elucidation used in the application of his method. To support this I will 
demonstrate that Wittgenstein bases his conception of philosophy on the say-show 
distinction in both the Tractatus and Investigations. 
3 Summary and Comment 
There are various other reasons, some discussed in chapter 3, for arguing that one 
of these three readings is better than the others. However, the specific issue which 
concerns me here is which reading best supports the claim that we can use the 
say-show distinction to understand the Investigations. I conclude that i) 
Metaphysical Readings are best suited to defend the view that Wittgenstein rejects 
the say-show distinction in the Investigations, ii) Therapeutic Readings would 
only be able to defend the view that the say-show distinction is not retained in the 
Investigations, iii) McGinn's Elucidatory Reading would only be able to defend 
It might seem possible to argue for a discontinuity thesis by claiming that the say-show 
distinction is part of the non-elucidatory strand in the Tractatus; but this runs counter to the central 
thrust of an Elucidatory Reading, which is to establish that the say-show distinction is the main 
point of the Tractatus (see McGinn 1999, 496 fh.12). 
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the view that the say-show distinction is retained in the Investigations as well as 
the Tractatus. 
I further conclude that it is possible to offer a convincing case for the view 
that the say-show distinction has a role in the Investigations only i f you have a 
view of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus that assumes it is not a doctrine 
or pseudo-doctrine. This is the interpretation I offer in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
Content 
1 Introduction 
2 Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the Tractatus 
2.1 The nature of philosophical problems 
2.2 The "correct method" of philosophy 
2.3 The outcome of a philosophical task 
2.4 The task of the Tractatus 
2.5 The overall aim of philosophical activity 
3 The say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
4 Summary 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present my own interpretation of the say-show distinction in the 
Tractatus.1 I propose that the say-show distinction is the central point of the 
Tractatus as it is the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and the 
main aim of the Tractatus is to introduce this new conception of philosophy. The 
focus of my interpretation is the remarks in the preface and conclusion that 
summarise the main point of the Tractatus.2 Wittgenstein states that "the whole 
sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said 
at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence" (TLP Preface p.3). The same statement is reaffirmed as the final remark 
of the Tractatus: "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" 
(TLP 7). In what follows I explain how these remarks sum up Wittgenstein's 
proposal for his conception of philosophy, and demonstrate that this conception is 
based on the say-show distinction. I use the phrase 'conception of philosophy' to 
encompass several related ideas including the nature of philosophical problems, 
the appropriate methods of philosophy, the end result of a philosophical task and 
the overall aim of philosophy. To say that the say-show distinction is the basis of 
this conception is to say that the distinction is what we need to understand i f we 
are to properly understand the conception of philosophy. 
I have provided full quotes in the footnotes, rather than just references to proposition numbers. 
This is to assist the reader, where needed, in following the exegesis. 
2 In a letter to Ficker Wittgenstein said that "the preface and the conclusion [...] contain the most 
direct expression of the point of the book" (cited in Janik & Toulmin 1973, 192). 
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2 Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the Tractatus 
The main purpose of the Tractatus is not to present a theory of language, logic or 
ontology. Nor is the main purpose to criticise or solve particular philosophical 
problems, such as Russell's theory of types. The main purpose is to replace 
traditional philosophical enquiry with an alternative conception of philosophy. 
The preface states: 
The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe that 
the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language 
is misunderstood. (TLP Preface p.3) 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein tackles several specific philosophical problems, but 
he does not do this simply to solve the problems. Instead he uses the treatment of 
particular issues to illustrate his general view of philosophical problems. 
Similarly, although the Tractatus does contain a highly influential picture of logic 
and language and the stated aim of the Tractatus is to "draw a limit to [...] the 
expression of thoughts" (TLP Preface p.3) this aim is only the means to a further 
goal, which is to offer "on all essential points the final solution of the problems 
[of philosophy]" (TLP Preface p.4). The ultimate value of the work is not the 
solutions to particular problems, or a new theory or doctrine, but "that it shows 
how little is achieved when these problems are solved" (TLP Preface p.4). 
I outline Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy by giving an account of 
the nature of philosophical problems, the correct method for philosophy, the 
outcome of a philosophical task and the ultimate aim of philosophical activity. In 
the process I establish that the say-show distinction is the basis for all of these. I 
also discuss the relation between the conception of philosophy presented in the 
Tractatus and the task of the Tractatus itself. 
2.1 The nature of philosophical problems 
Towards the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein emphasises that for something to 
be a genuine problem it must be something that can be said: " i f a question can be 
framed at all, it is also possible to answer i t" (TLP 6.5), "a question only [exists] 
where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said" (TLP 
6.51). His criticism of the traditional conception of philosophy is that 
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philosophical questions and answers are treated as things that can be said, but in 
fact they do not say anything, nor is there anything that can be said that would 
settle the disputes.3 According to Wittgenstein, i f we can reveal that philosophical 
problems do not say anything, then this demonstrates that they are not genuine 
problems and when the illusion vanishes so too wil l the problem, because the 
'problem' is just an illusion. It is the illusion that something can be said, when in 
fact nothing can be said. I f a problem has an answer that can be said, it is a 
problem of natural science.4 I f a problem does not have an answer that can be 
said, it is not a genuine problem but a confusion and can be removed by 
philosophical methods. This is why, for Wittgenstein, "all philosophy is a critique 
of language" (TLP 4.0031), rather than either an empirical or an a priori 
investigation. 
To make good his critique of the traditional conception of philosophical 
problems, Wittgenstein needs to establish how we can tell whether an utterance 
says something. In the Tractatus he believed that we cannot tell whether an 
utterance says something just by examining its appearance, because the outward 
appearance does not reveal the underlying logic: "it is not humanly possible to 
gather immediately from it what the logic of language is" (TLP 4.002). To 
elucidate the difference between the appearance and the underlying logic, 
Wittgenstein draws our attention to the difference between the propositional 
symbol and the propositional sign. The symbol is the "part of the proposition that 
characterises its sense" (TLP 3.31). The sign is the part of the proposition that can 
be perceived - it is the visible mark, the audible sound; "a sign is what can be 
perceived of a symbol" (TLP 3.32). The symbol is what is essential to the sense of 
the proposition5, the sign is arbitrary.6 So according to Wittgenstein i f we want to 
3 E.g. "Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where 
no questions can be asked" (TLP 6.51). 
4 "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the 
natural sciences)." (TLP 4.11) 
5 "Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an 
expression" (TLP 3.31). 
6 "For the sign of course is arbitrary" (TLP 3.322). "Accidental features are those that result from 
the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without 
which the proposition could not express its sense" (TLP 3.34). 
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know whether a proposition actually says something we must look at the symbol, 
not the sign. 
It is the difference between the symbol and the sign that causes many 
philosophical confusions.7 Wittgenstein's example is the proposition "Green is 
green" (TLP 3.323). The word 'green' is a single sign, but does not represent just 
one symbol. There are two symbols - one is a proper name, the other an adjective. 
Confusions are created for many different reasons - they do not all take the form 
of a sign that has more than one symbol. But, in general, the form of a 
philosophical problem is that it appears to say something (or requires something 
to be said) at the level of the sign, but in fact says nothing (nothing can be said) at 
the level of the symbol. Here is an example to illustrate the point: according to 
Wittgenstein one type of confusion occurs because logical constants are treated as 
though they represent objects of reality. For example, the negation sign looks like 
an ordinary sign (i.e. a name), so philosophers have been led to believe that the 
logical sign corresponds to a logical object, just as a name corresponds to a 
material object. Frege and Russell had this mistaken view of logical constants. 
But although a logical constant is a sign, it does not function as an ordinary name 
at the level of the symbol; specifically it does not have a representing relation to 
an object.10 A proposition that treats a logical constant as though it is a name may 
appear to say something, but actually says nothing.1 1 To elucidate the point 
Wittgenstein draws attention to the idea that there is no logical object 
"In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is 
full of them)" (TLP 3.324). 
8 "It is important that the signs lp' and '~p' can say the same thing. For it shows that nothing in 
reality corresponds to the sign (TLP 4.0621). 
9 "It becomes manifest that there are no 'logical objects' or 'logical constants' (in Frege and 
Russell's sense)" (TLP 5.4). 
1 0 "My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no 
representatives of the logic of facts" (TLP 4.0312) 
1 1 When Wittgenstein elucidates the problem, we are asked to see that a logical constant does not 
function as a name at the level of the logical symbol. This shows itself in the relation between 
propositions that employ the sign: "if there were an object called '~', it would follow that *~~p' 
said something different from what '/?' said, just because the one proposition would be about '~' 
and the other would not" (TLP 5.44) 
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corresponding to the 'T ' in a truth-table, just as there is no logical object 
corresponding to the horizontal and vertical lines, or to the brackets.12 
Before considering more types of confusion, I wish to elaborate my main 
contention about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems. I suggest 
that the Tractatus offers not just a treatment of particular problems, but a 
diagnosis of the problem of the problems of philosophy, i.e. the cardinal problem 
of philosophy. The ful l importance of elucidating the cardinal problem of 
philosophy is that it also provides the "final solution" to all the problems of 
philosophy. The Tractatus helps us see that the different types of philosophical 
problem all have something in common. Their general form is that they appear to 
say something, but say nothing. They can only remain a problem for as long as we 
continue to think that something is being said; in other words there is only a 
problem insofar as we remain confused. I f we can remove the confusion then we 
will remove the problem. The nature of the confusion is that we fail to see the 
logic clearly. Wittgenstein claims that "most of the propositions and questions of 
philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language" (TLP 
4.003). 
From a traditional perspective, the obvious solution to such confusion 
would be to explain the logic clearly. In other words it looks like the problem is 
caused because there is something we don't know - we don't know enough about 
the logic of language - so once we have explained the logic we will have solved 
the problem. This approach involves a fundamental mistake that will not solve the 
problem but merely generate further confusion. It involves precisely the mistake 
that is at issue - i.e. the mistake that is constitutive of philosophical problems. 
This mistake can only be understood in terms of the say-show distinction. I f we 
are to avoid confusion, Wittgenstein asks us to acknowledge that logic is not 
something that can be said. It is not something that can be explained and put into 
words. It is here that we see the most distinctive aspect of Wittgenstein's account. 
Logic cannot be said because it shows itself and "what can be shown, cannot be 
said" (TLP 4.1212). This is the main role of the say-show distinction. I f we try to 
1 2 "It is clear that a complex of the signs ' F ' and T ' has no object (or complex of objects) 
corresponding to it, just as there is none corresponding to the horizontal and vertical lines or to the 
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explain logic, we will be saying nothing but thinking that we are saying 
something. Hence our remarks wil l be nonsense, but we wil l think they have 
sense. This is the confusion that characterises a philosophical problem. The say-
show distinction is therefore the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of a 
philosophical problem. I have already mentioned one type of problem, but in the 
following brief survey, I demonstrate how various types of philosophical 
confusion are to be understood not just as linguistic confusions, but as confusions 
that involve the say-show distinction. 
A second type of mistake concerns internal properties. This occurs either 
when the internal (formal) properties of objects are confused with their external 
(material) properties; or, similarly, when the internal (structural) properties of 
facts are confused with their external properties.13 This is similar to a third type of 
mistake, which concerns internal relations}4 This is caused either by a confusion 
between internal (formal) relations of objects and their external relations, or by a 
confusion between the internal (structural) relations of facts and their external 
relations.15 In confusions concerning both internal properties and internal relations 
(of objects or facts) the important point is that the confusion is not simply between 
different types of property or relation - it is not simply a category mistake. What 
distinguishes the problem as a philosophical confusion is that it involves the say-
show distinction. It is an attempt to say something that cannot be said, an attempt 
to put into words what shows itself in language. 
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such 
internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this shows itself (es zeigt 
sich) in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are 
concerned with the relevant objects. (TLP 4.122) 
brackets. - There are no logical objects" (TLP 4.441). 
1 3 See (TLP 4.122) to (TLP 4.1241). 
1 4 "I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between internal 
relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread among philosophers" 
(TLP 4.122). 
1 5 See (TLP 4.122) to (TLP 4.1252). 
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Wittgenstein claims that an internal property of an object, an internal property of a 
possible situation (a fact) expresses itself in language.16 Similarly an internal 
relation between facts expresses itself in language.17 Internal properties and 
relations are features of logical form, they show themselves in language, but 
cannot be said in language.18 For example, one type of internal relation is that 
which is equivalent to an operation.19 An operation does not say anything, it 
merely shows itself: 
An operation shows itself (zeigt sich) in a variable; it shows how we can 
get from one form of proposition to another. (TLP 5.24) 
Wittgenstein treats negation and other logical 'constants' as operations.20 So now 
it is clearer where the real problem lay with the first, previously mentioned, type 
of problem. This was a confusion about logical constants (e.g. negation), it was 
the illusion that reality contains logical objects which correspond to the signs for 
logical constants. The mistake is not simply that one type of sign has been 
confused with a different type of sign, the mistake involves the say-show 
distinction at a fundamental level. The mistake is to assume that logical signs say 
something about logical objects instead of seeing that a logical sign says nothing 
because a logical operation such as negation shows itself in the internal relations 
between propositions. The internal relation is logical form, which shows itself but 
cannot be said. 
A fourth type of mistake concerns formal concepts}x These problems 
occur when there is a confusion between formal concepts and proper concepts.22 
The important point is that an ordinary concept can be expressed by means of a 
1 6 "The existence of an internal property of a possible situation is not expressed by means of a 
proposition: rather it expresses itself in the proposition representing the situation, by means of an 
internal property of that proposition" (TLP 4.124) 
1 7 "The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses itself in language by 
means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them" (TLP 4.125). 
1 8 "What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show 
the logical form of reality. They display it" (TLP 4.121). 
1 9 "The internal relation by which a series is ordered is equivalent to the operation that produces 
one term from another" (TLP 5.232). 
2 0 "Negation, logical addition, logical multiplication etc. etc. are operations" (TLP 5.2341) 
2 1 "(I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal 
concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole of traditional logic)" (TLP 4.126). 
2 2 See (TLP 4.126) to (TLP 4.1274). 
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function, but a formal concept cannot be represented in this way. This is because a 
formal concept does not say anything, a formal concept shows itself in language: 
When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this 
cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it shows itself (es 
zeigt sich) in the very sign for this object. (A name shows that it signifies 
an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc.). (TLP 4.126) 
I f the sign for a formal concept is used as though it is the sign for a proper 
concept, it wil l appear to say something at the level of the sign, but at the level of 
the symbol it wil l say nothing. Thus the proposition wil l be nonsense, although it 
may appear to have sense.23 
This survey is not comprehensive, but illustrates how the Tractatus 
elucidates philosophical problems specifically in terms of the say-show 
distinction.24 My claim should not be misinterpreted as the view that philosophical 
problems have the following form: there are ineffable features of reality (ineffable 
properties, objects, relations) that can be shown but they cannot said. The correct 
view is that philosophical problems have the following form: it appears that 
something needs to be said about a feature of reality, when in fact i f we look to 
what shows itself in language we wil l realise that nothing needs to be said. Using 
the correct interpretation reveals that the diagnosis of a problem as a confusion at 
the same time provides the means for the problem to disappear. This is why the 
say-show distinction elucidates both the cardinal problem of philosophy and the 
final solution for the problems of philosophy. In order to see clearly what can be 
said, so that we can see whether or not a philosophical proposition says anything, 
we must pay attention to what shows itself. What shows itself is not something 
that can be said. So, how should we pay attention to what shows itself in order to 
see clearly what can be said? To answer this question I now turn to Wittgenstein's 
account of the correct method for philosophy. 
2 3 "Whenever [the word 'object'] is used [...] as a proper concept word, nonsensical pseudo-
propositions are the result" (TLP 4.1272). 
4 1 discuss a further type of philosophical confusion in the following section - the confusion that 
arises if logical propositions are treated as though they are ordinary propositions. 
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2.2 Philosophical Method 
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say 
nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science - i.e. 
something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever 
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to 
him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions. (TLP 6.53)25 
This 'correct method1 is what Wittgenstein calls for when he says "what can be 
said at all can be said clearly" (TLP Preface p.3). There are two aspects to 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method: we must clarify confusions by revealing 
nonsense that is masquerading as sense. We can also avoid making such errors by 
Oft 
using a sign language that excludes them. Wittgenstein says more about 
removing confusions than avoiding confusions and I do the same. 
According to the Tractatus, i f we want to tell whether or not a proposition 
says something, we should not seek to determine whether the proposition is true 
or false.2 7 Instead the issue is to determine whether or not the proposition has 
sense - to have sense is to have both the possibility of being true and the 
possibility of being false. I f we wanted to tell whether a proposition was true we 
would compare it to reality,2 8 this is the task of natural science. We want to tell 
whether a proposition has sense so we must not look to reality, but look to its 
logical form. 2 9 This is the task of philosophy. As I have explained, to see the 
logical form we need to look beyond the propositional sign to the propositional 
symbol. As the signs are what we actually perceive, Wittgenstein explains how we 
can recognise a symbol from the propositional sign. He claims "in order to 
He makes the same point when he claims that "most of the propositions and questions to be 
found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any 
answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical" (TLP 4.003). 
2 6 "In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes them by not 
using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that 
have different modes of signification: that is a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar 
- by logical syntax" (TLP 3.325). 
2 7 "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science" (TLP 4.11). "Philosophy is not 
one of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.111). "Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of 
natural science" (TLP 4.113). It does this by determining the totality of propositions with sense. 
2 8 "In order to tell whether a proposition is true or false we must compare it with reality" (TLP 
2.223). 
2 9 We do not look to the content of the proposition, we look to its form. "A proposition contains 
the form but not the content of its sense" (TLP 3.13). 
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recognise a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense" (TLP 
3.326). We should not look at the appearance, but look at how the proposition is 
used. This is because all the propositions that serve the same logical purpose 
have the same sense.31 Another way of putting this is that all the propositions that 
are logically equivalent have the same use.32 
Wittgenstein believes that i f a proposition says something, it has a 
determinate sense that can be set out clearly.33 It can be set out clearly because it 
can be fully analysed.34 Fully analysed means that the analysis is complete and 
final. The logical analysis is always determinate because symbols are essential, 
they are guaranteed by logical space and every symbol gives the whole of logical 
space.35 Logical space is a complete, unified system. To identify the propositional 
symbol we need to look at the class of all the propositions that have the same 
logical essence in common.36 The symbol is a variable whose values are all the 
propositions that it characterises.37 The sense of the symbol is also what is 
common to all the symbols that can be substituted for i t . 3 8 To identify the symbol 
we need to recognise the variable, this is done by stipulating all the values for the 
variable.39 This just means describing all the propositions that have the same 
"(In philosophy, the question 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition for?' 
repeatedly leads to valuable insights.)" (TLP 6.211). 
3 1 "What is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that express the same sense have in 
common. And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can serve 
the same purpose have in common" (TLP 3.341). 
3 2 "Signs that serve one purpose are logically equivalent, and signs that serve none are logically 
meaningless" (TLP 5.47321). "If a sign is useless it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam's 
maxim" (TLP 3.328). 
3 3 "What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out 
clearly" (TLP 3.251). 
3 4 "A proposition has one and only one complete analysis" (TLP 3.25). 
3 5 "A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of the logical places is 
guaranteed by the [...] existence of the proposition with sense" (TLP 3.4). "A proposition can 
determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already by 
given by it" (TLP 3.42). "The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space" 
(TLP 3.42). 
3 6 "[An expression] is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions" (TLP 3.311). 
3 7 "An expression is presented by means of a variable whose values are the propositions that 
contain the expression" (TLP 3.312). 
3 8 "What signifies in a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the rules of logical syntax 
allow us to substitute for it" (TLP 3.344). 
3 9 "To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the propositions whose common 
characteristic the variable is" (TLP 3.316). 
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symbol - the same sense - i.e. the same logical purpose. The stipulation does not 
require us to say what the sense of the symbol is, the sense of the symbol shows 
itself when we stipulate the propositions.41 In other words the propositions show 
what it is that they have in common - their logical form. The logical form is not 
something that is said 4 2 We do not describe the logical form, we stipulate all the 
propositions that have the same logical form and in so doing the logical form of 
the propositions shows itself.4 3 The symbol shows itself and the symbol is 
equivalent to the rule of logical syntax.44 The rules of logical syntax show 
themselves, they simply are what all the values of a variable have in common.45 
The important point is that every proposition with sense both says 
something and shows something.46 When a proposition says something, all this 
means is that it affirms the sense that it shows. I f we want to tell whether a 
proposition has sense we do not need to make statements about the sense of the 
proposition. We just need to look at how it stands in logical relations with other 
propositions with sense. The relationship between propositions with sense is what 
Wittgenstein calls an internal relation and internal relations are shown but not 
said 4 7 The internal relationship between all the propositions that share a symbol 
shows itself. It shows itself whenever the propositions are used. As we saw with 
the problems already discussed, this set of internal relations is not something that 
can be stated by other propositions. I f this were possible it would set up a 
The stipulation is a description of the propositions that are the values, but the description can be 
done in several different ways. Wittgenstein lists three different ways in TLP 5.501. 
4 1 "It is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two expressions. For in order to be able to 
assert anything about their meaning, I must know their meaning, and I cannot know their meaning 
without knowing whether what they mean is the same or different" (TLP 6.2322). 
4 2 "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in 
common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form. In order to be able to 
represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere 
outside logic, that is to say, outside the world" (TLP 4.12). 
4 3 "If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means that they can be 
substituted for one another. But [whether this is the case must show itself] in the two expressions. 
When two expressions can be substituted for one another, that characterises their logical form" 
(TLP 6.23 - the modified section is from the Ogden translation). 
4 4 "These rules are equivalent to the symbols; and in them their sense is mirrored" (TLP 5.514). 
4 5 "The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each individual sign 
signifies" (TLP 3.334). 
4 6 "A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says 
that they do so stand" (TLP 4.022). 
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regress. Logical form shows itself in the internal relations between the totality of 
all propositions with sense.49 The whole of logic is shown in ordinary 
propositions.50 The totality of logical form is shown in every proposition with 
sense.51 Logic is something that cannot itself be put into words.5 2 
We might imagine that i f we cannot explain logic using ordinary 
propositions, then the answer is to do so using so-called 'logical propositions'. 
But this is to misunderstand logical propositions. An ordinary proposition has 
sense; it both says something and shows logical form. A logical proposition is 
senseless; it says nothing and only shows logical form. 5 3 Logical propositions are 
not nonsense; they are within language because they are part of the symbolism.54 
Logical propositions are produced when ordinary propositions are combined in 
such a way that they no longer say anything but merely show their logical form. 5 5 
Although logical propositions show logical form, the correct method of 
philosophy does not involve using logical propositions rather than ordinary 
propositions. It is wrong to imagine that the end result of logical analysis is to 
collect a body of logical propositions.56 Logical propositions show their logical 
form, but in itself this is not sufficient to solve philosophical problems.57 The 
treatment of confusions is achieved by elucidating the logical form of ordinary 
propositions, not simply admiring the logical form that shows itself in logical 
4 7 "It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and 
relations obtain: rather this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant 
states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects" (TLP 4.122). 
4 8 "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have 
in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form" (TLP 4.12). 
4 9 "The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses itself in language by 
means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them" (TLP 4.125). 
5 0 "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. [...] Propositions show the 
logical form of reality. They display it" (TLP 4.121). 
5 1 "A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical 
space must already be given by it" (TLP 3.42). 
5 "My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no 
representatives of the logic of facts" (TLP 4.0312). 
5 3 "Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing" 
(TLP 4.461). 
5 4 "Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism" 
(TLP 4.4611). 
5 5 When they cancel each other out in this way they produce tautologies or contradictions. 
Wittgenstein calls this process the "zero-method" (TLP 6.121). 
5 6 "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world" (TLP 6.13). 
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propositions. Logical propositions are not superior to ordinary propositions. By 
uttering a logical proposition a philosopher cannot achieve greater access to the 
logical form of reality. Nor would a collection of propositions that show the 
logical form of language or the world thereby give us satisfaction as though we 
had acquired direct access to ineffable truths.58 
Logical propositions are not necessary for the philosophical method of the 
Tractatus. Everything you might want to do with them can be done with ordinary 
propositions: 
We can actually do without logical propositions, for in a suitable notation 
we can in fact recognise the formal properties of propositions by mere 
inspection of the propositions themselves. (TLP 6.122) 
To a certain extent logical propositions can be helpful when clarifying confusions, 
we can use them as elucidations by employing the 'zero method' to clarify other 
propositions: "the propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of 
propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing" (TLP 
6.121).59 But in fact logical propositions are not discussed in the Tractatus as the 
solution to philosophical problems. Instead they are discussed because they are 
the source of yet another type of philosophical problem - i.e. the confusion of 
logical propositions with ordinary propositions. Confusion arises i f we treat a 
logical proposition as though it makes sense (if we think that it says something).60 
Doing so can produce a philosophical problem because we think that we have said 
something when in fact nothing has been said. The role of philosophy is to 
recognise when a particular proposition has sense or not, and this clarification 
"It is possible [...] to give in advance a description of all 'true' logical propositions" (TLP 
6.125). "Hence there can never be surprises in logic" (TLP 6.1251). "In logic process and result 
and equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise.)" (TLP 6.1261). 
5 8 "All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false. [...] Indeed, the 
logical proposition acquires all the characteristics of a proposition of natural science and this is the 
sure sign that it has been construed wrongly" (TLP 6.111) 
5 9 "If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they must 
have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined in this way shows 
that they possess these structural properties" (TLP 6.12). 
6 0 "Even at first sight it seems scarcely credible that there should follow from one fact p infinitely 
many others, namely — p, ~~~~pf etc. And it is no less remarkable that the infinite number of 
propositions of logic (mathematics) follow from half a dozen 'primitive propositions'. But in fact 
all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing" (TLP 6.43). 
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includes clearing up confusions when a logical proposition has been treated as 
though it says something.61 
In a letter to Wittgenstein on 13th August 1919, Russell wrote: " I am 
convinced you are right in your main contention, that logical props are 
tautologies, which are not true in the sense that substantial props are true" 
(Cambridge Letters p. 121). Wittgenstein replied: " I 'm afraid you haven't really 
got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical 
propositions is only a corollary" (Cambridge Letters p. 124) then explained that 
the main point is the say-show distinction. I take it that the issue of logical 
propositions is a corollary of the say-show distinction in the sense that it is one of 
many philosophical confusions that the say-show distinction can clarify. Logical 
propositions are not, however, essential to the correct method of philosophy for 
Wittgenstein. The method for being able to say clearly what can be said lies 
elsewhere - in Wittgenstein's account of elucidations. 
To tell whether a proposition has sense we need to look at the place it 
occupies in logical space, we need to look at the internal logical relations between 
the proposition and all other propositions with sense. How can this be turned into 
a method for solving philosophical problems? The answer lies in Wittgenstein's 
claim that: "philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity. A philosophical 
work consists essentially of elucidations" (TLP 4.112). Given my previous 
remarks about the say-show distinction, it might be assumed that while a 
proposition expresses what can be said, an elucidation expresses what can only be 
shown, but this is misleading. I f we think that an elucidation 'shows' logic, we 
risk treating 'showing' as a special type of expression. It might lead us to suppose 
that we cannot say logic but we can show logic - where 'showing' is a type of 
expression that is like saying but communicates what cannot be said in a special 
way. A better interpretation is available i f we remember that what is shown shows 
itself. We do not show logic, logic shows itself: "what expresses itself'in language, 
we cannot express by means of language" (TLP 4.121).62 Once we take this into 
account we realise that the function of an elucidation is to draw attention to what 
6 1 "The mark of a logical proposition is not general validity" (TLP 6.1231). 
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shows itself. The activity of philosophy is the activity of elucidating what shows 
itself, by means of elucidations. What we need to do to remove philosophical 
confusions is to see clearly what shows itself. An elucidation does not have 
content - an elucidation does not say, show or do anything - it is a person who 
must do something, by using the elucidation. A person must look and see what 
shows itself. You cannot say to someone what shows itself, they must see it for 
themselves. Only by looking at what shows itself and attempting to see it clearly 
can the confusion be clarified. 
So what is an elucidation? An elucidation is not a particular type of 
proposition, it is anything that is used in the activity of elucidating. The term 
'elucidation' has two uses - as a noun and as a verb. An elucidation (noun) does 
not automatically elucidate (verb). The elucidation only elucidates when it is used. 
The actual elucidation (verb) of an elucidation (noun) is when a person uses it to 
see clearly. When this occurs, the elucidation (noun) drops away and only the 
elucidation (verb) remains. Or, rather, all that remains is a clear vision of what can 
be said and an absence of confusion. An elucidation draws attention to the internal 
relations between propositions with sense. Anything can be used to elucidate 
logical form - including pictures, gestures and arrangements of objects. A good 
example is a truth-table. An elucidation is any utterance that draws attention to 
what can only be shown. It can be a proposition with sense. It can be a proposition 
that is senseless. It may even be a proposition that is nonsensical, although it 
would be wrong to assume from TLP 6.54 that elucidations are a special type of 
nonsense that shows what cannot be said. Technically nonsense does not show 
anything, but it can be used to draw our attention to what is shown in ordinary 
propositions with sense. For example it is possible to put a piece of nonsense next 
to a proposition with sense and ask someone to look at the difference. The 
important point is that when a nonsensical proposition helps us to see what shows 
itself, it is not the nonsense that does this, it is the function of the elucidation. So 
"Logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in 
which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself (TLP 6.124). 
6 3 The Tractatus contains several examples: "So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects' 
as one might say, 'There are books'" (TLP 4.1272) and "(It is just as nonsensical to say, 'There is 
only one 1', as it would be to say, '2 + 2 at 3 o'clock equals 4'.) (TLP 4.1272). 
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the nonsensical remarks of the Tractatus do not help us see clearly qua nonsense, 
but qua elucidations.641 say more about this in section 2.4. 
There are remarks in the Tractatus that may be nonsense, remarks that 
may be senseless, and remarks that may have sense, but all of them are meant to 
be elucidations and they must not be treated as substantial claims. Elucidations are 
what the philosopher needs to use to help us see clearly - but it is the seeing 
clearly that matters, not what is used as an elucidation. When it has drawn 
attention to what shows itself the elucidation becomes redundant and it should not 
be treated as a claim of any kind. Elucidations are like the lines and brackets of a 
truth-table, they are helpful to see what shows itself clearly, but no-one should 
imagine that they say something. It is also important to appreciate that 
elucidations work within language, they use language to draw attention to what is 
shown in language (not to draw attention to what is shown outside language). 
What philosophers need to see clearly is what can be said - not ineffable truths 
that lie outside the limits of language. 
To sum up, the correct method of philosophy is for a person to look at the 
logic of language, so that they can see clearly instances where a proposition 
appears to say something but in fact says nothing. The method is the activity of 
elucidation and the role of an elucidation is not to say something but to draw 
attention to what shows itself - i.e. logical form. This is why the say-show 
distinction is the basis of Wittgenstein's philosophical method. 
2.3 The outcome of a philosophical task 
I now need to explain the outcome that is to be achieved by using Wittgenstein's 
philosophical method. By applying the method to a particular philosophical 
problem we can see clearly when an utterance says nothing. The temptation is to 
misinterpret this outcome. We might think it indicates that the problem is such a 
deep problem that the answer is not something that can be said. We might think 
that the problem is so deep that the answer can only communicated through a 
special type of philosophical proposition - either important nonsense, or 
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognises them as nonsensical" (TLP 6.54). 
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'showing'. Both of these are wrong, they lead to the idea that the answers to 
philosophical problems are ineffable truths. The proper outcome is that when we 
see clearly that the problem says nothing we realise that it is simply not a problem 
at al l . 6 5 I f you remain dissatisfied, i f you still have a lingering feeling that there is 
a problem, then more clarificatory work is needed because the task has not been 
completed. 
Wittgenstein warned that the book would show "how little is achieved 
when [philosophical] problems are solved" (TLP Preface p.3). He also warned of 
the likelihood that the correct method of philosophy "would not be satisfying to 
the other person" (TLP 6.53). This is because traditional philosophers expect that 
the outcome of a philosophical task is a true statement that can be added to a body 
of doctrine. Instead, we have not gained something that can be said. "Philosophy 
does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of 
propositions" (TLP 4.112). The final outcome of a philosophical task is that we 
see clearly what shows itself, so we can say what can be said clearly.66 And when 
we say what can be said, there is nothing further to be said.6 7 This means that the 
problem vanishes. Seeing clearly and saying only what can be said, simply is the 
absence of confusion. We do not feel the need to say anything further but we are 
not left contemplating ineffable truths that cannot be said. 
Wittgenstein claims that philosophy is an activity, a philosophical work 
consists of elucidations and the result is clarification: 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather the 
clarification of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task 
is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (TLP 4.112) 
"The deepest problems are in fact not problems at all" (TLP 4.003). 
6 6 "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into 
words can be put clearly" (TLP 4.116). 
6 7 "[Philosophy] will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said" (TLP 
4.115). 
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These are different, though interrelated, ideas. Philosophy is an activity but not 
simply the activity of creating elucidations. A philosophical work must consist of 
elucidations because it must encourage readers to see things clearly. The 
philosophical activity is attempting to see things clearly. The task is elucidation, 
the result is when things are seen clearly. This is important because i f the end 
result of a philosophical task was an elucidation (e.g. a drawing or diagram) then 
this could be put into words. But i f the end result is a way of seeing things clearly, 
this cannot be put into words. An elucidation can be something that is said, seeing 
clearly is not something that can be said. The work of philosophy is to produce 
elucidations but elucidations are not the end result. The end result is seeing clearly 
what shows itself, in other words to see clearly what it is possible to say. An 
elucidation can be a proposition that says something, but the use it is put to is very 
different i f is it being treated as an elucidation rather than as a proposition. The 
difference between a proposition and an elucidation is that a proposition is the end 
result (for natural science the totality of propositions - the body of doctrine - is 
the end result). An elucidation is not the end result - it merely draws attention to 
what shows itself - then the elucidation drops away when clarification has been 
achieved. 
I f my interpretation so far is correct, it throws up an important exegetical 
question. I need to explain why Wittgenstein himself does not strictly employ the 
"correct method" of philosophy in the Tractatus, or rather, I need to explain how 
he puts it into practice to a certain extent, but also tries to do something more 
ambitious. 
2.4 The task of the Tractatus 
The task of the Tractatus is not identical with the "correct method" and the 
outcome of the Tractatus is not the same as the outcome of solving a 
philosophical problem. The Tractatus does elucidate several specific 
philosophical problems, for example Russell's theory of types.69 But it does not 
just aim to elucidate particular philosophical problems, it aims to elucidate the 
"The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the 
natural sciences)" (TLP 4.11). 
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cardinal problem of philosophy. It tries to draw attention to the limit to the totality 
of what can be said, because this will also elucidate what cannot be said.70 
Drawing attention to the totality of what can be said, and therefore what cannot be 
said, wil l elucidate the form of all philosophical problems and at the same time 
provide the solution for all philosophical problems. The outcome of a particular 
philosophical task is that the problem vanishes. The outcome of the Tractatus is 
that the reader can see clearly what can be said and will thus be able to employ the 
correct method. The correct method will provide the final solution to all the 
problems of philosophy. (Although the work of elucidation wil l remain to be done 
on each particular problem.) 
So, how does the Tractatus attempt to elucidate the totality of what can 
and cannot be said? We have seen that each specific philosophical task involves 
determining whether a particular proposition has sense. The task of the Tractatus 
is to draw the limit to the totality of propositions with sense. To see i f a particular 
proposition has sense we look to the symbol rather than the sign by describing the 
values for the propositional variable, or the rule of logical syntax. To determine in 
one move all the propositions that have sense the Tractatus does the same thing 
but on a far grander scale. It presents the ultimate variable - the variable that has 
as its values all propositions with sense. This is the general form of a proposition. 
It is the rule of logical syntax, such that "every possible sense can be expressed by 
a symbol satisfying the description and every symbol satisfying the description 
can express a sense" (TLP 4.5). The general form of a proposition is [p, N(^)] 
(TLP 6). 7 1 I f p is the set of all elementary propositions and % is a selection from 
the set of elementary propositions, then the negation of that selection wil l generate 
further propositions. All propositions can be generated in this way. Thus "every 
proposition is a result of a successive applications to elementary propositions of 
the operation N ® " (TLP 6.0001). The totality of propositions with sense is 
™ See TLP 3.332 - 3.333. 
7 0 "[Philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought by working outwards through what can be 
thought." (TLP 4.114). "It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be 
said" (TLP 4.115). "It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies 
on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense" (TLP Preface p.3). 
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equivalent to the totality of elementary propositions with all their possible 
combinations. The general form of a proposition elucidates the limit of what can 
be said, but it should not be treated as a claim that has sense. It is not a theory, it is 
a logical proposition, the "sole logical constant", which shows logical form, the 
logical form of all propositions with sense, but does not say anything. 
'What shows itself is language taken as a whole - the whole system of 
internal relations. Logical form is the totality of the internal relations. Objects 
only exist insofar as they feature in possible states of affairs, names only exist 
insofar as they feature in propositions, the world is the totality of facts not of 
things - so too, propositions only exist within logical form. 7 4 When a proposition 
says something it does so only because the whole of language is shown by the 
proposition. What is shown is not just the logical form of that proposition, but the 
logical form of the whole of language. The logical scaffolding reaches out through 
logical space.75 This whole cannot be put into a single proposition - a single 
proposition cannot represent the whole of logical space. But the whole of logical 
space is shown in that there are propositions that show logical form. 
The Tractatus attempts to elucidate the totality of propositions with sense. 
This totality is equivalent to the general form of a proposition. Or rather, the 
general form of a proposition is an elucidation for the totality of propositions with 
sense. The general form of a proposition shows itself in all propositions with 
sense. To see this simply is to see the difference between propositions which say 
something and those which say nothing. The Tractatus works outwards from 
within language. It needs only to elucidate what can be said, it does not have to 
say anything about nonsense. Nonsense does not have its own characteristics, it is 
7 1 Wittgenstein claims that we might say that the General Form of a Proposition is "the sole logical 
constant" (TLP 5.47), it is "the description of the one and only general primitive sign in logic" 
(TLP 5.472). 
2 The General Form of the Proposition is "the sole logical constant" (TLP 5.47) and Wittgenstein 
claims "my fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives. There can be no 
representatives of the logic of facts" (TLP 4.0312). "All the propositions of logic say the same 
thing, to wit nothing" (TLP 5.43). 
7 3 "The totality of propositions is language" (TLP 4.001). 
74 "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (TLP 5.6). "Logic pervades the world: 
the limits of the world are also its limits" (TLP 5.61). 
7 5 "The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They 
presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their 
connection with the world" (TLP 6.124). 
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determined only by failing to have sense. Nonsense does not show anything. What 
can be said can be said and this totality is what determines nonsense. However, it 
is not the case that everything that does not say something is nonsense. It is simply 
the case that everything that does not say something does not say something. 
There are two alternatives to what can be said - nonsense and silence. I f I put a 
book on a table, it is not usually appropriate to call it nonsense because neither is 
it appropriate to say that it has sense. This is because the arrangement of the book 
on the table is not being treated as a proposition. It is, however, possible to treat a 
book on a table as a propositional sign - for example it could represent "it is 
raining". In this case the arrangement either has sense or it is nonsense. So in 
order for us to call something nonsense we must be treating it as a proposition. I 
will now argue that i f we treat the remarks in the Tractatus as propositions ( i f we 
think that they have sense) then they are nonsense. I f we do not treat them as 
propositions then they are neither sense nor nonsense, they are elucidations. This 
is why it is important to understand the distinction between sense and nonsense in 
terms of the say-show distinction, rather than explain the say-show distinction in 
terms of a theory of sense and nonsense. 
TLP 6.54 is needed because of the gap between what Wittgenstein 
proposes as the correct method of philosophy and what he does in the Tractatus.76 
I interpret TLP 6.54 in the following way. The remarks of the Tractatus are signs, 
but a sign in itself is not either sense or nonsense. We must look to the symbol, to 
how the signs are used with a sense. I f we look at the remarks of the Tractatus and 
assume that they are propositions then most of the remarks are nonsense - we 
make an assumption that they have sense, but they do not have the logico-
syntactic use that we imagine. We need to realise that our assumption has created 
our confusion - i.e. treating the remarks as propositions means that they are 
nonsense (nonsense is something that is treated as though it has sense when it 
does not). By undoing our assumption, we can instead see the remarks as 
elucidations. When we see them as elucidations we do not treat them as though 
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond 
them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it.) He must transcend 
these propositions and then he will see the world aright" (TLP 6.54). 
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they say anything. We look at what the propositions draw our attention to, at what 
shows itself, rather than what they say. I f we think they say something then they 
are nonsense, i f we look at what shows itself then they are elucidations. Seeing 
them as elucidations means that they cease to be nonsense (because we no longer 
think they say something), so they just drop away. This is how the reader of the 
Tractatus is to "throw away the ladder after he has climbed up i t" (TLP 6.54). 
The Tractatus is an elucidatory text that is designed to introduce the reader 
to the correct conception of philosophy and then make itself redundant. In fact i f 
the reader could already act in the way recommended by TLP 7, then the 
Tractatus would not be necessary. Hence why it may only make sense to a person 
for whom it is already redundant.77 The purpose of the book is achieved when a 
person understands the book, but the book must not be treated as a body of 
doctrine, it is "not a textbook" (TLP Preface p.3). Wittgenstein does not want the 
reader to think something, but to do something. This is how the aim of the book 
does coincide with the aim of philosophy. What counts as understanding the book 
is engaging in the activity of trying to see clearly. This is why the say-show 
distinction is important for how we read the Tractatus. The person who sees 
clearly will say only what can be said and then remain silent. The activity of 
seeing clearly is its own reward. For Wittgenstein, seeing clearly is the aim of the 
Tractatus and also the aim of philosophical activity as I now explain. 
2.5 The overall aim of philosophical activity 
When the reader ceases to see the remarks of the Tractatus as propositions and 
comes to see them as elucidations, they cease to be nonsense, cease to be sense. 
They just drop away. The reader is left not with a theory of language, but a new 
conception of philosophy. Only one remark remains: "what we cannot speak 
about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7). One way to interpret the main point 
would be as follows: 'what we can say' we can say clearly and 'what we cannot 
say' we can only show when we are silent (we can show it only without saying 
anything). Indeed many commentators associate the limits of language with the 
'Terhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the 
thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts" (TLP Preface p.3). 
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limits of what can be said and claim that the silence beyond the limits of language 
is the realm of what can only be shown. This is a common misinterpretation. The 
correct view is that the limits of language are the limits of what can be said and 
also what can only be shown.78 Saying and showing are both features of language: 
what is shown shows itself when we say anything - ordinary propositions with 
sense show that they have sense, logical propositions show that they say nothing. 
Silence does not involve either saying or showing. It is wrong to imagine that the 
silence contains something ineffable that can be shown but not said. What is 
shown is within the realm of language and therefore within the reach of 
philosophy. 
This has important implications for the aim of philosophical activity. The 
work of philosophy takes place within language, within what is thinkable. When 
the work of philosophy is done, what remains is silence. Silence is required when 
philosophy reaches the limit of what it can say (and hence also the limit of what is 
shown). Silence is not a further philosophical activity, it is where philosophy 
stops. We must resist the temptation to think that being silent involves showing 
something. Nothing ineffable is shown when we are silent. When we have said 
what can be said clearly we can remain silent. Nothing more needs to be said and 
nothing further shows itself. I f philosophers could recognise where to stop, there 
would be no philosophical problems, but the philosophical urge is precisely the 
urge to say things even when there is nothing to be said. This is why philosophical 
propositions can be characterised as nonsense, although they are not to be 
characterised as important nonsense - nonsense that shows something that cannot 
be said. 
Seeing clearly involves seeing clearly the totality that is language and the 
world, but the vision of this totality cannot be put into words.7 9 Philosophy is not 
the activity of showing. Philosophy is the activity of attempting to see clearly 
In notes dictated to G. E . Moore, Wittgenstein described the say-show distinction as "what can 
be shewn by the language but not said" (Notebooks 1914-1916 p.109). The distinction is not 
between what can be said in language and what can be shown outside of language, or shown by 
something that is not language. Language is what shows itself. 
7 9 "To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole. Feeling the 
world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical" (TLP 6.45). "Logic pervades the world: the 
limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, 
but not that'" (TLP 5.61). 
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what is shown in order to say only what can be said and recognise when to be 
silent. When the task is accomplished and you do see clearly, it is not possible to 
put your point of view on the world into words because this would involve saying 
on 
what can only show itself. Furthermore only you can see what you see clearly. 
That you can't put what you see into words is the other side of the coin from the 
point that you can't put what shows itself into words. Each person must attempt to 
see for themselves. Elucidations are a way of encouraging others to see for 
themselves what shows itself. The solution of a problem is not something that a 
philosopher can say or show. It is what the philosopher can see when they see 
clearly: "the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the 
problem. (Is this not the reason why those who have found after a long period of 
doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say 
what constituted that sense?)" (TLP 6.521 - my italics). 
Wittgenstein elucidates the totality of what can be said and what can be 
shown and this totality leaves two 'others' to language - nonsense and silence. 
When we have reached the limit of what can be said, we have a choice and we 
should choose silence rather than choose nonsense. This choice is something that 
we must do. We can choose to make noise or choose be silent. Although nonsense 
is what lies beyond language and silence is what lies beyond language, talking 
nonsense is not the same as being silent. The difference between a philosopher 
who sees clearly and one who does not is a difference in whether they say 
anything at all, rather than a difference in the philosophical claims they make. 
Philosophy is a way of seeing the totality of propositions (the totality of 
propositions with sense, not just the true propositions), so it is something entirely 
different to the natural sciences. Philosophy helps to clarify our vision of the 
totality of propositions with sense, this is how "philosophy sets limits to the much 
disputed sphere of natural science" (TLP 4.113). Philosophy is not outside logical 
This appears to be the basis of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism, although, as with the issue 
of ethics, this issue cannot be investigated here. 'Tor what the solipsist means is quite correct; only 
it cannot be said, but shows itself [es zeigt sich]. The world is my world: this shows itself [es zeigt 
sich] in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the 
limits of my world" (TLP 5.62). 
8 1 "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something 
whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)" (TLP 4.111). 
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form, it must work from within language. In the final section of the Tractatus (the 
6.5s) everything that can count as a problem is either something that can be said 
or it is not a problem. Non-problems are dissolved by seeing clearly that they 
attempt to ask a question where nothing can be said. This is where we need to be 
silent. Philosophers have a great resistance to this idea. They assume that 
Wittgenstein is wrong, that there really is something that can be said. This 
response begs the question against Wittgenstein. He wants philosophers to let go 
of their assumption that something needs to be said, but philosophers use this 
assumption to argue that Wittgenstein is wrong. This is the main problem with 
critics who label Wittgenstein a quietist. They assume that there is something that 
needs to be said and that Wittgenstein is telling us that we cannot say it. 
Wittgenstein is telling us that what can be said can be said. When we have said 
what can be said we do not need to be quiet about something. We just need to be 
quiet. 
I have attributed to Wittgenstein the idea that the ultimate aim of 
philosophical activity is the end of philosophical activity - the aim is silence. This 
position is likely to attract accusations that it is defeatist and that it belittles the 
role of philosophy (particularly in comparison with science). I wil l briefly offer a 
defence. There are remarks in the Tractatus which could be used to argue that 
philosophy is more important than science because the philosophical task of 
clarifying which propositions have sense is logically prior to the scientific task of 
determining which propositions are true.8 2 However, I prefer to argue that 
Wittgenstein believed that philosophy matters in its own right. Philosophy is not 
less important than science, but it is different. The end result is not new 
information, we end up knowing only what we already knew, but the difference is 
that we are now able to see it clearly. Seeing clearly is its own reward. The value 
of each task depends upon how extensive is the particular problem - how deep the 
mistakes are in our thinking and how difficult it is to remove the confusion. The 
deeper the problem, the harder we must work before we can see clearly and the 
more it matters that we try to do so. Although when the problems are solved, in 
98 
Ch.5: The say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
one sense we see "how little is achieved", because we gain no new knowledge, in 
another sense the silence that is the aim of philosophy is a hugely valuable 
achievement. 
3 The say-show distinction in the Tractatus 
I have claimed that the say-show distinction underwrites Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy. By this I mean that the distinction is what we need to 
understand i f we are to understand his conception of philosophy. In this section I 
summarise the role of the say-show distinction and further clarify my 
interpretation, including my responses to some potential objections. 
The say-show distinction is the cardinal problem of philosophy. It is the 
general form of all philosophical problems. Philosophical problems appear to say 
something, but they actually say nothing. 
The say-show distinction offers the final solution to all philosophical 
problems. I f we pay attention to what shows itself then we will see whether we are 
saying something or uttering nonsense. We do not need special propositions to do 
this. What shows itself does so in ordinary propositions. We can use any type of 
utterance as an elucidation; all that matters is that we see clearly what shows 
itself. 
The say-show distinction helps us to dispel philosophical problems and it 
helps us to avoid philosophical problems. It enables us to point out nonsense and 
to say clearly what can be said (avoid nonsense). In both cases the desired 
outcome of a task is to see clearly what shows itself. 
Saying and showing are both within the totality of language. The limit of 
what can be said is also the limit of what shows itself. Philosophical activity takes 
place only within the realm of language. What can be said can be said. That the 
totality of language is what can be said shows itself. What lies outside language 
"Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science" (TLP 4.113). 'The word 
'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside 
them" (TLP 4.111). 
8 3 "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is this not the 
reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to 
them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)" (TLP 6.521). 
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neither says nor shows. It is nonsense or silence. The overall aim of philosophical 
activity is to reach silence when what can be said has been said. 
It might be objected that, in interpreting the say-show distinction as the 
basis of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, I owe an explanation of what 
status I think this distinction has - is it an empirical doctrine? A metaphysical 
doctrine? A therapeutic pseudo-doctrine? I f the Tractatus were an ordinary 
philosophical textbook, presenting a unified theory of language, logic and 
ontology, then the say-show distinction would be a doctrine about the ineffable 
logical relation between language and world. But the Tractatus "is not a textbook" 
(TLP Preface p.3); it does not present a theory of language and the world. It is a 
challenge to traditional assumptions about the aims and methods of philosophy 
and introduces a revolutionary conception of philosophy. The say-show 
distinction is bound up with the issue of language, but it is not a doctrine about 
language, it is a distinction for a philosophical purpose. I f there were no 
philosophical confusions, no practice of philosophical enquiry, there would not be 
any need for the say-show distinction. It is not a feature of language independent 
of philosophy. It is not something that scientists or linguists would discover i f 
they examined language. It is Wittgenstein's way of characterising how 
philosophers should see language i f they are to resolve philosophical confusions. 
In other words it is a mistake to assume that the say-show distinction is a 'real' 
feature of language and the world, just as it is a mistake to assume that it gives the 
'transcendental' conditions for the possibility of language. The point is that i /we 
are gripped by philosophical concerns, i /we feel the need to solve philosophical 
problems, then it will be helpful to see language in terms of the say-show 
distinction. I f we are not troubled in this way, then we do not need to accept the 
say-show distinction as a theory about the relationship between language and 
world, as though it were a discovery similar to atomic theory or the law of gravity. 
The say-show distinction is neither a doctrine nor a pseudo-doctrine, it is 
simply an elucidation that serves a philosophical purpose. It is used to draw our 
attention to what shows itself. This leaves a benign circularity in my 
interpretation. I accept Wittgenstein's idea that a work of philosophy offers 
elucidations not doctrines, which leads me to treat the say-show distinction as an 
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elucidation not a doctrine. The distinction then elucidates the very idea that 
philosophy is an elucidatory activity not a body of doctrines. However, this 
benign circularity is more coherent than the vicious circularity in many 
interpretations which criticise the Tractatus. They assume that philosophy offers 
doctrines and theories, so treat the say-show distinction as a doctrine (moreover an 
incoherent doctrine), then argue that the doctrine cannot support the view that a 
work of philosophy should consist of elucidations not doctrines. 
In my interpretation, the say-show distinction is an elucidatory device that 
draws attention to the nature of philosophical problems and, in the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein believed that the distinction would provide "the final solution of the 
problems" (TLP Preface p.4). This was because elucidation (seeing clearly) makes 
philosophical problems disappear, so elucidating the nature of all philosophical 
problems will make all philosophical problems disappear. This interpretation may 
be misunderstood. My claim is not that the say-show distinction generates 
philosophical problems. I do not follow those commentators who think that 
Wittgenstein viewed the say-show distinction as a feature of language which 
generates philosophical problems, such that philosophical problems are attempt to 
say something that can only be shown. My interpretation is that the say-show 
distinction is not a feature of language, it is a feature of philosophy. It is the form 
that all philosophical problems take because they are all misunderstandings of 
language. Wittgenstein's point is that philosophical problems are attempts to say 
something when nothing can be said. Rather than trying to say or show something, 
philosophers need to see clearly what shows itself. Then they wil l say only what 
can be said and recognise when to be silent. 
Several commentators have argued that there are two versions of the say-
show distinction in the Tractatus, although they disagree about how these two 
versions should be explained.84 The only extent to which I think there are two 
versions is as follows. What shows itself is the internal relations of logical form 
within the totality of language. In this type of showing nonsense and silence do 
not show anything. However, the totality of propositions with sense constitutes the 
limits of language, the limits of what can be said. That these are the limits of what 
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can be said shows that what lies on the other side of the limit is nonsense. So we 
might claim that, in the latter instance, nonsense is also shown but not said. 
However, nonsense does not show anything and nonsense does not show itself. 
The totality of language shows that nonsense is nonsense. Nonsense does not 
show us that it is nonsense. Moreover in the Tractatus itself Wittgenstein does not 
employ the say-show distinction (or a method of "showing") to "show" something 
that cannot be said, nor does he use nonsense to show something that cannot be 
said. His approach assumes that i f we put into place everything that can be said, 
then this totality shows everything that can be said, and thereby shows what 
cannot be said. This may seem ambiguous so to repeat: the point is not that what 
cannot be said (the inexpressible) is shown. The point is that the limits of 
language are the limits of what is said and shown and this is what delimits the 
inexpressible. There is a further potential misunderstanding that I wish to avoid. I 
have said that the limit of what can be said is both the limit of what can be said 
and also the limit of what can be shown. What is shown simply is the totality of 
what can be said, everything else is nonsense or silence. This does not mean that 
the realm of what cannot be said is something shown. It is correct to say that 
"what can be said" is the same as "the sayable" which is the same as "sense". It is 
not correct to treat "what can be shown" as "the unsayable" and "nonsense", these 
notions are not equivalent. 
My interpretation runs contrary to the idea that "what can be shown cannot 
be said" (TLP 4.1212) means that the role of science is to say what can be said 
and the role of philosophy is to show what can only be shown. I reject the idea 
that philosophical propositions do not say anything but they show ineffable truths, 
or the idea that philosophical propositions are nonsense, but they show what 
cannot be said. When we talk about the distinction between saying and showing, 
we should not imagine there are two activities we can do - saying and showing, 
such that showing is a bit like saying only a different way of expressing thoughts. 
There is not an activity of 'showing' that we can engage in because we do not 
show what is shown, what is shown shows itself. Showing is not something that 
we do. What we do is express our thoughts using language (TLP 4.121). We make 
See Block (1980), Conant (2000) and Koethe (1996). 
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ourselves understood through propositions that say something (TLP 4.026), but 
what is shown expresses itself in what is said (TLP 4.124). By emphasising this 
point strongly I risk making it seem less credible. Of course when we employ an 
elucidation to draw someone's attention to what shows itself, then in a sense we 
are 'showing' that person something. But my concern is that used in this manner 
"showing" appears too similar to "saying". We might imagine that we use a 
proposition to say something and an elucidation to show something, so saying and 
showing are simply two different ways of expressing ourselves, expressing our 
thoughts. Wittgenstein emphasises that what is shown shows itself in language, it 
is not something that we show: "what expresses itself in language, we cannot 
express by means of language" (TLP 4.121). 
Another problem is that the say-show distinction in the Tractatus can lead 
philosophers to treat 'showing' as the really important issue - we all know what 
saying means, saying is the purview of science and ordinary empirical speech, so 
the philosophically significant issue must be 'what is shown'. It is true that 
Wittgenstein requires philosophers to pay attention to what shows itself, but this is 
only in order to gain a better understanding of 'saying' - to properly appreciate 
the amazing idea that what can be said can be said. My interpretation thus 
highlights a truism, the "unassailable" truth that Wittgenstein wants us to see 
clearly: what can be said can be said. This platitude is important (but shows how 
little is achieved by the Tractatus). Its purpose is to relieve the mental cramp of 
philosophers who are tempted to think that there are facts beyond the sayable that 
are unsayable. Wittgenstein reminds us that what can be said can be said clearly, 
but often is not said clearly. Philosophers who believe that they are struggling to 
express an unsayable fact, or an idea that they can think but not say, need to see 
their problem in a different light. They need to appreciate that they are not 
struggling to say something unsayable, they are failing to say clearly what can be 
said. The say-show distinction is, then, a philosophical truism which is that we say 
things in language, but i f we want to see whether language says something we 
must look, there is not something further to say. It isn't that the silence shows us 
something. It is that when we see what shows itself we realise that nothing needs 
to be said and therefore all we need to do is be silent. 
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4 Summary 
I have argued that the Tractatus offers a critique of traditional philosophy and 
offers an alternative account of the nature of philosophical problems and the 
appropriate methods for resolving them. I have also argued that the say-show 
distinction is the basis of this conception of philosophy. However, Wittgenstein 
himself claimed that the Tractatus contained "grave mistakes" (PI Preface p.viii). 
Does this mean that we should assume that the whole conception of philosophy I 
have just introduced is flawed? Does it mean that the Investigations rejects the 
say-show distinction? I believe not. In the next chapter I discuss the failure of the 
Tractatus, but also explain why Wittgenstein retained fundamentally the same 
conception of philosophy in the Investigations. Then, in chapter 7, 1 defend the 
view that the say-show distinction is the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy in the Investigations. 
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1 Introduction 
In the preface to the Investigations Wittgenstein wrote: " I have been forced to 
recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in [the Tractatus]" (PI Preface p.viii). 
Wittgenstein believed that the Tractatus contained mistakes, but he did not 
consider it to be entirely worthless. In this chapter I explain why Wittgenstein 
considered the Tractatus to be a failure and discuss which aspects of the Tractatus 
he rejected. I then outline some significant aspects of the Tractatus that 
Wittgenstein did not reject and suggest that the legacy of these aspects can be seen 
in the Investigations. I briefly consider what commentators have judged to be the 
failure of the Tractatus, but my main concern is to know what Wittgenstein 
himself judged to be the mistakes in the Tractatus when he wrote the 
Investigations. This is what we need to establish i f we are to appreciate why he 
wanted the Tractatus to be read alongside the Investigations. 
The most obvious problem with the Tractatus is that can appear to be self-
referentially incoherent.1 Many commentators have seized upon this and made it 
the basis of their account of why Wittgenstein later believed the Tractatus to be a 
failure, but I think this is a red herring. The apparent self-reflexive problem of the 
Tractatus is not the 'grave mistake' that Wittgenstein refers to in the 
Investigations. To gain a correct understanding of the failure of the Tractatus, I 
first describe the incoherence problem and explain why this is not the grave 
mistake that commentators take it to be. I then explain where the real failure of the 
Tractatus lies. 
This objection can be traced back as far as Russell's introduction to the Tractatus where he 
remarks: "Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said" (TLP 
Introduction p.xxi). 
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2 The apparent failure of the Tractatus 
Many commentators believe that the Tractatus was a failure because it is self-
referentially incoherent. They assume that Wittgenstein either did not realise this 
at the time of writing the Tractatus, or he believed wrongly that he had managed 
to avoid the problem. They furthermore suppose that when he returned to 
philosophy he either recognised for the first time that the book was incoherent, or 
he realised that the strategy he had used to avoid the problem was flawed. These 
views are mistaken and the mistakes are significant because they involve a 
misinterpretation of the say-show distinction. In the first instance people often 
consider the say-show distinction to be the culprit for the self-referential 
incoherence and think that Wittgenstein just failed to recognise the problem -
namely that the book says what cannot be said. In the second instance they 
suppose that Wittgenstein had recognised the problem, but thought that the say-
show distinction would rescue the book from incoherence because it can show 
what cannot be said rather than say what cannot be said. In both cases 
philosophers assume that when he wrote the Investigations, Wittgenstein believed 
that the say-show distinction was irreparably flawed and that the Tractatus was 
thus a failure. This is how the failure of the book is typically made to rest on the 
failure of the say-show distinction. It also gives rise to the commonly held idea 
that the say-show distinction is a 'grave mistake' in the Tractatus. 
The views described are held by commentators who read the Tractatus 
from the standpoint of traditional philosophy, those who assume that the say-show 
distinction is a theory or doctrine about language and world. Treated as such the 
distinction is clearly in tension with ideas expressed in the Tractatus, namely that 
philosophy should not consist of substantial philosophical doctrines, and so 
renders the book self-referentially incoherent. On this reading TLP 6.54 is 
interpreted as an indication that what the book appears to say cannot be said but 
can only be shown, which in turn explains why the book is nonsense. This has led 
to the idea that Wittgenstein wanted his remarks to be taken as 'important 
nonsense', nonsense that 'shows' ineffable truths that cannot be said. Peter 
Carruthers is a representative example. He rejects the stylistic demands of the 
Tractatus: "my own view is that art and philosophy ought not to be mixed" 
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(Carruthers 1989, xii), and makes his traditional standpoint clear: "my overall goal 
is truth. The doctrines of the TLP must therefore be assessed" (Carruthers 1989, 
2). His criticism starts with the point that, according to TLP 6.54, "a piece of 
nonsense can show something [.. .] since Wittgenstein thinks that the nonsensical 
propositions in a philosophical work can help us to see the world aright" 
(Carruthers 1989, 56). He then rejects the say-show distinction using the 
following argument: 
Something, somewhere, has surely gone wrong with the showing/saying 
doctrine. [.. .] it must be wholly unacceptable to claim that all of 
philosophy is nonsense. For either a nonsensical sentence can show us 
something or it cannot. I f it cannot, then Wittgenstein's claim at 6.54 that 
anyone understanding TLP would be led to see the world aright must be 
unfounded; indeed there can be no such subject as philosophy. But if, on 
the other hand, a piece of nonsense can show us something, then there 
must somehow be a distinction to be drawn between illuminating and 
unilluminating nonsense. (Carruthers 1989, 57-58) 
This argument contains a series of mistakes that are characteristic of criticisms of 
the Tractatus. The mistakes are based on a misinterpretation of the say-show 
distinction. Carruthers thinks that TLP 6.54 indicates that the Tractatus consists of 
nonsense. He assumes that this is a consequence of the say-show distinction, as, 
the distinction apparently commits Wittgenstein to the view that all philosophy is 
nonsense, including the Tractatus. He imagines that Wittgenstein nonetheless 
thinks that nonsensical sentences 'show' something even though they do not say 
anything. Then, by pointing out the incoherence in this view of nonsense, believes 
he is entitled to reject the say-show distinction. A l l of the steps in this argument 
are wrong. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, recent commentators have 
attempted to avoid this conclusion by taking a non-traditional approach and 
reading the Tractatus from the standpoint that the book itself recommends. Their 
intention is well-placed, but in practice they make a major mistake. To take 
seriously the idea that the book does not present doctrines, they focus on TLP 6.54 
as the key to understanding Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. In doing so 
commentators privilege TLP 6.54 over the say-show distinction. They invoke TLP 
6.54 to claim that the say-show distinction is utter nonsense that must be thrown 
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away. Read in this way the book is considered a success when it encourages the 
reader to see that the say-show distinction is a pseudo-doctrine which is utter 
nonsense. These commentators therefore disagree with the traditional view that 
Wittgenstein failed in his sincere attempt to make the Tractatus coherent. They 
suggest instead that the self-referential incoherence of the Tractatus was a 
deliberate ploy, designed to demonstrate that any such philosophical project is 
fundamentally flawed. I f this is so, then the success of the book is made to rest on 
the failure of the say-show distinction. In other words, the Tractatus achieves its 
aim i f the reader recognises that the say-show distinction is nonsense. Despite 
denying that the Tractatus is a failure, this interpretation shares the view held by 
the former group of commentators that the say-show distinction is fundamentally 
flawed and leads only to self-referential incoherence.2 
The views I have described all accept that the say-show distinction is 
flawed. The differences between them hinge on whether they take Wittgenstein to 
have been aware of this flaw at the time of writing, whether he thought the flaw 
could be avoided, or whether he purposefully included the flawed distinction. In 
all cases I propose that the alleged flaw - the charge of self-referential 
incoherence - is the result of a mistaken understanding of the say-show 
distinction, combined with a mistaken understanding of how to read the book. 
Both the traditional and non-traditional readings have misunderstood the 
relationship between the say-show distinction and TLP 6.54. Both groups share 
the view that we should use TLP 6.54 as the key to understanding the say-show 
distinction, rather than the other way round. Rather than privilege TLP 6.54 as 
others have done, my view is that we should use the say-show distinction to 
understand the conception of philosophy summed up in TLP 7 and use this 
conception of philosophy to understand the need for TLP 6.54. This is the proper 
2 On this type of account the say-show distinction is not a grave mistake insofar as it is incoherent. 
It is a mistake because it is insufficiently obvious that it is nonsense. In other words the say-show 
distinction fails not because it is nonsense, but because the Tractarian method of uncovering 
nonsense does not work. This is Conant's position: "When Wittgenstein himself criticises the 
Tractatus's mode of philosophical presentation it is not [...] on the grounds that its doctrine is 
flawed, but on the grounds that its method is flawed: it is inherently dogmatic - the work cultivates 
the impression that things are being dogmatically asserted" (Conant 1995, 297). 
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way to make an interpretation cohere with Wittgenstein's explicit statement that 
whole point of the book is summed up in the Preface and TLP 7. 
I believe that Wittgenstein was well aware that the expression of his ideas 
in the Tractatus was problematic, but did not believe that the book was self-
referentially incoherent. Or, rather, he could see that it would appear self-
referentially incoherent from the perspective of traditional philosophy, but knew 
that i f it was seen from the perspective of his alternative conception of philosophy 
it would work. TLP 6.54 is not required because the book is self-referentially 
incoherent (whether intentionally or unintentionally). It is required to prevent the 
book being read in a way that will make it appear self-referentially incoherent. 
TLP 6.54 is Wittgenstein's way of dealing with the difficulty of expressing his 
vision of philosophy in a book. It is an attempt to stop the reader treating the work 
as doctrine rather than elucidation. TLP 6.54 should not be read as saying that 
every remark in the book is nonsense (whether 'important nonsense' or 'utter 
nonsense'), it should be read as saying that every remark in the book should be 
taken as an elucidation rather than a proposition because i f treated as propositions 
they are only nonsense. This is not an attempt by Wittgenstein to be cryptic, it is 
wholly consistent as a consequence of his view that the task of philosophy is to 
offer elucidations rather than propositions. When he published the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein was confident that his conception of philosophy was correct, but 
recognised that his book might not adequately demonstrate this conception, hence 
his admission that in expressing his thoughts " I am conscious of falling a long 
way short of what is possible" (TLP Preface p.4). Although there was indeed a 
problem with the presentation of his ideas, the apparent incoherence is not the 
'grave mistake' he mentioned in the Investigations because even at the time of 
writing the Tractatus Wittgenstein realised that this was a problem. I f the book is 
read in the correct way - as elucidations not propositions - it is not self-
referentially incoherent because it does not say what cannot be said, nor does it 
appeal to an illicit alternative form of expression - i.e. 'showing' ineffable truths. 
It is not an ineffable doctrine and it is not a pseudo-doctrine. It is an elucidatory 
device employed to introduce an elucidatory method of philosophy. 
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Although the style of presentation is a problem for the Tractatus, it is not a 
grave mistake. When he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed that the ladder 
device in TLP 6.54 could be employed successfully - it should be possible for the 
reader to treat the remarks as elucidations rather than propositions, so they would 
not be nonsense and could be thrown away when they had served their purpose. 
The measure of success for this device is whether all of the elucidations of the 
Tractatus work as elucidations. We know this because when writing the book 
Wittgenstein only included remarks that he considered to be elucidations. In a 
t h 
letter to Ogden (5 May 1922) Wittgenstein refused to allow his remaining notes 
to be added to the Tractatus: 
The supplements are exactly what must not be printed. Besides THEY 
REALLY CONTAIN NO ELUCIDATIONS AT ALL. {Letters to C. K. 
Ogden, p.46) 
However, in the Investigations he indicates that some of the elucidations of the 
Tractatus were unsuccessful. In fact the most ambitious and important elucidation 
did not work - namely the general form of a proposition. From the perspective of 
his later work, the gesture of revocation in TLP 6.54 cannot be performed 
successfully. Not all the elucidations are effective, so they cannot all be entirely 
thrown away. This does not mean, however, that the conception of a work of 
philosophy as elucidation, or the activity of philosophy as seeing clearly is flawed. 
I rejected the idea that Wittgenstein had reason to call the say-show 
distinction a 'grave mistake' due to self-referential incoherence of one form or 
another. But is it possible that the say-show distinction was a mistake for other 
reasons? I believe not. I f the say-show distinction involved a theory or doctrine of 
language or the world, then it would be a grave mistake because Wittgenstein did 
later reject many Tractarian presuppositions about language. But the say-show 
distinction is not a theory or doctrine. Instead I demonstrated in chapter 5 that it is 
the basis for Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. To establish that he did not 
believe the distinction to be a mistake, I argue in chapter 7 that the same 
conception of philosophy features in the Investigations. Once this is done it will 
establish beyond doubt that the say-show distinction was not one of the grave 
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mistakes in the Tractatus. Now we must consider what are the real 'grave 
mistakes' in the Tractatus. 
3 The real failure of the Tractatus 
It is wrong to think that 'grave mistakes' entail that the book fails utterly. This is 
something that many critics argued even before the Investigations was published, 
but it was not Wittgenstein's own assessment. His view was that the book worked, 
but presented a mistaken picture of language. According to Anscombe, 
"Wittgenstein used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a 
bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right 
time" (Anscombe 1959, 78). Malcolm claimed that "he told me once that he really 
thought that in the Tractatus he had provided a perfected account of a view that is 
the only alternative to the viewpoint of his later work" (Malcolm 1967, 69). 
The grave mistakes arose because Wittgenstein failed to properly employ 
his own method of philosophy in the Tractatus, or rather, there were problems 
with the way he employed the method. This is not a form of self-referential 
incoherence - what he did was consistent with the method he had proposed, but he 
misjudged the outcome. The Tractatus is a working clock, but it tells the wrong 
time. As we saw in the last chapter, Wittgenstein wanted philosophers to say 
clearly what can be said and avoid using signs that say nothing. Philosophy should 
be an activity, the activity of attempting to see clearly what shows itself, rather 
than stating true claims. The correct method is to use elucidations rather than 
propositions and the required outcome of a task is to achieve clarity of what 
shows itself. Wittgenstein's work in the Tractatus was in accordance with all of 
these principles, yet the Tractatus contained grave mistakes. I argue that the grave 
mistakes arose because certain presuppositions insidiously distorted his work. 
However, the presuppositions were not intrinsic to his conception of philosophy, 
they were additional demands of which Wittgenstein was oblivious. It is as though 
Wittgenstein set the clock to the wrong time to begin with (or did not check that it 
was set at the right time to begin with), then wound it up and let it run. When he 
came to read the time from the clock it told the wrong time, but not because it was 
failing to work properly. I explain how this occurred by drawing on discussions in 
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the Investigations which diagnose his former presuppositions. A l l the remarks up 
to PI 143 shed light on Wittgenstein's rejection of the Tractatus, but, to be 
economical, I focus on the main points contained in PI 89 to PI 115. In particular I 
discuss the numerous presuppositions which combine to form the main mistake, 
the 'wrong time' that is on the face of the clock: namely the general form of a 
proposition. 
When Wittgenstein employed his new philosophical method, his biggest 
achievement was the general form of a proposition. This is the most important 
elucidation in the Tractatus, its function is to draw attention to the totality of 
propositions with sense - the totality of what can be said and shown. The general 
form of proposition works within what can be said to draw a limit to what cannot 
be said. It permits the clarification of all propositions with sense and in doing so 
provides the final solution to the problems of philosophy. In the Investigations 
Wittgenstein has his interlocutor refer to the general form of a proposition as "the 
very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache" (PI 65). 
Wittgenstein responds by admitting that he no longer sees his task as "producing 
something in common to all that we call language" (PI 65). This was one of 
Wittgenstein's presuppositions in the Tractatus - it was the idea that there is an 
"essence" to all language uses, something that they have in common. In terms of 
the Tractatus this is seen in the idea that a prepositional symbol is a variable and 
all the values of the variable have the same essence, the same logical form. The 
general form of a proposition is the ultimate variable - the essence of what is 
common to all propositions. It was the sole logical constant, the rule which laid 
down in advance all possible combinations of propositions with sense. 
By unpacking various problems with the general form of a proposition I 
shall demonstrate that these were generated by Wittgenstein's requirement to see 
clearly the sense of a proposition, combined with a misunderstanding of what 
seeing clearly would involve. The following is a brief outline of the key issues 
before I discuss them individually. The general form of a proposition is based 
upon the assumption that the sense of a proposition is determinate - each 
proposition has one and only one complete analysis. The logical analysis of a 
prepositional sign is achieved by identifying the prepositional symbol - the 
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essence of the proposition is the variable that the proposition has in common with 
all other signs that can be employed with an identical sense, i.e. all the signs that 
share the same logical form. As logical form is essential and determinate it is not 
apparent in prepositional signs (which are accidental and indeterminate) and must 
instead be seen as a structure that underlies ordinary language use - it is hidden 
but can be uncovered by logical analysis. Logical form is a single, complete 
system. Language forms a totality and all meaningful propositions are constructed 
according to the rules of logical syntax. The rules of logical syntax are ultimately 
reducible to one logical constant - the general form of a proposition - hence all 
language works in the same way. Now I shall explain why these features of the 
general form of a proposition arise from Wittgenstein's methodological demand 
for clarity. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein claimed that "philosophy aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts" (TLP 4.112). He assumed that logical clarity would 
reveal the exact, determinate sense of each proposition. Anything less would not 
count as seeing clearly the logical essence of the proposition. I f a proposition has 
a determinate sense, then the sense must be definite.3 An indefinite sense could 
not be determinate, logic cannot be vague, so it was assumed that clarifying 
concepts involved making them more definite, more exact.4 In the Investigations 
he characterises the requirement for exactness as follows: 
We eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; 
but now it may look as i f we were moving towards a particular state, a 
state of complete exactness; and as i f this were the real goal of our 
investigation. (PI 91) 
This illusory state of complete exactness is precisely that offered by the general 
form of a proposition, and it is why the latter was seen as the ultimate aim of the 
Tractatus. Language is treated as a complete, unified system with an exact limit. 5 
The general form of a proposition is the sharp boundary that exactly demarcates 
"The sense of a sentence - one would like to say - may, of course leave this or that open, but the 
sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. An indefinite sense - that would really not be a 
sense at air (PI 99). 
4 "We want to say that there cannot be any vagueness in logic" (PI 101). 
5 "An indefinite sense - that would really not be a sense at all. This is like: an indefinite boundary 
is not really a boundary at all" (PI 99). 
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the limit of language, the limit between propositions which say something and 
those which say nothing. The idea that an exact limit of language could be 
elucidated was a logical extension of the principle that this could be achieved in 
the case of ordinary propositions. Each proposition has a complete analysis, so it 
seemed possible to provide a complete analysis of all propositions - indeed it was 
necessary to do so i f complete clarity was to be achieved.6 When he later criticised 
this assumption, Wittgenstein acknowledged that it is possible to give ordinary 
propositions a sharp boundary for particular purposes, but his mistake was to 
imagine that this was required for the totality of propositions.7 His point was not 
that it is impossible to draw such a limit, but rather that he had misunderstood the 
need for such an absolute and permanent boundary.8 
A crucial factor in Wittgenstein's employment of the general form of a 
proposition was his treatment of the distinction between the essential and 
accidental features of propositions.9 He assumed that the apparent differences 
between the function of words was only superficial and accidental. Underneath, at 
the level of the logical symbol, all propositions with sense could be derived from 
the general form of a proposition. This was the guarantee that the sense of each 
proposition was determinate and laid down, once and for all, in advance of actual 
uses of language. In the Investigations Wittgenstein criticises the idea that the uses 
of language are "something fixed, given once for all" (PI 23). Instead he draws 
attention to the many varied types of language use, without attempting to 
assimilate them to a single logical structure. 
6 "It may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, 
and so a single completely resolved form of every expression" (PI 91). 
7 "To say 'This combination of words makes no sense' excludes it from the sphere of language and 
thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various 
kinds of reason" (PI 499). "When a sentence is called senseless, it is not, as it were, its sense that is 
senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from 
circulation" (PI 500). 
8 "We can draw a boundary for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? 
Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more that it took the definition 1 pace = 75 cm. to 
make the measure of length 'one pace' usable. And if you want to say 'But still, before that it 
wasn't an exact measure', then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one. - Though you still owe me 
a definition of exactness" (PI 69). 
9 "But how can I decide what is an essential, and what an inessential, accidental, feature of the 
notation? Is there some reality lying being the notation which shapes its grammar?" (PI 562). 
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It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of 
the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, 
with what logicians have said about the structure of language. Including 
the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (PI 23) 
The distinction between the appearance of a sign and its actual sense had led him 
to imagine that language all works one way. I f the essential sense of a proposition 
is what it looks like underneath, rather than its accidental features, then the surface 
differences between propositions are insignificant. He was not interested in the 
differences between uses of language, only what they have in common - all 
propositions that have the same sense have the same logical variable. Language is 
a totality, a complete system, so all possible propositions are generated through 
the rules of that single system. The general form of a proposition is the variable 
that all propositions with sense have in common. It is the logical essence hidden 
under the surface of all propositions.10 
Ordinary propositions did not clearly reveal their logical sense.11 Instead 
the sense must be clarified, which meant it must be revealed and uncovered by 
logical analysis.12 This gave rise to the idea that the sense was an underlying 
structure, hidden behind the confusion of ordinary propositional signs: "we are 
under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential in our investigation, 
resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language" (PI 97). 1 3 The 
sense, the essence of a proposition seems to be "something that lies beneath the 
surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, 
and which an analysis digs out" (PI 92). Once it was accepted that logical analysis 
could uncover the pure, perfect necessary structure of logic underneath the 
confused and vague appearance of language, it implied that that the method of 
enquiry was extremely powerful and this illusion led to further mistakes: 
'"The essence is hidden from us': this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask 'What is 
language?', 'What is a proposition?' And the answer to these questions is to be given once and for 
all; and independently of any future experience" (PI 92). 
1 1 "Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is 
impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it" (TLP 4.002). 
1 2 "Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them 
clear and give them sharp boundaries" (TLP 4.112). 
1 3 "The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in 
the background - hidden in the medium of the understanding" (PI 102). 
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Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the 
special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the 
unique, correlate, picture of the world. These concepts: proposition, 
language, thought, world, stand in line behind the other, each equivalent to 
each. (PI 96) 
Not only would the elucidation of logical form make clear the essential structure 
of language, it would also elucidate the logical form of thought and the world. The 
demand that sense be determinate was equated with the demand that objects be 
simple.14 This was not a metaphysical doctrine about the world, but a failed 
elucidation of what would count as an object, given the structure of language. The 
picture of the world as the totality of facts was an elucidation rather than a theory, 
but nonetheless it was an overly demanding picture. The ideal of simple, pure 
units of sense is rejected in the Investigations.15 Having shown that the notion of a 
simple element is meaningless in most contexts, he concedes that it is "impossible 
to give an account of any primary element"(PI 46) he admits that "my objects 
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements" (PI 46). 
According to the conception of philosophy I presented in the last chapter, 
one of Wittgenstein's key proposals was that philosophical problems were not to 
be solved with facts or empirical discoveries. To avoid any risk of empirical 
contingency or indeterminacy Wittgenstein had made an extreme contrast between 
logical analysis and empirical enquiry: 
[Logic] must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run 
through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be 
allowed to affect it. - It must rather be of the purest crystal. (PI 97) 
This extreme misconception was in fact "a tendency to sublime the logic of 
language" (PI 38). Wittgenstein calls the subliming of logic a "tendency to assume 
a pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the facts" (PI 94). He 
1 4 "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate" 
(TLP 3.23). "The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple 
signs in the propositional sign" (TLP 3.21). 
1 5 '"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains 
the same in all changes.' - But what is that? - Why, it swam before our minds as we said the 
sentence! This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of a particular picture which 
we want to use. For certainly experience does not show us these elements" (PI 59). 
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previously thought that logic lay beneath the surface of ordinary language and 
empirical facts: 
There seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth - a universal 
significance. Logic lay, it seemed at the bottom of all the sciences. - For 
logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the 
bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what happens 
is this or that. (PI 89) 
He describes this as a temptation that must be avoided, it is the "urge to 
understand the basis, or essence of everything empirical" (PI 89). He gives a 
specific reference to TLP 5.563 when he describes the mistaken view that logic 
presents "the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which 
must be common to both world and thought" (PI 97). 
It is important to recognise that this idealised view of logic was produced 
by Wittgenstein's methodological demands in the Tractatus: "(For the crystalline 
purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement)" 
(PI 107). Crystalline purity is the ideal that results from a demand for absolute 
clarity. Wittgenstein's fundamental mistake in the Tractatus was to assume that i f 
we are to see absolutely clearly then what we see must be absolutely clear, 
precise, exact and perfect.16 Anything less would not meet the requirement for 
1 7 
complete clarity. He failed to consider the possibility that when we achieve a 
clarified vision of what shows itself, the uses of language that we see clearly may 
be indistinct, vague and lacking an essential logical structure. The preconception 
about clarity and the emergence of the general form of a proposition are different 
mistakes - but mutually reinforcing. The requirement for a certain type of clarity 
is a frame through which Wittgenstein viewed language, the general form of the 
proposition is what Wittgenstein saw when he looked through this frame and it 
fitted his requirement so perfectly that it seemed to confirm the success of the 
approach. He quotes a remark from the Tractatus "the general form of a 
proposition is: "this is how things stand" (TLP 4.5) as though it is the voice of his 
"Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to 
questions are symmetrically combined - a priori - to form a self-contained system. A realm 
subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri" (TLP 5.4541). 
1 7 "I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I 
must grasp the essence of the matter" (PI 113). 
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interlocutor, who is expressing a particularly tempting misunderstanding. He 
comments: "that is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless 
times" (PI 114). In the Investigations Wittgenstein sums up the long series of 
remarks on the general form of a proposition with the following remark: "a 
picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI 115). In the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein thought his elucidations would draw our attention to the underlying 
1R 
logic that we usually fail to see. However he was in the grip of a picture. He 
projected the assumptions of the picture onto language and thought he was seeing 
clearly the logical form that showed itself, when instead what he saw was imposed 
by the frame of logical analysis.19 In the Investigations he realised that the task is 
not to uncover a hidden structure, we just need to see our ordinary language use 
clearly. 
Wittgenstein thought his elucidations in the Tractatus enabled him to see 
clearly what shows itself, but instead he only saw the aspects of language which 
matched his standard of clarity. 2 0 In other words, when Wittgenstein attempted to 
employ his method of doing philosophy, he failed to take into account the extent 
to which he was working within a traditional picture of language. These ideas 
were so much a part of his thinking that when he tried to employ his new method, 
his view was distorted. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein made it known that his 
investigation had to work from within language, but he had perhaps been too 
immersed in philosophical language - the language of logicians. He did not 
propose to construct an ideal language to replace ordinary language, as Russell 
and others imagined, but he did believe that the logic underlying ordinary 
language would show itself as a pure, perfect system.22 Achieving clarity would 
"A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI 115). 
1 9 "One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is 
merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (PI 114). 
2 0 "A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual use, 
compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied" (PI 426). 
2 1 Many of Wittgenstein's preconceptions about language can probably be traced to Frege and 
Russell, particularly the requirement that sense is determinate. However it is not the task of this 
thesis to explore these historical influences. 
2 2 "The most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word 'ideal' is apt 
to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday 
118 
Ch.6: The failure of the Tractatus and its legacy 
simply be to have an unhindered vision of this pure, perfect system. The source of 
Wittgenstein's confused ideas about language were superficial similarities 
between certain forms of expression in ordinary language and the possibility of 
comparing one form of expression with another.23 As language could be compared 
to a pure logical model, Wittgenstein was lured into thinking that it really was 
logical - underneath: "in philosophy we often compare the use of words with 
games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is 
using language must be playing such game" (PI 81). 2 4 
Many critics claim that Wittgenstein lapsed into incoherence because he 
"said what can only be shown" in the Tractatus. To put it this way is misleading. 
He did not say what can only be shown, because this cannot be said! Rather, he 
was guilty of presenting assumptions that in the end looked as though they said 
something but they said nothing. Even though, in the Investigations, he rejected 
his previous assumptions, this was not because he believed he had stated 
illegitimate doctrines in the Tractatus. Instead, he believed his mistake was to 
constrain in advance what would count as something that shows itself but cannot 
be said. He restricted 'what shows itself to the systematic internal relations of 
logic, all of which could be elucidated by the general form of a proposition. His 
elucidations in the Tractatus were not meant to be taken as a theory or true claims, 
but some of his elucidations were not genuinely elucidatory because they 
engendered further confusions. These were confusions that he himself did not see 
clearly until later. The problem with the main elucidation was that it was too 
limited. He thought it could be used to elucidate the whole of language - but it 
only elucidated a part. The failure of the Tractatus is thus like the failure of 
Augustine's picture of language discussed in the opening section of the 
Investigations. Augustine is not completely wrong - but his account of language 
does not achieve what it purports to have achieved. It purports to apply to the 
language; and as if it took the logician to show people at last what a proper sentence looked like" 
(PI 81) 
2 3 "We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the 
possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality" 
(PI 104). 
2 4 "It will then become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a 
sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules" (PI 81). 
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whole of language, but actually only describes a limited range of language uses. In 
one sense Augustine's view is correct - i f treated as a picture of those specific 
cases. 
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only 
not everything we call language is this system. And one has to say this in 
many cases where the question arises "Is this an appropriate description or 
not?" The answer is: "Yes it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly 
circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to 
describe. (PI 3) 
Similarly the Tractatus purports to have elucidated the totality of propositions 
with sense, but only succeeds in elucidating a limited range of cases. The 
Tractatus is a failure i f this picture is treated as a picture of the whole of language, 
particularly as doing so gives rise to further confusions. However, i f it is treated as 
one elucidation among many and as applying only to certain limited cases, then it 
does serve a purpose. I f we only use limited elucidations then it makes it appear 
that the whole of language must fit the elucidation. This ruins the whole point of 
looking to see what shows itself: "we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to 
see the actual use of the word [.. .] clearly" (PI 100). In effect we think that we are 
seeing what shows itself, but we only use an elucidation that reveals a fraction of 
what shows itself and fail to notice the rest. We then assume that we are able to 
see clearly the whole of what shows itself. This is not a failure with the method, 
but with an overly limited application of the method. The say-show distinction is 
not a grave mistake in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein made grave mistakes when 
he failed to properly implement the say-show distinction. 
4 The legacy of the Tractatus 
It is widely accepted by philosophers that there are numerous points of continuity 
between the Tractatus and Investigations; indeed there are several themes which 
are said to persist throughout Wittgenstein's entire career. In this section I 
demonstrate that we should use the say-show distinction to identify the significant 
continuities and to understand why he retained and developed those Tractarian 
themes in the Investigations. Some of these successor notions are 
straightforwardly continuities between the two texts, some are developments and 
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modifications, but all are products of Wittgenstein's ongoing commitment to the 
say-show distinction. 
In the Tractatus logic is autonomous. It is independent of any empirical 
facts: "logic must look after i tself (TLP 5.473).25 It does not make any sense to 
interfere with logic or try to make discoveries about logic because it could not be 
otherwise. Whatever could be otherwise is something that can be said. Hence the 
autonomy of logic is crucial to the idea that logic is what shows itself in language 
but cannot be said. The successor notion to logic in the Investigations is Grammar. 
Grammar is autonomous, it takes care of itself. Grammar shows itself in language 
but it makes no sense to say things about it. It is not possible to interfere with it or 
make discoveries about it, philosophers can only pay attention to it and attempt to 
Oft 
see it clearly. 
In the Tractatus there is a distinction between logical propositions and 
ordinary propositions. Logical propositions show logical form but say nothing, 
they can only be used to draw attention to what shows itself. These are contrasted 
with ordinary propositions which show logic but also say something. The 
successor notion to this distinction in the Investigations is between empirical 
propositions and grammatical propositions.27 Empirical propositions say what can 
be said, they have sense and so can be either true or false. These propositions also 
show grammar i f we pay attention to the grammar that shows itself in their use. 
Grammatical propositions do not say something, they only show grammar - the 
grammar that is exhibited in ordinary propositions. It is not appropriate to treat 
grammatical propositions as i f they are true, although they may have appearance 
of necessary truths. It makes no sense to treat these as saying something as their 
role is to be a reminder of the grammar, to draw attention to what shows itself. 
They are not meant to be treated as saying something informative or revealing a 
"Hence there can never be surprises in logic" (TLP 6.1251). 
2 6 "Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in 
order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains 
the use of signs" (PI 496). 
2 7 See PI 251: "these words are a defence against something whose form makes it look like an 
empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one". Also: '"I know ... only from my 
own case' - what kind of proposition is this meant to be at all? An experiential one? No. - A 
grammatical one?" (PI 295). 
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discovery. There is a big difference between logical propositions in the 
Tractatus and grammatical propositions in the Investigations because the former 
are treated as logical tautologies and the latter are treated as grammatical rules. 
However this difference is a reflection of the more central shift from logic to 
grammar. The crucial point is that in both cases Wittgenstein proposes that 
logic/grammar shows itself in ordinary language use, but in addition to ordinary 
empirical propositions there are forms of language use which say nothing, but 
only serve to draw attention to the logic/grammar that is shown in ordinary 
language use. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein establishes an important distinction between 
the task of philosophy and that of natural science. The task of natural science is to 
discover truths, which involves stating empirical propositions. To say that the task 
of philosophy is different does not mean that it involves stating philosophical 
propositions. Instead the philosophical task is to pay attention to what shows itself 
and cannot be said, rather than try to say something true. I f the task involved 
constructing propositions that appear to say something about what shows itself 
then these are either senseless logical propositions, in which case they merely 
show what is already shown in ordinary propositions, or they are nonsensical 
pseudo-propositions which appear to say something but in fact say and show 
nothing. The successor notion to this in the Investigations is also a distinction 
between philosophy and science. Once again the task of science is to utter true 
empirical propositions - hypotheses, discoveries and theories. The task of 
philosophy is not to interfere and change things, or state true propositions and 
give explanations.30 The task of philosophy is to draw attention to the grammar 
that shows itself in our ordinary language use. This does not mean that it should 
simply state grammatical propositions, because grammar shows itself in ordinary 
propositions, which are what we actually need to clarify. Just as logical 
propositions can be useful in drawing attention to grammar, grammatical 
propositions can do the same so long as they are recognised as such. It is just 
2 8 See PI 392: "the analysis oscillates between natural science and grammar". 
2 9 See PI 109: "It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones". 
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important not to treat them as saying something because to do so causes confusion 
and disguised nonsense. 
In the Tractatus the task of philosophy is to give elucidations not 
propositions. The successor notion to this in the Investigations is that the task of 
philosophy is to give descriptions and reminders rather than explanations and 
7 1 
philosophical propositions. In the Tractatus the purpose of giving elucidations is 
to draw attention to what shows itself - logic - so that we can see it clearly. As we 
have seen, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein misconceived what it is to see something 
clearly, however in the Investigations he retains the same point - that the role of 
grammatical reminders is to draw attention to what shows itself - grammar - so 
that we can see it clearly. In both cases philosophy is to be seen as an activity, 
rather than a body of doctrine. The aim in both cases is to produce clarity, but in 
the Investigations it is a different notion of clarity - not the absolute, pure clarity 
required in the Tractatus. 
In the Tractatus the point of seeing clearly what shows itself is that it 
would remove confusions and this would make philosophical problems dissolve. 
In the Investigations we see exactly the same point, that philosophical problems 
are not solved by new information, but dissolved by seeing clearly the grammar of 
ordinary language.32 In both cases Wittgenstein holds the view that philosophical 
problems arise from confusions between the appearance of language and the 
actual logic or grammar.33 Clarity makes the problems disappear.34 The absence of 
confusion simply is the absence of a philosophical problem. Clarity, seeing clearly 
logic or grammar, is an end in itself. It is not a further theory or truth that 
contributes to our knowledge. In the Tractatus the aim of philosophy is not to 
produce a body of doctrine and the same applies in the Investigations. The overall 
aim of philosophy in the Tractatus was silence. The successor notion to this in the 
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only 
describe it" (PI 124) and "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything" (PI 126). 
3 1 Ibid. 
3 2 "These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the 
workings of our language" (PI 109). 
3 3 See PI 422, PI 520 and PI 664. 
3 4 "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the 
philosophical problems should completely disappear" (PI 133). 
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Investigations is peace. When everything that can be said is said clearly then 
there is nothing further to be said. 
In the Tractatus there is a single correct method for establishing whether a 
proposition says something. It is to analyse logical form, to identify the 
propositional symbol, the underlying variable. It is possible to have a single 
correct method, because all propositions with sense have the same essence - the 
general form of a proposition. In the Investigations there is not one single correct 
method for establishing whether a proposition says something, because it is not 
assumed that all propositions have the same grammatical essence. However the 
many different methods can still be seen as successor notions to the method 
employed in the Tractatus.3* Just as the general form of a proposition was meant 
to elucidate logical form, language games are used to elucidate grammar. The 
difference is that the general form of a proposition attempted to elucidate the 
totality of propositions with sense, whereas individual language games, and other 
methods, only attempt to elucidate smaller regions of grammar. The successor 
notion to logical analysis in the Tractatus is grammatical investigation in the 
Investigations.39 
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations Wittgenstein wishes to prevent 
readers from treating elucidations and language-games as theoretical devices. In 
the Tractatus the problem was that his use of single picture - the general form of a 
proposition - led him to project that picture as the underlying structure of 
language. In the Investigations he recommends that we do not just rely on a single 
picture, but work with many pictures, so that we do not become fixated with any 
one way of looking at language.40 In the Tractatus the remarks of the book were 
"The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want 
to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which 
bring itself 'into question" (PI 133). 
3 6 "Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you 
see them there is a good deal that you will not say)" (PI 79). 
3 7 "What is essential [...], however, was not hidden beneath the surface of this case, but this 
'surface' was one case out of the family of cases" (PI 164). 
3 8 "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" 
(PI 133). 
3 9 "Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one" (PI 90). 
4 0 "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what 
it is, as an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring rod; not as a preconceived idea to 
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constructed in such a way that it reflected the methodological principle of logical 
analysis. Al l the remarks were ordered in a single framework of logical space. 
Although the Investigations is constructed in a very different way, it remains the 
case that the presentation reflects the method. In the Investigations grammatical 
remarks are a reflection of grammatical investigation. The important thing is that 
the unusual presentation is not a cryptic hermeneutic challenge. It is an indication 
that in both cases Wittgenstein believed it was necessary for his texts to have a 
physiognomy that reflects their methods. 
The view I have presented in this chapter enables us to understand why 
Wittgenstein claimed that the Investigations could be understood in the right light 
only against the background of his old way of thinking in the Tractatus. The 
Tractatus was not an entirely different philosophical approach, it was 
fundamentally the same approach but wrongly executed and the mistakes are 
illuminating. However, it is important to see these mistakes in the right way. I f we 
imagine that Wittgenstein's point in the Investigations is to expose the general 
form of a proposition as an incorrect theory, then we effectively retain the 
assumption that there could be a something that would count as a correct theory. 
We imagine that it is possible and even desirable to replace the false doctrine with 
a true doctrine. For example: to replace the general form of a proposition with a 
'family resemblance' theory of propositions. This is precisely the assumption that 
we must dispel i f we are to properly understand his conception of philosophy in 
the Investigations. The general form of a proposition must not be seen as a false 
doctrine, it must be seen as a confusion arising through various philosophical 
misunderstandings of our ordinary language. The general form of a proposition is 
the culmination of various philosophical temptations, which held Wittgenstein 
captive in the Tractatus. These temptations are difficult to overcome and they 
even re-emerge in the idea that the general form of a proposition needs to be 
disproved or refuted. To properly introduce his non-traditional conception of 
philosophy in the Investigations it is necessary for Wittgenstein to help his reader 
see that philosophical confusions must be clarified by seeing clearly what shows 
which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)" 
(PI 131). 
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itself. Confusions and temptations must be made to disappear, without refuting the 
'theories' with new evidence. By demonstrating how these mistakes infected his 
work in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein hopes to encourage vigilance in philosophers 
who wish to learn his way of doing philosophy. Wittgenstein does not draw 
attention to the Tractatus to condemn the failings of an old philosophical 
approach that he has since rejected. He draws attention to the Tractatus because it 
serves as a vivid reminder of a certain types of mistake that it is easy to slip into 
when attempting to implement his present conception of philosophy - the 
conception of philosophy in the Investigations. Thus we can properly understand 
why Wittgenstein wanted the Investigations to be read alongside the Tractatus i f 
we recognise that they share the same conception of philosophy. 
5 Summary 
My conclusion about the real failure of the Tractatus is supported by two lines of 
argument. In this chapter I have argued that the grave mistakes of the Tractatus 
were caused by Wittgenstein's failure to work through properly his conception of 
philosophy. In the next chapter I argue that the Investigations endorses the same 
conception of philosophy, but properly worked through. So, on the one hand I 
have argued that we need to use the say-show distinction to identify the genuine 
grave mistakes in the Tractatus and, on the other hand I next argue that 
Wittgenstein continued to base his conception of philosophy on the say-show 
distinction. Both lines of argument indicate that the say-show distinction is the 
basis of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. 
I f we treat the say-show distinction as the basis of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy then it helps us to appreciate why clarity - seeing 
clearly what shows itself - is so crucial to his whole project. Furthermore, by 
focussing on the issue of clarity we are able to see the real significance of the 
relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations. I f we treat the say-show 
distinction as the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy then we find 
that the philosophical task is not to say something true, but to attempt to see 
clearly what shows itself. The demand for clarity - seeing clearly what shows 
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itself - is of the utmost value for Wittgenstein. In both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations, clarity is an end in itself, it determines the outcome of each 
philosophical task and the overall end goal of philosophy. However, although in 
both the Tractatus and the Investigations clarity means seeing clearly what shows 
itself, they are committed to radically different conceptions of clarity. In the 
Tractatus he believed that when we see clearly what shows itself, what we see 
wil l be determinate, exact and complete. In the Investigations he realised that 
when we see clearly what shows itself we cannot specify in advance whether what 
we see may be determinate or vague, exact or inexact and complete or incomplete. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein was in the grip of a particular picture of clarity, in 
the Investigations he let go of this picture but retained his commitment to a 
revised conception of clarity. This is why the notion of clarity, understood in 
terms of the say-show distinction, enables us to see the real similarities and 
differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations.41 
The requirement for absolute clarity is what led Wittgenstein to use the 
general form of a proposition as the primary elucidation in the Tractatus. In the 
Investigations Wittgenstein recognised that he had misjudged the requirement for 
clarity and misconstrued the significance of the general form of a proposition. 
These were his grave mistakes. In the Investigations Wittgenstein continued to 
believe that the aim of philosophy was to see clearly what shows itself but the 
need for clarity was conceived of in very different terms. In the following chapter 
I demonstrate that this conception of philosophy can still be summed up as "what 
can be said at all can be said clearly and we cannot speak about we must pass over 
in silence" and that the basis for this conception of philosophy in the 
Investigations is still the say-show distinction. 
I defend and develop this conclusion in a paper called "Clarity in the Tractatus and the 
Investigations", to be presented at the Irish Philosophical Club Conference in February 2003. 
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1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present my interpretation of the say-show distinction in the 
Investigations.1 I argue that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the 
Investigations is fundamentally the same as his conception in the Tractatus and 
that in the Investigations, as in the Tractatus, the say-show distinction is the basis 
for his conception of philosophy. 
The Investigations has two sections, the latter in an unrevised state. There 
is disagreement amongst commentators about whether the material from part two 
should be treated as part of the whole. The preface to the Investigations was 
written in January 1945, at which time the Investigations consisted only of part 
one. According to the Editor's note, part two was written between 1947 and 1949. 
When the preface asks for the Investigations to be read alongside the Tractatus it 
thus refers in the first instance only to part one. Although I do not have any 
objection to reading both parts alongside the Tractatus, for my purposes it is not 
necessary to consider part two when attempting to understand why Wittgenstein 
made his suggestion in the preface. 
2 Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the Investigations 
I suggest that we can only achieve a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's 
Investigations i f we understand his conception of philosophy and we can only 
1 I have provided full or partial quotes in the footnotes, rather than just references to proposition 
numbers. This is to assist the reader, where needed, in following the exegesis. 
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achieve a proper understanding of his conception of philosophy i f we interpret it 
in terms of the say-show distinction. In Chapter 6 I presented an interpretation of 
the say-show distinction in the Tractatus which does not treat it as either a 
doctrine or pseudo-doctrine. On my account, the say-show distinction does not 
involve a theory of language, mind, world, or epistemology. Instead the phrase 
"what can be shown, cannot be said" (TLP 4.1212) is the basis of the 
methodological principle for philosophy summed up in the Preface and TLP 7. 
The methodological principle can be paraphrased as 'don't try to say something, 
pay attention to what shows itself and is closely echoed in the Investigations as 
the instruction "Don't think, but look!" (PI 66). However, my interpretation does 
not rest on isolated remarks in the Investigations that may or may not refer back to 
the say-show distinction. Instead it rests on an overview of his conception of 
philosophy. In what follows I outline Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, as 
presented in the Investigations, by describing his account of philosophical 
problems, the various methods of philosophy, the outcome of a philosophical task 
and the ultimate aim of philosophical activity. In the process I establish that the 
Tractarian say-show distinction, properly understood, is the basis for 
understanding all of these. I also discuss the relation between the conception of 
philosophy introduced by the Investigations and the task and presentation of the 
Investigations itself. 
Wittgenstein's most explicit remarks about his conception of philosophy 
appear in the section PI 89-142.1 claimed in Chapter 6 that most of these remarks 
are criticisms of the 'grave mistakes' in the Tractatus, however a few indicate 
Tractarian views that he continued to hold and others reveal the developments in 
his later approach. The remarks which specifically describe his view of 
philosophy in Investigations are PI 116-133. In particular PI 109 is one of the 
clearest statements of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the 
Investigations and it is significant that this remark starts with a backward look of 
approval towards the Tractarian view of philosophical problems. 
2 "What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence" (TLP Preface p.3). "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7). 
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2.1 Philosophical problems 
In PI 109 Wittgenstein confirms that he had been correct in the Tractatus to claim 
that the problems of philosophy are different to the problems of natural science. 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It 
was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary 
to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such' whatever 
that may mean. (PI 109) 
As in the Tractatus, empirical problems are solved by discovering facts that we 
did not previously know. These facts are presented as informative statements that 
are true but may be false. Philosophical problems are different, but not because 
they are solved by discovering non-empirical facts, or stating philosophical truths. 
Instead philosophical problems involve misunderstandings or confusions, rather 
than a knowledge deficit. 
The difference between these two types of problems is significant because 
it is not always apparent whether the utterances we are confronted with present a 
genuine empirical problem or a philosophical confusion. I f we can determine that 
a particular question is meaningful, and establish that it can be answered by 
meaningful statements, then we can judge that it is a problem of natural science. 
The task of natural science is then to find the true facts that wil l solve the 
problem. If, upon closer inspection, an utterance which appears to be a meaningful 
question is recognised as failing to make sense, then we at the same time 
recognise that there is nothing that would count as a meaningful answer.3 Hence 
the task of philosophy is not to provide solutions to problems, but to recognise 
cases when nothing is being said and hence realise that nothing further needs to be 
said. Seeing clearly that the apparent problem is not a problem is how philosophy 
can make its confusions disappear. 
In the Tractatus, philosophical confusions were caused by 
misunderstanding the logic of language. In the Investigations confusions are 
3 "Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this 
language, if there was anything to ask!" (PI 120). 
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caused by misunderstanding the grammar of language. Philosophical problems 
are not a failure to know something, they are a failure to understand what we 
already know. They are a failure to see clearly whether we are saying something, 
or merely using words that appear to say something: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a 
clear view of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuity. (PI 122) 
The grammar of our language is something that we already know, insofar as we 
are able to use language.5 The crucial issue is that, although we use language, we 
do not always see our language use clearly: "Language is a labyrinth of paths. 
You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same 
place from the other side and no longer know your way about" (PI 203). This is 
why Wittgenstein characterises philosophical confusions by saying that "a 
philosophical problem has the form: ' I don't know my way about"' (PI 123). As 
in the Tractatus, many philosophical confusions arise because the superficial 
appearance of language does not give an immediate, clear view of the actual 
working of the language: 
What confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them 
spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not 
presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy! (PI 
l l ) 6 
We cannot tell simply from the appearance of language whether the utterance says 
something or says nothing, as the 'surface grammar' may be different to the 
'depth grammar'.7 To be able to tell whether an utterance is meaningful we need 
to see clearly the application of the words, rather than just the superficial 
4 '"Language (or thought) is something unique'. - This proves to be a superstition, (not a 
mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these 
illusions, to the problems" (PI 110). 
5 "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to 
be master of a technique" (PI 199). "How do I know that this colour is red? - It would be an 
answer to say: 'I have learnt English'" (PI 381). 
6 See TLP 4.002. 
7 "Now compare the depth grammar, say of the word 'to mean', with what its surface grammar 
would lead us to expect. No wonder we find it difficult to find our way about" (PI 664). 
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appearance. This is because, as in the Tractatus, philosophical problems are not 
genuine problems. They are simply illusions of problems and when the illusion 
vanishes so too wil l the problem. The illusion wil l vanish i f we see clearly that 
nothing is being said. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein discussed various examples of philosophical 
problems, but in one sense they were all fundamentally the same problem, which 
is why his method could offer the final solution to all the problems. In every case 
the confusion occurs when an utterance appears to say something at the level of 
the propositional sign, but fails to do so at the level of the propositional symbol. 
Logical analysis was supposed to enable us to see clearly the determinate sense, or 
lack of sense and remove the confusion. This view of philosophical problems is 
too restrictive - it relies on the mistaken idea that the underlying logical form of 
language is a complete, determinate structure that can be revealed through 
analysis. In the Investigations Wittgenstein still believes that philosophical 
problems are confusions that occur when we fail to see clearly the grammar of 
language, but there are unlimited varieties of philosophical problems because 
grammar is not a complete, unified system. Wittgenstein considers it unhelpful to 
see grammar as a single system which forms a perfectly determinate totality. 
Instead it is useful to see it as a criss-crossing of many different types of language 
use, with many regions of language that are separate from other regions, or 
connected in various complex ways. Wittgenstein uses the term 'language-game' 
to elucidate the difference between regions of language, though it is important not 
to take this as a theoretical claim, as though he is claiming that there are 
subsystems of language. It is simply helpful to see grammar in terms of a family 
of overlapping language-games because this lets us appreciate that different 
confusions arise in and between different areas of language use. This is why 
philosophical confusions take many different forms and why Wittgenstein does 
not rigidly categorise the essence of philosophical problems: instead he gives a 
wide variety of examples. His aim is to teach us to recognise new variants of 
philosophical problems. For the purposes of interpretation I do not discuss his 
"We now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. -
Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem" (PI 133). 
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examples specifically, but describe them in outline and explain why I think it is 
helpful to understand them in terms of the say-show distinction. 
When we are doing philosophy we typically try to provide explanations for 
the phenomena that concern us. In doing so we form what Wittgenstein calls 
'pictures' - these are models which we use to make sense of the object of study. 
Rules and definitions are also pictures. Often we take a picture from one area of 
language and use it to understand something in a similar, yet different, area of 
language. The problem is that we fail to treat these pictures simply as objects of 
comparison and instead project features of the picture onto the object of study. We 
think that we have discovered explanations for the phenomena, but we are led 
astray by the picture, rather than seeing clearly what shows itself.9 When we talk 
about a particular expression in language we are misled by comparisons with 
other areas of language.10 Often confusion arises when words are used outside the 
language-game that is their home. "Philosophical problems arise when language 
goes on holiday" (PI 38). 1 1 One of the reasons why we are led into this confusion 
is because we are tempted to think that all language works one way and forms a 
complete system (PI 27). 1 2 Instead Wittgenstein asks us to be aware that specific 
language uses have a home in a limited region of the overall phenomenon we call 
language. We should not assume that because an expression says something in 
one context it is meaningful in all contexts. To tell whether an expression is 
meaningful it is not sufficient to establish that it is meaningful in one context. We 
need to look to see whether it is meaningful in the actual context that it is being 
employed.13 
9 "The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the 
picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the 
correct idea of the use of the word 'to remember'. We say that this picture with its ramifications 
stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is" (PI 305). 
1 0 "Even if such an explanation rather tempts us, we need only think for a minute of what actually 
happens in order to see that we are going astray here. We say that we use the command in contrast 
with other sentences because our language contains the possibility of those other sentences" (PI 
20). 
1 1 An example is discussed in PI 47. 
1 2 "The paradox disappears when we make a radical break with the idea that language always 
functions one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about 
houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please" (PI 304). 
1 3 "There is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the 
application of the picture is not easy to survey" (PI 422). 
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Another type of problem arises because philosophers want to state claims 
that are exact and comprehensive - to talk about the essence of phenomena rather 
than accidental or irrelevant features. Wittgenstein encourages us to consider that 
when we state general claims we often assimilate the surface descriptions of the 
language use and think this reveals that the language uses are actually similar.14 
There is a temptation to think that reducing language uses to a common form of 
expression reveals the underlying essence of the concept - to the logical symbol 
that all the terms have in common. Instead Wittgenstein asks his reader to stop 
thinking about the appearance of language, stop assuming that we know what a 
term says, and instead look and attempt to see clearly the application of the words 
in various contexts of use. Wittgenstein's diagnosis of this type of mistake is that 
when we do traditional philosophy we are sometimes tempted to substitute one 
form of language for another because the expressions have a similar appearance.15 
Sometimes in the name of clarifying concepts we highlight similarities between 
the surface appearances of language utterances and assume that this reveals that 
the grammar of the language is also the same. One of the reasons that we make 
this kind of mistake is through a failure to appreciate the multiplicity of language 
(PI 24). In philosophy we use an impoverished set of examples. We suffer from a 
diet of only one type of example.16 
From the perspective of traditional philosophy, i f we accept that 
philosophical problems are confusions caused by a failure to properly understand 
the grammar of language, then it seems obvious that the task of philosophy is to 
explain the grammar properly - to state rules and definitions that will clarify the 
confusions. According to Wittgenstein, this is precisely the mistake that lies at the 
heart of philosophical confusions. It is also where we can acknowledge the central 
importance of the say-show distinction in his account. Like logic in the Tractatus, 
grammar shows itself; and what can be shown cannot be said. Traditional 
1 4 "But assimilating the descriptions of uses of words in this way cannot make the uses themselves 
any more like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely unalike" (PI 10). See also PI 22 and 
PI 24. 
1 5 Philosophical problems are misunderstandings, "misunderstandings concerning the use of 
words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in 
different regions of language" (PI 90). 
1 6 "A main cause of philosophical disease - a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with 
only one kind of example" (PI 593). 
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philosophy attempts to say whether particular utterances are meaningful - for 
example by presenting a theory of language and testing the utterance in 
accordance with the criteria of that theory. A theory of this sort effectively devises 
a rule that fits the specific language use in question, then concludes that the 
correct rule has been discovered, rather than realising that many different rules 
could equally apply.1 7 According to Wittgenstein, we lay down rules when we are 
doing philosophy, but get entangled in the rules because we treat the rule as a true 
claim, we assume that it says something meaningful. Then the rule obscures our 
view of the language use - we no longer look at the language, we look at the 
rule. 1 9 Wittgenstein's point is that rules can be useful, they can help to clear up 
confusions, but only i f treated as a description used to draw attention to grammar 
- to help us see what shows itself. I f treated as a once-and-for-all explanation of 
the grammar, they appear to say something, but in fact are meaningless. Even i f a 
rule is meaningful in one context, this does not mean that it is meaningful as an 
explanation that applies to the whole of language. Philosophers fail to realise this 
and are tempted to think that definitions apply comprehensively, rather than 
recognising that they apply for a particular purpose and to a circumscribed realm. 
This is the mistake made by Augustine (PI 3), and Wittgenstein himself held a 
similar presupposition in the Tractatus. The point is that rules and definitions can 
help to clear up a misunderstanding i f used as 'pictures' to help us see clearly the 
grammar of language. But i f treated as a true claim they can obscure the actual 
working of the language and thus cause further confusion. 
Philosophical problems are thus confusions brought about by the very 
mode of enquiry that philosophers employ.20 In doing philosophy we utter well 
formed sentences of natural language and assume that these propositions say 
1 7 "For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word 'number' for a 
rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a 
frontier" (PI 68). 
1 8 'The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique for a game, and that then 
when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it 
were entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand 
(i.e. get a clear view of)" (PI 125). 
1 9 'This general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze 
which makes clear vision impossible" (PI 5). 
2 0 "An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it 
were bars the way out" (PI 339). 
135 
Ch.7: The say-show distinction in the Investigations 
something. We think that we know what the proposition says - in fact we often 
think that it must say such-and-such because we have provided a strict 
definition. 2 1 Wittgenstein wants us to stop thinking that we know what 
propositions say and actually look to see whether our propositions say anything at 
a l l . 2 2 He accepts that any combination of words can be used to say something i f 
we specify a definition for the words and start using them according to the rules 
laid down in our definition. But this is not the same as looking at the use of the 
proposition in the language-game that is its home.23 Only by doing this will we 
see clearly what shows itself - the grammar of language. 
Wittgenstein's diagnosis of philosophical problems in the Investigations is 
far richer than his account in the Tractatus, but it still adheres to the same 
principle. This is the idea that philosophical problems are confusions arising 
because we think that an utterance says something, and think we know what it 
says, but fail to see clearly that it says nothing. Philosophers see a problem and 
assume that it is to be solved by saying something. Instead their philosophical 
utterances are disguised nonsense which further stands in the way of seeing 
clearly and removing the confusion. Hence in the Investigations, as in the 
Tractatus, philosophical problems are not to be solved by saying something -
whether empirical or non-empirical truths. They are to be dissolved by seeing 
clearly what shows itself. To see how this is possible we need to examine the 
methods of philosophy proposed in the Investigations. 
2.2 The methods of philosophy 
Far from prescribing a single, correct method in the Investigations, Wittgenstein 
hopes to make philosophers appreciate that the range of possible methods is open-
ended: "there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like 
2 1 "(Remember we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their 
form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that 
supports nothing)" (PI 217). 
2 2 "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the 
difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid 
prejudice" (PI 340). "In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we must focus 
on the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to" (PI 51). "But first we must learn 
to understand what it is that opposes such an examination of details in philosophy" (PI 52). 
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different therapies" (PI 133). There are many different methods because there are 
many different types of confusions - the range is open-ended. Philosophical 
problems may be grouped according to their similarities, there may be 'types' of 
philosophical problems, but each problem is a product of a particular confusion in 
a particular context. A particular confusion can be dissolved by various techniques 
- indeed sometimes it wil l require lots of different ways of approaching the 
problem before it is dissolved. However Wittgenstein encourages philosophers to 
let the type of confusion determine the method, rather than applying a 
predetermined method to a problem. 
Although I wish to avoid the impression that Wittgenstein has a single 
method to be applied to all problems, it is helpful to recognise a distinctive theme 
that makes his ideas different to traditional philosophical methods. The 
overarching theme which characterises Wittgenstein's proposal for philosophical 
methods is "Don't think, but look" (PI 66), which I believe can be rephrased as 
"don't try to say something, try to see clearly what shows itself. A philosopher 
who has the wrong method is one who is "unable to simply look and see" (PI 93). 
I believe it is helpful to consider how the different methods recommended by 
Wittgenstein can be seen in terms of the principle that we must see clearly what 
shows itself rather attempt to solve problems with true statements. 
In both the Tractatus and Investigations Wittgenstein believed that 
philosophical problems are not empirical problems and cannot be solved by 
empirical methods. 
[Philosophical problems] are, of course, not empirical problems; they are 
solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in 
such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in despite of an urge 
to misunderstand them. (PI 109) 
Traditional philosophical methods assume that problems will be solved by saying 
something - by stating true claims. Wittgenstein believed that problems are to be 
dissolved by seeing clearly what can be said. "The problems are solved, not by 
giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (PI 109). 
2 3 '"I know how the colour green looks to me' - surely that makes sense! - Certainly: what use of 
the proposition are you thinking of?" (PI 278). 
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Not only is it the case that philosophical problems are not empirical problems, but 
one major type of philosophical confusion results from the temptation to think that 
a philosophical problem can be solved by empirical means.24 
As in the Tractatus, to dispel philosophical confusions we need to be able 
to tell whether or not an utterance says something or merely appears to say 
something, In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had an overly narrow conception of 
what would count as a proposition having sense - he required that it would have 
logical function in common with all other symbols that had the same sense. In the 
Investigations Wittgenstein undermines the Tractarian assumption that each 
proposition has a logical essence and a single correct analysis - although he does 
confirm that it is possible to provide a definition of the essence, or a rule that 
stipulates the correct analysis, so long as this is done for a particular, limited 
purpose. To replace his method of logical analysis, Wittgenstein offers a different 
approach to the task of establishing whether an utterance has sense, but retains the 
principle that the grammar of a proposition shows itself in the use of the 
proposition. He calls these methods "grammatical investigations". The task is to 
try to see clearly how the word is used in the context where it does have meaning 
- in the context which is its home: 
When philosophers use a word - 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', T , 
'proposition', 'name' - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used this way in the 
language-game which is its original home? (PI 116) 
It is not simply that we should look at the narrow use, in other words a specific 
application - we should look at the context in which it has usage, the whole 
context of practice in which the usage is meaningful. 
In both the Tractdtus and the Investigations Wittgenstein wants us to look 
at what shows itself in the use of words, but in the Tractatus this was the logical 
use - the symbol or variable that represented the unique position of the term 
within the totality of logic. So, one and the same variable would apply throughout 
"It shows a fundamental misunderstanding, if I am inclined to study the headache I have now in 
order to get clear about the philosophical problem of sensation" (PI 314). 
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the whole of language. In the Investigations the use is grammatical use - limited 
to a specific region of language, not the whole. Logic was seen as a perfect, 
complete system, such that the totality of logic is reflected in every proposition. I f 
we know one logical symbol we already know all of logical space in advance. 
Grammar is not like this. It is not a perfect or complete system in the same way. 
(Although this does not mean that it is imperfect or incomplete.) One proposition 
does not give us access to the whole of grammar - it just gives us the grammar of 
that particular region of language. 
To tell whether a proposition says something we should not look for a rule 
that wil l lay down what counts as a meaningful use of the words in advance of all 
future cases. Instead we must look to the application of the proposition in the 
actual practice of language use. The use can be described in rules, but the 
statements of the rules do not determine the use of the words. In the Investigations 
rules are not logical variables. For Wittgenstein, rules are reminders and ways of 
describing grammar for particular purposes. It is a mistake to treat them as though 
they say something. I f you look too deep - look for the underlying rules that are 
hidden underneath the use of language - you will fail to see the grammar that 
shows itself in the actual use. I f you look only at the appearance of the words you 
will also fail to see the grammar that shows itself in their application. What shows 
itself is open to view, it is neither the appearance of expressions, nor hidden 
underlying rules. It is the use of the word that we already know, insofar as we 
have mastery of the use of language. We fail to see it clearly because we fail to 
look in the right place - or fail to look at a l l . 2 6 We are too keen to say something, 
instead we need to look. 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain. (PI 126) 
"If, for example, someone says that the sentence 'This is here' (saying which he points to an 
object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special 
circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense" (PI 117). 
2 6 "What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not 
contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have 
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes" (PI 415). 
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There is nothing that needs to be said. The aim is to see clearly what shows itself 
- to see what lies open to view. 
To be able to tell whether an utterance says something or says nothing we 
need to use philosophical tools - in the Tractatus these were elucidations. In the 
Investigations they are characterised as grammatical reminders, which take many 
forms. Grammatical reminders include pictures, language-games, imagined cases 
and diagrams. Rather than rely on a particular tool to treat a confusion, we must 
remember to keep changing the tools - and to always see them as pictures, not as 
statements of what really exists. The philosophical work is to gradually loosen 
preconceptions, to change the fixed way that one thinks of the meaning of the 
term and look and see how it actually functions. The methods of philosophy 
involve finding ways to look at the functioning of ordinary language and try to see 
it clearly. The difficulty is that when we start thinking about language and talking 
about the meaning of words we impose our ideas on what we see and these 
pictures distort or obscure what we are meant to be studying. Constant vigilance is 
needed and it is important to return to our investigations from different directions, 
rather than deal with them in only one way. It can be very difficult to break 
through the illusion because our philosophical determination stands in the way of 
seeing propositions in their ordinary usage. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein distinguished between ordinary propositions 
and logical propositions and in the Investigations this is replaced by a distinction 
between empirical and grammatical propositions. As in the Tractatus, the 
important point is that every empirical proposition with sense both says something 
and shows something, whereas a grammatical proposition shows grammar, but 
says nothing.2 8 Once again the task of natural science is to state true empirical 
propositions, but, as in the Tractatus, the task of philosophy is not simply to state 
grammatical propositions but to make use of them in a different way. One of the 
"I might answer 'It's an English sentence; apparently quite in order - that is until someone 
wants to do something with it; it has a connection with other sentences which makes it difficult for 
us to say that nobody really knows what it tells us; but everyone who has not become calloused by 
doing philosophy notices that there is something wrong here'" (PI 348). 
2 8 Unlike in the Tractatus, a proposition that says something does not have to be either true or false 
- the proposition "Help!" has sense but is not true or false. But any proposition which says 
something also shows the grammar of the language-game where it is meaningful. 
140 
Ch.7: The say-show distinction in the Investigations 
many methods of philosophy is to use grammatical propositions as reminders -
elucidations - which draw attention to the grammar of language, grammar which 
shows itself but cannot be said. However, a major source of philosophical 
confusion arises because grammatical propositions are sometimes treated as 
though they are empirical propositions. The danger is that philosophers see 
grammatical propositions such as "all rods have length" as being obviously true, 
in fact so true that they cannot conceive of them being false. They then imagine 
that the claim represents an important truth about reality or the laws of thought. 
When we make such observations we need to realise that we are reminding 
ourselves of a grammatical paradigm, not a necessary truth (PI 50). Grammatical 
propositions do not say something (PI 56), they say nothing but only show the 
grammar of ordinary language use, which is open to view in our ordinary 
propositions i f we look at them properly. 
As in the Tractatus, philosophy is an activity not a body of doctrine. The 
methods of philosophy do not require us to make certain types of claims, but to 
look at the problems in a way that will dispel the confusions. The activity is to see 
clearly what shows itself, but this involves changing how we tend to look at 
language: 
In order to see clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we must focus on 
the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to. (PI 51) 
Wittgenstein recognises that this is not how philosophy assumes that it should 
approach problems "we must learn to understand what it is that opposes such an 
examination of details in philosophy" (PI 52). 2 9 So what types of remark is a 
philosopher permitted to make? In one sense there are no restrictions on what a 
philosopher may say: "Does it matter what we say, so long as we avoid 
misunderstandings in any particular case?" (PI 48). However, our proper task is to 
clarify ordinary sentences, not to give the philosophical explanations that 
traditional philosophy would expect: 
However, even this approach must come with a caveat, because we should not expect to deal 
with every problem in an identical manner. There may be some cases where seeing clearly 
involves drawing back from the detail and looking at the wider scene. "If I am supposed to 
describe how an object looks from far off, I don't make the description more accurate by saying 
what can be noticed about the object on closer inspection" (PI 171). 
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We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation 
and description alone must take its place. (PI 109) 
To say that philosophy must not provide explanations is not to say that it is 
prohibited from using empirical propositions, or that it must not attempt to say 
anything at all. Philosophers may use empirical propositions but, as in the 
Tractatus, the difference is that they are used to draw attention to what shows 
itself, rather than what they say. "In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. 'But 
it must be like this!' is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states 
what everyone admits" (PI 599). So any proposition can be used in philosophy so 
long as it is being used qua grammatical reminder, rather than qua empirical 
proposition. 
It would even be misleading to say categorically that avoiding 
explanations and theories is the only way to do philosophy, nothing else is 
permitted. This could give the impression of another dogmatic claim that may 
prevent us from seeing clearly in particular cases. It is not inconceivable that there 
may be occasions where it is appropriate to offer true claims and necessary 
conditions, i f this is what it takes to elucidate a problem. We must be flexible and 
vigilant - to avoid cramp by not standing in one position for too long. This means 
that we should not dictate in advance only a limited range of elucidatory tools. 
Instead it is important to be creative and responsive in the face of emergent 
confusions. The prohibition against true claims and explanations has a particular 
use - it is used to emphasise that these should not be treated as an end, but only a 
means to an end. I f our goal is to remove confusion then we must see clearly what 
shows itself and our methods should all be used towards this outcome, not 
towards the statement of true claims. 
2.3 The outcome of a philosophical task 
For Wittgenstein, the solutions that philosophers offer to philosophical problems 
are often the real problems. The substantial claims that are the results of 
traditional philosophical enquiry are, for Wittgenstein, only the raw material for 
philosophers to work on: 
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What we 'are tempted to say' in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; 
but it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is 
inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts is 
not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical 
treatment. (PI 254) 
The claims that philosophers are 'tempted to say' only have the appearance of 
saying something meaningful, they do not really say something meaningful. I f 
something meaningful is actually said, then the statement is a contribution to 
natural science. I f something appears to be said but actually nothing is said, then 
this typifies a philosophical confusion. This does not mean that in every case the 
outcome of the task of philosophy will be to reveal that the issue troubling 
philosophers is merely a confusion. It is possible that some issues that trouble 
philosophers are not in fact philosophical problems in Wittgenstein's sense. These 
may indeed require empirical solutions and cannot simply be made to disappear 
through grammatical clarification. However, the point is that recognising a 
problem to be an empirical problem and recognising what would count as an 
answer, even i f we do not yet know the answer, is still an important contribution. 
In this case the confusion that has been dispelled is the confusion that the problem 
required a non-empirical answer. In such a case we would say that clarification of 
a problem that appeared to be philosophical enabled us to see it as an empirical 
problem, which can now be investigated by the natural sciences. 
It is hard for traditional philosophy to remove the confident assurance that, 
even when we do not know the answer to a question, we seem to know already 
what the answer will be like. We might be happy to think that we don't know the 
exact answer already - we will need to make a discovery - but we are confident 
that we know what the answer wil l be like, and anything that does not fi t this 
assumption wil l not be the correct answer.30 This is precisely the crucial mistake, 
it is the mistake of thinking we know what is being said and know what would 
solve the problem, rather than looking to see whether there really is a problem: 
"The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and 
leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them - we think. But 
that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite 
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Don't say: "There must be something in common, or they would not be 
called games'. - But look and see whether there is anything common to 
all. [...] To repeat: don't think, but look! (PI 66) 
I f we see the tasks for philosophy in Wittgenstein's terms then one of the things 
we must accept is that it is impossible to specify in advance what the outcome of a 
particular philosophical task wil l be - insofar as it is not possible to say what will 
count as seeing clearly in each individual case. In one region of grammar seeing 
clearly may be best achieved with a picture that has an exact, determinate order, in 
another region it may be achieved with a picture that is vague and indistinct. "The 
work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" 
(PI 127). In each case, the outcome of the task is simply to see clearly what shows 
itself rather than saying in advance what we must see when we see the language 
use clearly. 
The result of a grammatical investigation is not new knowledge or a 
change in the use of language. "It is not our aim to refine or complete the system 
of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways" (PI 133). The result is seeing 
clearly the mastery of language that we already display in what we do. But seeing 
clearly does not mean that we uncover the 'real' hidden structure. Rather, we must 
simply see an order which helps to remove the particular misunderstanding that 
has caused our confusion. "We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the 
use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible 
orders; not the order" (PI 132). It is possible that in some cases we may wish to 
reform the language use, but this is something that happens within ordinary 
language, it is not the outcome of a philosophical task.31 The outcome of a 
philosophical task is not the clarification of grammar in the sense of making it 
orderly. The outcome of the task is seeing clearly the grammar of ordinary 
language as it is. 
concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)" (PI 308). 
3 1 "Such a reform for practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent 
misunderstandings in practice is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with 
[when doing philosophy]" (PI 132 - my addition). 
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Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can 
in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It 
leaves everything as it is" (PI 124). 
Many of Wittgenstein's remarks have been treated as substantive claims, with the 
consequence that he is believed to hold theoretical positions. This is because his 
remarks are treated as though they are answers to philosophical problems, rather 
than grammatical reminders - remarks that are used merely for a particular 
purpose and then become redundant. For example, many remarks in the opening 
section of the Investigations are designed to loosen the grip of a certain picture of 
language - the picture which assumes that every word has a meaning and the 
meaning is something that corresponds to the word. One of the steps Wittgenstein 
takes is to ask philosophers to look at the use of words, rather than think that there 
must be a meaning in the mind that accompanies the word (PI 43). Philosophers 
have wrongly concluded that Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of a word is its 
use - that there are fixed, specific uses that determine the meaning of a word. This 
is a mistake - for one thing it is not helpful to claim that there are determinate 
limits to the uses of a word - this is no different to saying that each word has an 
essential meaning. The important point is not that Wittgenstein makes a claim -
'look to the use'- but that he asks us to do something, namely 'look to the use'. To 
understanding the meaning of a word, to see clearly the grammar that shows itself 
in ordinary language use we can look to many things. We can look to the use, to 
the corresponding object, to an inner sensation, an outward gesture or a rule - we 
can look to anything we like, so long as we are attempting to see clearly rather 
than prescribing in advance what must be the case. 
The outcome of grammatical investigation is that we see clearly whether 
the utterance that troubles us says something or says nothing. I f it says nothing 
then our activity has led us to see that the utterance was nonsense although it 
appeared to have sense. When we see this clearly nothing further needs to be done 
to remove the problem. The removal of a philosophical confusion consists in 
seeing clearly that an apparently meaningful philosophical problem consists of 
expressions that say nothing. Seeing clearly what shows itself simply is seeing 
clearly when nothing needs to be said and the confusion disappears. The results of 
philosophy are thus not philosophical propositions or true claims. The outcome of 
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a philosophical task is not to gain new knowledge. The results are the gaining of 
clear vision by paying attention to what we already know. 
From the perspective of traditional philosophy this outcome is likely to 
seem unsatisfactory. Although philosophical confusions are to be dissolved by 
seeing clearly what can be said, this does not mean that the achievement is merely 
linguistic - as though all that is achieved is talking about the words, but not the 
real issues that the words refer to. 
One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one 
imagines anything, but how the word 'imagination' is used. But that does 
not mean that I want to talk only about words. (PI 370) 
The criticism that this type of investigation only deals with words begs the 
question against Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. To think this way is to 
be in the grip of the idea that the task of philosophy is to penetrate phenomena, to 
get behind the words to the real things. From this perspective, it may seem that the 
words we have are simply inadequate and this is why the problem resists 
explanation. Philosophers then either postulate a more complicated solution or 
claim that it is inexplicable. In particular we think that, i f something cannot be 
defined, this means it is indefinable.32 Instead Wittgenstein recommends that we 
should be prepared to resist the temptation to give explanations at all. 
It is tempting, but wrong, to imagine that Wittgenstein's account makes 
philosophical problems trivial. Seen as merely linguistic confusion they are 
insignificant: as when a child mixes up the word "carrot" with the word "parrot" 
and claims that carrots can talk. Wittgenstein's point is that philosophical 
confusions are nothing more than confusions arising from language, but 
nonetheless extremely serious. They pervade extensive areas of our thought.33 
Philosophical problems are "grammatical illusions" but it is not enough to see 
"(This role [of these words in our language] is what we need to understand in order to resolve 
philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does 
the assertion that a word is indefinable)" (PI 182). 
3 3 "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character 
of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and 
their significance is as great as the importance of our language" (PI 111). 
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them simply as mistakes - it is better to see them as superstitions. They are 
entrenched ways of thinking that involve deep confusions. It is correct that once 
we have clarified the confusion, once we see the grammatical fictions are mere 
illusions, then they do have a trivial character. But this is because once they can 
be seen like this the work has been done, the danger has been overcome. A 
philosophical problem is only a problem while the illusion remains unrecognised. 
So long as the confusion remains it is certainly not a trivial matter. When the 
confusion has been dispelled all that is left are trivial linguistic reminders -
nothing substantive remains.35 It is precisely because philosophers are looking for 
substantive philosophical claims that they believe that such an outcome of a 
philosophical task indicates that they whole activity is trivial and achieves nothing 
worthwhile. They fail to recognise that the activity of dissolving problems is 
valuable in its own right. 
Wittgenstein colourfully characterises the outcome of his own 
philosophical methods as follows: 
The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of 
plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its 
head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value 
of the discovery. (PI 119) 
It is tempting to think that a philosopher encounters a pre-existing set of problems 
- as though the problems are just lying around in the world, waiting for 
philosophical answers. This is an illusion. Philosophical problems are not 
independent of the methods used in philosophical enquiry. Philosophical thought 
is what gives rise to the philosophical problems in the first place. When 
Wittgenstein likens philosophical methods to therapies this draws attention to a 
difference between his view and traditional philosophy. The methods of 
traditional philosophy are not sensitive to context, they apply indiscriminately to 
all problems. This is because the problems they deal with are problems that appear 
3 4 '"Language (or thought) is something unique' - this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), 
itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to 
the problems" (PI 110). 
3 5 "If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because 
everyone would agree to them" (PI 128). 
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to transcend particular people, places and times. Wittgenstein's methods are 
therapies because to treat a problem is to treat a confusion - and a confusion is 
something that only a person or group of people can suffer from. 3 6 The language 
is not confused, the language is alright as it is. It is people who are confused 
because they fail to see clearly what is in plain view. 3 7 This does not mean that 
philosophical problems are merely psychological - such that it would not matter i f 
a person were to be cured by a philosophical method or a drug. The outcome of a 
philosophical task is not a true piece of knowledge. It is an improvement in the 
life of a person. The person must see the connections for themselves and it will 
not just change what they see, but what they do. 
A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which 
consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and 
inventing intermediate cases. The concept of a perspicuous representation 
is of fundamental significance to us. It earmarks the form of account we 
give, the way we look at things. (PI 122) 
The outcome of a task is not achieved when someone knows something they did 
not know before, but when they do something they did not do before. The 
following remark seems to sum up the outcome of a task 
I wanted to put a picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture 
consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is 
to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his 
way of looking at things. (PI 144) 
I f you have an empirical problem and solve it, you can inform another person of 
the solution to the problem in a true empirical proposition. I f you suffer from a 
philosophical confusion and manage to dispel the confusion, it is not possible to 
inform another person of the solution to the problem in a true philosophical 
proposition. You may offer elucidations, but these elucidations must be put to use 
by the person who has the confusion, it is not possible to solve someone else's 
confusion for them. You may only help them in their attempt to see clearly. The 
outcome of a philosophical task is not a piece of information that can be said. It is 
"The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (PI 255). 
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that a person sees clearly what shows itself - they see what can and cannot be 
said. 
The way I have characterised Wittgenstein's view of philosophical tasks 
differs significantly from previous discussions of his thought. It is commonly 
claimed that Wittgenstein believed that all philosophical problems are really 
nonsense (E.g. Carruthers 1989, 57-58). I f this is correct then the outcome of the 
philosophical task is when we have demonstrated that a particular utterance is 
nonsense. This is very misleading. For one thing the claim "all philosophical 
problems are nonsense" serves to assimilate the appearance of all the problems 
but it does not help us know how to deal with the problems, which might be very 
varied. Furthermore particular utterances are not categorically nonsense, nonsense 
once-and-for-all, as any combination of words can be meaningful i f it can be used. 
Instead Wittgenstein's point is that philosophical confusions are disguised 
nonsense: nonsense that appears to have sense. This is significant because an 
utterance can only be disguised nonsense i f we treat it as though it has sense and 
fail to see clearly that it does not. So, the fact that a particular utterance is 
nonsense is unimportant. What matters, what makes it philosophically 
problematic, is when we fail to see clearly that it is nonsense. This is why it is 
misleading to say that Wittgenstein viewed philosophical problems as nonsense. It 
is more helpful to say that philosophical confusions are a failure to see clearly 
whether or not something is being said. The outcome of a philosophical task is not 
to demonstrate that an utterance is nonsense, but to see clearly whether it is 
nonsense or sense. This is why it is important to see Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy in terms of the say-show distinction, rather than in terms of the 
distinction between sense and nonsense. 
2.4 The overall aim of philosophical activity 
In the Tractatus, the ultimate aim of philosophical activity was to attain silence, 
when the task of philosophy was complete. In the Investigations Wittgenstein 
talks about peace rather than silence, but there are significant parallels: 
"The aspects of things that are most important to us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before one's eyes.)" (PI 129). 
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The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing 
philosophy when I want to. - the one that gives philosophy peace, so that 
it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question. (PI 
133) 
The overall aim of the Tractatus was complete clarity, but it was a misguided 
form of clarity "do not forget that all sorts of problems attach to the words 'to 
know' and 'to be clear"' (PI 30). In the Investigations the aim is still complete 
clarity but it is a different type: "for the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed 
complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should 
completely disappear" (PI 135). An important shift is made from clarifying logic 
to clarifying grammar, but the say-show distinction is why clarification is needed 
in both cases. Clarity in the Investigations no longer involves the demand that 
what we see clearly is exact, determinate and once-and-for-all. What we see 
clearly may be something indistinct, incomplete and inexact - but this does not 
matter, so long as it is sufficient for the confusions to be dispelled. 
Understanding the aim of philosophy in terms of the say-show distinction 
can help to prevent a possible misunderstanding. The aim of philosophy according 
to the Investigations is not to produce grammatical reminders, or grammatical 
propositions which state the rules of grammar. The aim is to achieve clarity - to 
see clearly what can be said by paying attention to what shows itself. Once what 
can be said is said clearly, nothing else needs to be said, this is why clarity will 
bring peace to philosophical troubles. Furthermore the aim of philosophy is not 
simply to clarify confusions, but also to achieve peace by avoiding further 
confusion. Wittgenstein's method does not simply teach philosophers to cure 
problems, but also how to prevent them. Philosophers who have learned his 
method must put it into practice and take responsibility for not producing more 
disguised nonsense. They must pay attention to the words they use in order to say 
clearly what can be said and avoid using words that only appear to have sense. 
Seen in this way the overall aim of philosophy for Wittgenstein is a 
positive achievement, not just a negative achievement. But this is overlooked 
because philosophers fail to appreciate the value of clarity. Seeing clearly, 
achieving clarity, is its own reward. When the problems are clarified and the 
confusion dispelled we are left without any new, substantial claims, but this does 
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not mean that our achievement is purely negative. The value of the achievement is 
determined by the work that has had to be done. As in the Tractatus, the value of 
each task depends upon how extensive is the particular problem - how deep the 
mistakes are in our thinking and how difficult it is to remove the confusion. The 
deeper the problem, the harder we must work before we can see clearly and the 
more it matters that we should try to do so. The work of philosophy is working on 
oneself and the aim of philosophy is to achieve clarity. This clarity is a personal 
achievement.38 
Wittgenstein's philosophy does not announce the 'end of philosophy'. In 
the Investigations he does give the impression that he would like to insist that we 
get rid of all philosophical thought39 - but this is not necessary even i f it were 
possible. It is enough to insist that we should see clearly what we are doing and 
not take it for granted that our methods are suitable for every task. In particular we 
need to adopt methods that will minimise these sorts of confusions. 
2.5 The task of the Investigations 
The conception of philosophy introduced in the Tractatus was not strictly 
equivalent to the task performed in the book itself. The task of the Tractatus was 
more ambitious than the task of philosophy - it aimed to elucidate the limits of 
language once and for all in order to dissolve all the problems of philosophy. In 
comparison the task of the Investigations is just a part of the overall task of 
philosophy. It demonstrates many interconnected small scale investigations and in 
the process teaches Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy. The Investigations 
does not aspire to provide the final solution to all the problems of philosophy, but 
it does teach us an open-ended way of dealing with problems, even the many 
problems that philosophers have not yet encountered. 
In the Investigations, as in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's aim is to replace 
traditional philosophy with an alternative conception, rather than to solve 
particular philosophical problems, or to reveal particular instances of disguised 
"Work in philosophy [...] is really more work on oneself. On one's conception. On how one 
sees things. (And what one expects of them.)" (Culture and Value p.24) 
3 9 "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want 
to. - the one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which 
bring itself in question" (PI 133). 
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nonsense. "What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the 
fly-bottle" (PI 309). His aim is to teach a method, not just to report the results of 
his enquiry.40 He states "my aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised 
nonsense to something that is patent nonsense" (PI 464 - my emphasis). To 
achieve this he does not present an explanation of his method - he demonstrates 
his method. Like the Tractatus, the Investigations is not a textbook. It is a 
sketchbook of Wittgenstein's own travels, but it is not to be studied merely in 
order to see where he explored " I should not like my writing to spare other people 
the trouble of thinking. But, i f possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his 
own" (PI Preface p.viii). Its role is to encourage others to journey for themselves, 
but also to provide some signposts for places where people commonly go astray. 
As in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein hoped to encourage philosophers to let 
go of their methodological presuppositions and adopt a different way of doing 
philosophy which involves a shift from thinking to looking, or from saying to 
seeing what shows itself. 
One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and 
learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands 
in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice. (PI 340) 
The difficulty is how to break out of the circle. Seen from the perspective of 
traditional philosophy, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is unacceptable -
it appears quietist, defeatist and trivialises the value of philosophy. 
Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only 
to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? 
(As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) 
What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing 
up the ground of language on which they stand. (PI 118) 
Wittgenstein must break this perspective in order to make people see the value of 
his new conception. One of the ways that he does this is by giving traditional 
philosophy a voice in the Investigations - he engages in dialogue with one or 
more interlocutors. The interlocutors do not represent a single viewpoint, just 
"Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different to that 
which 'points beyond' them" (PI 208). 
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various ways of doing philosophy that Wittgenstein is aiming to escape. By giving 
a voice to traditional philosophers and making their confusions part of his own 
concern, he encourages philosophers to work with him and engage with the 
activity he is undertaking, rather than judge his work critically from an external 
point of view. 
In particular Wittgenstein anticipates that, seen from the perspective of 
traditional philosophy, what he is doing wil l appear to be behaviourism,41 
nominalism42, relativism,4 3 or positivism. In all of these cases it is because the 
philosopher treats Wittgenstein's remarks as though they say something (and 
thinks he or she recognises what the remarks say) rather than using the remarks as 
grammatical reminders to look at what shows itself. 
For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look 
like. The one part attack the normal form of expression as i f they were 
attacking a statement; the others defend it, as i f they were stating facts 
recognised by every human being. (PI 402) 
In both cases confusions are perpetuated because philosophers attempt to say 
something, rather than realise that the problem cannot be solved by saying a 
statement of fact. Wittgenstein's aim is to help philosophers by teaching them to 
realise when they think they are saying something but are not saying what they 
think they are saying. This does not mean he is prohibiting the use of certain 
words, or saying that certain words cannot be combined, nor is he prohibiting the 
discussion of certain issues, such as ethics. But he does want to draw 
philosopher's attention to the fact that when language uses are removed from the 
context of their original language-game they need to be given a use, otherwise 
what they say "may be anything or nothing" (PI 6). 
Wittgenstein does not rule out any uses of language as illicit, including the 
claims made by traditional philosophy. This is why he gives a voice to traditional 
'"Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behaviour is a fiction?' - If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction" (PI 307). 
4 2 "We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and 
therefore the use of a word. So it may look as if what we were doing were Nominalism" (PI 383). 
4 3 '"So does it depend wholly on our grammar what will be called (logically) possible and what not 
- i.e. what that grammar permits?' - But surely that is arbitrary! - Is it arbitrary?" (PI 520). 
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views in the Investigations. There is no combination of words or marks that 
necessarily lacks sense - i.e. there is no sign that cannot be given a sense. " ' I 
know how the colour green looks to me' - surely that makes sense! - Certainly: 
what sense of the proposition are you thinking of?" (PI 278). His criticism of the 
claims of traditional philosophy is not that they are categorically nonsense - it is 
not that they 'say nothing' in the strong sense that it is impossible for those words 
to say anything at all. The criticism is simply to ask philosophers to look and see 
that the words do not say what it is that they appear to say. They may be given a 
sense - there may be a language-game in which those words do say something -
but removed from that context of use the words do not say anything. 
Wittgenstein does not need to make a grand claim about the status of the 
remarks in the Investigations as he did in TLP 6.54. However, it is still important 
that the reader of the Investigations should not treat the remarks as substantial 
philosophical claims. We might still say that the remarks need to be read as 
elucidations rather than propositions, in other words with awareness that they 
should be used to draw attention to what shows itself, rather than read for what 
they appear to say. To make this difference apparent, every grammatical 
investigation presented in the Investigations is open-textured. Every remark, 
doubt, objection, mistake and correction is exposed and laid out to view. This is 
intended to prevent the reader from treating the remarks as substantial claims. As 
in the Tractatus, it is still the case that i f the remarks of the Investigations are 
treated as theses and explanations they will produce nonsense. This is because 
philosophers assume they know what the remarks say, but the remarks will fail to 
have a proper use in the contexts where they are employed. Moreover, nothing of 
any value can be achieved by simply reporting the results of the investigation as 
philosophical claims. Wittgenstein is not attempting to put into words his own 
clarity of vision, he is offering examples of the elucidations he has used to 
overcome his own confusions and inviting the reader to use these, and other 
methods, to overcome their own confusions. Wittgenstein is not attempting to put 
into words what shows itself. Instead he is seeking to draw our attention to what 
shows itself and teach us the importance of attempting to see clearly rather than 
stating philosophical theses. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein is not informing 
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us of the things that can be said. He is teaching us what we must do. We should 
see clearly what can be said, by paying attention to what shows itself, and avoid 
uttering remarks that fail to say clearly what can be said. 
3 The say-show distinction in the Investigations 
I have claimed that the say-show distinction is the basis of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy in the Investigations. By this I mean that the distinction 
is what we need to understand i f we are to understand his conception of 
philosophy. 
The say-show distinction can help us see philosophical problems in the 
right light. Philosophical problems are confusions because we treat philosophical 
utterances as though they say something, but they actually say nothing. This is not 
because philosophical propositions cannot say something, but rather that they do 
not say anything in the context that they are uttered. There are many different 
types of philosophical problems and many different types of philosophical 
methods. 
The say-show distinction is the basis of the methods of grammatical 
investigation. Grammar shows itself in propositions that say something, but is not 
itself something that can be said. Philosophical methods attempt to clarify 
grammatical confusions through the use of grammatical remarks - remarks which 
draw attention to what shows itself, but are not to be treated as making true 
statements. We do not need special propositions to do this. We can use any type of 
utterance as a grammatical reminder: all that matters is that we see clearly what 
shows itself. 
The say-show distinction helps us to dispel philosophical problems and it 
helps us to avoid philosophical problems. It enables us to move from disguised 
nonsense to patent nonsense and to say clearly what can be said, thus avoiding 
further nonsense. In both cases the outcome of a philosophical task is when we see 
clearly what shows itself. The nature of the clarity cannot be specified in advance 
in the way that the solution to an empirical problem can be anticipated. When we 
see clearly that a particular problem is a confusion, when we see clearly the 
grammar, the problem is dissolved. 
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Philosophical activity takes place only within the realm of language. What 
can be said can be said and the grammar of language is what shows itself. What 
lies outside language neither says nor shows. It is nonsense or silence. The overall 
aim of philosophical activity is to reach peace when what can be said has been 
said and there is no need to say anything further. There is no fixed logical limit to 
the totality of language, so there is not a final resting place for philosophy, just 
respite from particular confusions. 
Saying and showing are not two distinct realms of expression. What shows 
itself is simply the grammar of everything that can be said. One of the sources of 
philosophical confusion that Wittgenstein hopes to teach us to avoid is precisely 
the confusion that has caused the say-show distinction to be misunderstood. 
Philosophers have been tempted to think that various problems are so difficult that 
they are indefinable, or indescribable. These concepts are so extraordinary that 
they cannot be expressed in ordinary language, we can only know that they are 
beyond the limit of what can be expressed. One temptation is to think that we can 
conceive what it is that a nonsensical proposition would say i f it did say 
something.44 This is why the say-show distinction has been treated as leaving 
room for ineffable facts - facts that can be expressed by 'showing' but not by 
'saying'. 
So, in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where 
one would just like to emit an inarticulate sound. - But such a sound is an 
expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should 
now be described. (PI 261) 
Wittgenstein makes this point to emphasise that his conception of philosophy does 
not lead to the view that there are things that philosophy cannot say. Instead it 
must be seen as the claim that philosophers must learn to recognise when there is 
nothing to be said. Everything that can be said has a place in the grammar of 
4 4 "But what we really want is to simply take 'Red exists' as the statement: the word 'red' has a 
meaning. Or perhaps better: 'Red does not exist' as '"Red" has no meaning'. Only we do not want 
to say that expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be saying if it meant 
anything. But that it contradicts itself in the attempt to say it - just because red exists 'in its own 
right'. Whereas the only contradiction lies in something like this: the proposition looks as if it were 
about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about the use of the word 'red'" (PI 
58). 
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language, this grammar can be seen clearly thanks to descriptions and 
grammatical reminders. I f we are tempted to make an inarticulate sound then we 
must not assume that it says something or that there is something that it fails to 
say. Instead we must find ways to see clearly whether it has a role in a language-
game. I f it does not, then this does not indicate that it has failed to put an ineffable 
phenomenon into words. It simply says nothing and shows nothing. 
4 Summary 
The conception of philosophy in the Investigations is fundamentally the same as 
the Tractatus, and, as in the Tractatus, it can be properly understood in terms of 
the say-show distinction. Philosophical problems are disguised nonsense because 
they are treated as though they say something, when in fact they say nothing. 
Philosophy is still an activity not a body of doctrine. It is the activity of 
conducting grammatical investigations which involve seeking to see clearly what 
can be said. The correct method of philosophy takes many forms, not a single 
correct form, but the methods are different ways of seeing clearly what shows 
itself. Grammar replaces Logic as what shows itself but cannot be said. The result 
of a philosophical task is to dissolve problems by seeing clearly what is already 
known - the mastery of language use - not discovering new facts. The aim of 
philosophy is 'peace' when nothing further needs to be said. 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is not derived from a particular 
account of language. He does not have a "use-theory" of meaning, a 
"communitarian theory" of rule-following, or an "anti-realist" view of concepts, 
nor is he a "quietist" about the relation between mind, language and world. 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is derived from an insight that is the 
legacy from the Tractatus: everything that can be said can be said, and when we 
cannot speak meaningfully we should be silent. His views of mind, language and 
world arise from specific applications of his methods. They are responses to 
particular confusions, not definitive positions. The remarks of the Investigations 
can be thrown away just as much as those of the Tractatus. Not because the 
remarks are categorically nonsense, but because they become redundant once they 
have been used by the reader to learn the methods of philosophy and once they 
have been used in the activity of paying attention to what shows itself. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Content 
1 Thesis overview 
2 Fulfilling the desiderata 
3 Avenues for future research 
1 Thesis overview 
I have argued for the thesis that the say-show distinction is the basis for 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. By making this connection and supporting it with an exegesis of 
both texts, I have provided a correct account of his conception of philosophy and a 
correct account of the say-show distinction. 
The thesis is motivated by Wittgenstein's claim that the Investigations 
should be read in conjunction with the Tractatus. I have argued that to understand 
the Investigations in this way requires us to first understand the role of the say-
show distinction in the Tractatus. Furthermore, to achieve a proper understanding 
of both texts they must be read from the perspective of Wittgenstein's own 
conception of philosophy rather than from a traditional perspective. I identified 
the desirable features for such an interpretation and used these conditions to 
evaluate three available readings of the Tractatus and Investigations. 
I have argued that all three of the available readings fail because they do 
not properly appreciate the connection between the say-show distinction and 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. Metaphysical Readings highlight the 
say-show distinction, but fail to understand Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is 
an activity not a doctrine. Hence they do not correctly interpret Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy and hold that the say-show distinction is a paradoxical 
or incoherent doctrine. This type of reading has led philosophers to claim that the 
Investigations rejects the say-show distinction. Therapeutic Readings interpret 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in terms of a distinction between sense 
and nonsense, rather than the say-show distinction. Hence they present only a 
limited view of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and hold that the say-
show distinction is a nonsensical pseudo-doctrine. This type of reading is not able 
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to support the claim that the Investigations retains the say-show distinction. 
McGinn's Elucidatory Reading offers a more promising interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and, as a result, does not treat the say-
show distinction as a doctrine or pseudo-doctrine. However, she treats the say-
show distinction only as one application of Wittgenstein's method, rather than the 
basis for Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. This would make it difficult for 
her to explain how the say-show distinction is retained in the Investigations, even 
though she is committed to that claim. 
Having argued that none of the available readings are adequate to explain 
the role of the say-show distinction in the Investigations, I presented my own 
readings of the say-show distinction in the Tractatus and the Investigations. To do 
so I have argued that Wittgenstein's main purpose in both books was to replace 
traditional philosophy with an alternative conception of philosophy, which can 
only be understood through the say-show distinction. My readings of the 
Tractatus and the Investigations demonstrate that they are different attempts to 
present the same conception of philosophy. I describe how, in both cases, 
Wittgenstein uses the say-show distinction to present a distinctive account of the 
nature of philosophical problems, the appropriate methods of philosophy, the end 
result of a philosophical task and the overall aim of philosophy. 
I have argued that my interpretation provides a correct view of the 
significant continuities and discontinuities between the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. The failure of the Tractatus was not a flaw in the conception of 
philosophy presented in it, nor a flaw in the say-show distinction. In the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein failed to implement properly his proposed conception of philosophy, 
as he remained in the grip of traditional philosophical presuppositions. His main 
presupposition was a requirement for perfect clarity, which led him to offer the 
general form of a proposition as a single elucidation for the totality of logical 
form. The Investigations presents the same conception of philosophy, but freed 
from the presuppositions of the Tractatus, particularly the requirement for perfect 
clarity. Rather than offer a single elucidation for the whole of language, 
Wittgenstein teaches many elucidatory methods which can be used to clarify 
particular regions of grammar. As in the Tractatus, seeing clearly involves paying 
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attention to what shows itself, rather than stating true claims. The say-show 
distinction thus remains the basis of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in 
the Investigations. 
2 Fulfilling the desiderata 
In Chapter 2,1 offered the desiderata for any interpretation of the Tractatus and 
Investigations. I can now explain how my interpretation satisfies these conditions. 
My reading of the Tractatus presented an account of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy, demonstrating consistency between what he took 
himself to be doing and what he hoped other philosophers would do. I was able to 
give a coherent account of his remarks about the "correct method" for philosophy; 
the difference between philosophy and science; the view that philosophy is an 
activity not a body of doctrine; and the view that philosophy results in 
clarification of propositions not philosophical propositions. 
I gave full credence to Wittgenstein's claim that "the whole sense of the 
book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be 
said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 
Preface p.3). To achieve this I argued that this statement sums up Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy and argued that the whole sense of the Tractatus was to 
introduce this conception of philosophy. Giving full credence to this statement in 
the Preface also ensured that my reading prioritised TLP 7 rather than TLP 6.54 
and thus avoided the mistakes made by other readings, which have misguidedly 
built their view of Wittgenstein's philosophy around TLP 6.54. 
By prioritising TLP 7 I was able to deal with the problems created by TLP 
6.54. My reading made it possible to explain how the Tractatus consists of 
elucidations, yet the elucidations are to be thrown away as nonsense, including the 
remark that tells us that the elucidations are nonsense. However I did not have to 
make commitments to 'important nonsense' that shows what cannot be said. I 
argued that the elucidations of the Tractatus do not 'show' anything as they are 
used to draw attention to what shows itself. Elucidations are not, strictly speaking 
nonsense, but they do become nonsense i f treated as though they are propositions. 
The role of TLP 6.54 is to remind the reader to treat the elucidations of the 
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Tractatus as such, rather than treating them as propositions. In the Tractatus the 
elucidation of the general form of a proposition was unsuccessful but only 
because it generated confusions, not because it was a doctrine, or because it 
involved important nonsense. 
I was able to explain why Wittgenstein believed that in the Tractatus he 
had found "on all essential points the final solution of the problems [of 
philosophy]" (TLP Preface p.4). I argued that Wittgenstein hoped to achieve this 
by replacing the traditional conception of philosophy with an alternative 
conception. He undermined the view that philosophical problems can be solved 
with true philosophical propositions and replaced this with the view that 
philosophical confusions are to be dissolved by seeing clearly that nothing needs 
to be said. Hence he believed that the application of his "correct method" would 
provide the means for making all philosophical problems disappear. This view of 
his project allowed me to explain the significance of the general form of a 
proposition and explain why Wittgenstein felt that his task was to draw a limit to 
the expression of thought (TLP Preface p.4). 
My reading of the Tractatus gave special emphasis to the say-show 
distinction. I was able to demonstrate that the say-show distinction is central to the 
whole Tractatus and accounted for those notions, such as logical relations and 
formal concepts, which are shown but cannot be said. To achieve this I argued 
that the say-show distinction is the basis for Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy. Furthermore I argued that, properly understood as a elucidatory 
principle rather than a philosophical doctrine, the say-show distinction does not 
make the Tractatus self-refuting. 
In Chapter 6 I gave a detailed account of why Wittgenstein considered the 
Tractatus a success when he published the book in 1921, and why he 
subsequently claimed " I have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I 
wrote in that first book" (PI Preface p.viii). At the same time I was able to explain 
why the Investigations can "be seen in the right light only by contrast with and 
against the background of [his] old way of thinking" (PI Preface p.viii). I argued 
that it was possible to understand these claims by recognising that he was working 
with fundamentally the same conception of philosophy in both books. His 
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realisation of the grave mistakes in the Tractatus led him to revise his approach in 
the Investigations significantly, but he did not reject the conception of philosophy 
or the say-show distinction. Instead he wanted the Tractatus to stand as a warning 
to others of the mistakes he made whilst attempting to implement his conception 
of philosophy. Thus it is by claiming that Wittgenstein retained a conception of 
philosophy based on the say-show distinction that I have been able to point out 
which aspects of the Investigations are in agreement with ideas in the Tractatus 
and which aspects are criticisms of ideas in the Tractatus. 
My reading of the Investigations presented an account of Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy in that work and I argued that there is consistency 
between what he took himself to be doing and what he hoped other philosophers 
would do. By arguing that this conception of philosophy is based on the say-show 
distinction, I was able to give a coherent account of his view that there are many 
philosophical methods not a method; that philosophy must use descriptions rather 
than explanations and that complete clarity will mean that philosophical problems 
completely disappear. 
I have accounted for the way that both texts present a singular challenge to 
commentators. In neither case is it appropriate to select a remark and treat it as a 
philosophical proposition, in other words as though it 'says' something. Instead 
the remarks must be seen in the context of Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy. In the Tractatus the remarks form part of a logical system that is 
designed to draw attention to what shows itself - the logical form underlying 
ordinary language. In the Investigations the remarks are part of a series of 
examples that teach various methods of grammatical investigation and 
demonstrate how to pay attention to what shows itself - the grammar of ordinary 
language. My readings show why Wittgenstein felt it necessary to present the 
remarks in a different idiosyncratic style in the two books. In the Tractatus, where 
the sequence of remarks is numbered in order of logical importance, each remark 
was designed to be as pure and economical as possible. Each remark is in an exact 
logical place and numbered in order to make clear its logical relations with other 
remarks. By contrast, in the Investigations we see the advantage of coming back 
to the same point from a number of different directions and different contexts. 
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When he shifts from logical analysis to grammatical investigations, Wittgenstein 
emphasises the need for a variety of pictures, rather than a single picture of 
language, but in both cases the pictures serve to draw attention to what shows 
itself. This is how my reading is able to explain why "the very nature of the 
investigation" in the Investigations compelled Wittgenstein to present his ideas as 
an "album" of "remarks" or "sketches" (PI Preface p.vii), and why the remarks 
could not be forced into a single ordered sequence. I was also able to account for 
the polyphony of voices in the Investigations. In both cases I use Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy to understand the physiognomy of his texts, rather than 
resort to a distorted mode of textual interpretation as a key to unlock his 
philosophical ideas. 
My readings take into account that in both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations Wittgenstein is simultaneously treating philosophical problems and 
introducing a new method for dissolving philosophical problems. He introduces 
an alternative conception of philosophy to challenge the traditional conception, 
and he demonstrates and teaches that conception of philosophy by tackling 
philosophical problems. However, Wittgenstein's concern in both the Tractatus 
and Investigations was not the treatment of particular philosophical problems but 
the problem of philosophy itself. His ambition was to understand the nature of 
philosophical problems and provide methods for treating all philosophical 
problems, not just the problems that feature in the books. Both texts contain 
localised treatments of particular problems but this was not his main achievement, 
the various investigations are illustrations of his methods and a way of teaching 
the reader to engage in the activity of attempting to see clearly what shows itself. 
In my reading I use this point to make sense of the claim that the Tractatus is "not 
a textbook" (TLP Preface p.3) and have attempted to consider why the book might 
"be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts 
expressed in i t" (TLP Preface p.3). I use the same point to understand why 
Wittgenstein states in the Investigations " I should not like my writing to spare 
other people the trouble of thinking. But i f possible to stimulate someone to 
thoughts of his own" (PI Preface p.viii). 
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By fulfilling the desiderata, I have provided readings of the Tractatus and 
Investigations from the perspective of Wittgenstein's own conception of 
philosophy, rather than from a traditional perspective. 
3 Avenues for future research 
My thesis encourages scholars of Wittgenstein to read the Tractatus alongside the 
Investigations, rather than take their view of his ideas solely from the 
Investigations. I hope it will also have relevance to philosophers who are not 
Wittgenstein scholars, and those not interested in exegesis, insofar as it presents a 
conception of philosophy that can be judged on its own merits. 
There are several issues of interest that I have not addressed in this thesis, 
particularly Wittgenstein's views on ethics, aesthetics, religion and mathematics. 
Many of these issues feature prominently in collections of Wittgenstein's work 
that have been published posthumously from his notes, or from lecture notes 
transcribed by his students. For example: Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics and Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief. My focus in this thesis has been to provide a robust account of 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and, to achieve this, it was not necessary 
to explore these other issues. But I hope that the interpretation I have offered here 
may open new avenues for dealing with these issues and offer a helpful approach 
for interpreting the remainder of Wittgenstein's published and unpublished work. 
This will involve reading his remarks about these issues as grammatical 
reminders, rather than philosophical propositions and paying attention to the 
grammar that shows itself in our ordinary language, rather than looking for true 
claims in his books. 
I have not attempted to evaluate Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, 
or to defend his views against critics. However, i f the conception of philosophy I 
have presented here is correct, it presents a particular area of concern that will 
need to be addressed i f this conception of philosophy is to be accepted. I will not 
tackle this problem here, but raise it as a concern requiring future attention. For 
Wittgenstein the goal of philosophical endeavour is to achieve clarity - to see 
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clearly. Clarity is an end in itself, not a means to an end, as he says in the 
following remark from Culture and Value: 
Our civilisation is characterised by the word progress. Progress is its form, 
it is not one of its properties that it makes progress. Typically it constructs. 
Its activity is to construct a more and more complicated structure. And 
even clarity is just a means to this end and not an end in itself. For me, on 
the contrary, clarity, transparency is an end in itself. I am not interested in 
erecting a building but in having the foundations of possible buildings 
transparently before me. So I am aiming at something different than are 
the scientists and my thoughts move differently than do theirs. (Culture 
and Value p.9) 
From a biographical perspective, the fact that Wittgenstein prized clarity as the 
highest value is evident in his views about music, literature, architecture, teaching, 
his views about ethics and his relationships with others. It is also the basis of his 
self-development and self-criticism.1 I have argued that when we 'see clearly', 
what we see is what 'shows itself and this is not something that can be said. I 
believe that the fact that clarity is built upon the say-show distinction in this way 
leaves open a potential target for critics of his conception of philosophy. The 
problem is that, i f we cannot put what it is that we see clearly into words, then 
how can we tell whether clarity has been achieved? How can we know i f we are 
truly seeing clearly, or just have the illusion of seeing clearly? One indication 
would be that we know when we are seeing clearly because the philosophical 
problem that has plagued us vanishes and we are left with a sense of peace. This 
seems a reasonable criterion. But we may still ask how we wil l know when the 
problem has vanished or whether we are just under the illusion that the problem 
has vanished? The response to this is that we know when the problem has 
genuinely vanished when clarity has been achieved - when we can see clearly 
what shows itself. The problem with this criterion is that it is circular. Of course, 
this apparent circularity will only constitute an objection for someone who 
requires that the value of clarity be justified in terms of some further condition, 
1 These features of Wittgenstein's life are discussed by McGuinness (1988), Janik and Toulmin 
(1973) and Monk (1991). 
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and I am optimistic that it will be possible to respond to this potential objection, 
but must leave this task for a future study. 
Wittgenstein's view that clarity is an end in itself highlights the major 
difference between science and his conception of philosophy. It perhaps also 
offers an interesting avenue for exploring the similarity between philosophical 
activity and artistic work. Wittgenstein's distinction between philosophy and 
science should be treated only as a distinction for a particular purpose, rather than 
a dogmatic assertion. It is helpful when used to clear up confusions that arise 
when philosophical claims are treated as though they are empirical claims, due to 
superficial similarities in the forms of expression. Seen in this way, and not as a 
dogmatic position, I think it will prove valuable to use Wittgenstein's conception 
of philosophy as the basis for discussing similarities and differences between 
philosophy and science. This may make it possible to defend a distinctive role for 
philosophy against the prevailing trend towards scientism. The potential for 
exploring this issue in a new way is a particularly valuable outcome of this thesis. 
Reading Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in terms of the say-show 
distinction should invite reconsiderations of the historical context of his work. 
This avenue could be fruitfully explored by comparing the conception of 
philosophy presented here with the work of writers, such as Schopenhauer, who 
are known to have had an influence on Wittgenstein's thought.2 This would help 
us to understand whether Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, understood in 
terms of the say-show distinction, is a genuinely original conception of 
philosophy. A further avenue for discussion would be to conduct a similar study 
of Wittgenstein's subsequent influence on other philosophers. The interpretation 
presented in this thesis opens these questions as new avenues for enquiry because 
it invites us to ignore the issue of whether Wittgenstein held the same doctrines as 
other thinkers, and instead consider whether they were doing something similar. It 
permits us to draw comparisons based on the work they do, rather than the 
philosophical claims they say. 
Lawrence Goldstein has recently written on the historical influences on Wittgenstein's thought, 
and has not identified a source for the say-show distinction (Goldstein 2003). 
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Although I have not discussed Wittgenstein's relation to other 
philosophers, my reading does leave me in a position to comment as to why 
Wittgenstein did not consider it important to discuss the work of other historical 
figures in philosophy. I suggest that Wittgenstein's work is seen as ahistorical 
because he is concerned primarily with problems that plague him. I f he did not 
feel in the grip of a particular confusion, feel the urge to say something, then for 
him there was no work to be done. It is significant that the Tractatus is one of the 
few texts that Wittgenstein does consider. He looks back to the Tractatus as an 
historical work, but he does so precisely because he feels the grip of the 
confusions in the Tractatus - they are his problems. When writing the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with logical problems. These were his 
problems, but they arose through his contact with Frege and Russell. When 
writing the Investigations he was concerned with confusions from a much wider 
variety of sources, including many psychological issues. His infrequent references 
to other writers, such as Augustine and William James, are not an indication of his 
agreement with their solutions to philosophical problems. Rather that he 
recognises in their work confusions that he himself suffered from and struggled to 
escape. 
Wittgenstein's contribution to various philosophical disputes has been 
misunderstood because his achievements have been assimilated to make them fit a 
pattern demanded by traditional philosophy. Many writers are overly confident 
about Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical issues - a good example is Peter 
Hacker's recently published Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies. 
Although this provides an extremely high quality discussion of themes from 
Wittgenstein's work, the tone of the book is significant. Hacker gives the 
impression that many of the problems still perplexing contemporary philosophers 
have been solved by Wittgenstein. In effect the hard work has been done and the 
solution to those philosophical problems is readily available i f philosophers would 
only read and understand Wittgenstein's arguments. I think that this misses the 
real point of Wittgenstein's work. The real point was not to solve particular 
problems once and for all, but to teach a way of doing philosophy that would 
encourage philosophers to tackle their own confusions, to help them clear up 
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confusions suffered by other people and above all to avoid generating further 
confusion or disguised nonsense. 
When we are dealing with a philosophical confusion it may or may not 
matter what Wittgenstein said about the issue, because it is not always helpful to 
characterise the problems in exactly the same way that Wittgenstein set them up. 
A lot of work has been done by philosophers to establish exactly what problem 
Wittgenstein was combating and how he dealt with the problem.3 By putting 
Wittgenstein's arguments on a pedestal, philosophers fail to address the 
confusions that are most relevant to them personally. Wittgenstein did not want to 
spare others the trouble of thinking (or rather the trouble of attempting to see 
clearly) but this is exactly what has happened. The idea that Wittgenstein has 
solved these problems means that the old idols have been replaced by new idols -
namely the absence of idols.4 When Wittgenstein deals with the private language 
problem, he is not providing a solution to a problem of philosophy - he is not 
adding a solution to the body of doctrine. Rather, he is demonstrating how he has 
worked through his own confusions in an attempt to see clearly what can be said 
and see which utterances say nothing. The significance of his work does not lie in 
the results of his investigations, but the method that can be learnt by tracing his 
steps. To dispel philosophical confusion we should not look at what Wittgenstein 
says, we should look at what Wittgenstein does. We should not look to 
Wittgenstein to solve our problems; we must solve our own problems for 
ourselves. 
This sheds light on a further issue. Philosophers have been right to insist 
that Wittgenstein's later work should not be systematised, but the correct reason 
for this is not always appreciated. The point is that Wittgenstein's treatment of 
confusions should not be reduced to a set of philosophical propositions because 
doing so makes it appear that he is offering a solution to a problem - a solution 
that can be said. Instead Wittgenstein's treatment of confusions cannot be reduced 
to a set of philosophical propositions because he does not provide solutions to 
To see this we need only consider the debate that has followed Kripke's interpretation of what is 
now known as "Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument". 
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problems. His treatments are elucidations that need to be used by someone who is 
attempting to see clearly what shows itself but cannot be said. An elucidation does 
not do anything i f it is not used - this is because it does not say anything. When a 
confusion is dispelled by a person seeing clearly what can and cannot be said, this 
is not something that can be put into words and conveyed to another person. This 
is why there is not progress in philosophy the same way that there is in science. 
We do not add to an increasing body of knowledge - each generation must tackle 
their own problems for themselves.5 
I do not deny that Wittgenstein's elucidations (both in the Tractatus and 
Investigations) can be re-deployed successfully when philosophers suffer from 
confusions. My point is that philosophers have been too quick to treat these 
arguments as definitive solutions to the problem and this is precisely what 
Wittgenstein did not intend. Philosophers commonly refer to Wittgenstein's rule-
following argument, his theory of family resemblance and his rejection of private 
mental objects. To see these as the results of his grammatical investigations and as 
solutions to problems, is to treat confusions as problems that can be cured in one 
way. But it is a mistake to think that anyone and everyone who suffers from such 
problems can be given the same cure. Too often people do exegesis of 
Wittgenstein by first explaining how he characterises a particular problem and 
then how he knocks that particular problem down. This does not achieve anything 
unless the problem was really a confusion for the persons concerned. It is far more 
valuable to tackle new, relevant problems - perhaps ones that Wittgenstein 
himself did not even consider. 
Although I hope to dissuade philosophers from concentrating solely on the 
problems that Wittgenstein considered important, I do think it wil l be fruitful to 
apply Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy to contemporary problems. Rather 
than speculate too widely, it seems appropriate to outline some avenues for future 
4 In the Big Typescript Section 88 Wittgenstein wrote "(All that philosophy can do is destroy idols. 
And that means not creating a new one - for instance as in 'absence of an idol')" (Reprinted in 
Philosophical Occasions p. 171) 
5 "We keep hearing the remark that philosophy really does not progress, that we are still occupied 
with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. Those who say this however don't 
understand why it is so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us 
into asking the same questions" (Culture and Value p.22) 
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research that I intend to pursue. My immediate plan is to investigate confusions 
found in contemporary accounts of the problem of personal identity.6 Many 
influential writers in this field, such as Sydney Shoemaker and David Parfit, have 
argued that certain types of causal connection are a necessary condition for 
personal identity, or for psychological connectedness with a future self. 
Specifically, these "M-type causal connections" are required to underpin 
memories, intentions and desires, which are then used as the psychological 
characteristics that underpin the account of personal identity or survival. To 
consider how these philosophical problems may consist of grammatical 
confusions, I plan to conduct a grammatical investigation into the role of causal 
connections by comparing a variety of claims that are made about personal 
identity. I hope to demonstrate that the claims made by Shoemaker, Parfit and 
others are cases where certain forms of expression have been removed from the 
ordinary context in which they are meaningful and have been misapplied in a 
philosophical context. In particular I suspect that similarities between ordinary 
expressions that state reasons for action have been confused with expressions that 
specify causes, an issue that has already been usefully investigated by Julia 
Tanney.7 
An investigation of confusions in personal identity and philosophy of mind 
will be a step towards my gaining a clearer understanding of the issue of 
responsibility. At present I find that the question of whether a person was 
responsible for their actions typically involves confused causal accounts of their 
intentions and their identity over time. My long term interest is to elucidate the 
issue of authorial responsibility8 - particularly to consider how differing degrees 
of responsibility are used to judge authors in the fields of literature, philosophy 
and science. To investigate this topic, I have designed a module called 
Responsibility, available for 3 r d year undergraduates at University College Cork. 
My interest in this topic arises from teaching an MA Module on Personal Identity. It is also a 
return to my own MA work on first person self reference, with Dr Andy Hamilton. 
7 My interest in this topic started whilst teaching Philosophy of Mind alongside Dr Julia Tanney, 
see Tanney (1995) "Why Reasons May Not be Causes" Mind & Language vol. 10, nos. 1/2 pp. 
103-126. 
8 1 explore this topic in a paper called "Authorship: Origin and Originality" to be presented at the 
Writing Aesthetics Conference in May 2003, hosted by the International Association for 
Philosophy and Literature. 
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Ch.8: Conclusion 
The module aim is: "To achieve a clearer understanding of the concept of 
responsibility and address problems arising from misunderstandings of this 
concept".9 In this series of investigations I will attempt to find ways of paying 
attention to the grammar that shows itself in ordinary language, in order to see 
clearly what it makes sense to say and recognise when nothing is being said. 
These avenues for future research are a consequence of my view that the 
Investigations should be read in the right light against the background of the 
Tractatus. The Tractatus stands as a reminder to the reader of the Investigations. 
It warns of the mistakes that it is easy to fall into whilst learning and applying the 
conception of philosophy introduced in the Investigations. In particular it 
highlights the danger of treating particular elucidations or descriptions as the final 
outcome of philosophical activity. It demonstrates how easy it is to see particular 
pictures as the solution to a problem, rather than something that must drop away, 
or must be used in conjunction with many other pictures. To do this is to fall into 
the trap of treating elucidations as though they say something - as though they 
communicate a solution for a problem. Elucidations do not provide a solution to a 
problem, only the activity of attempting to see clearly what shows itself can do 
this. To forget this is the price of ignoring the elucidatory reminder that "what can 
be shown, cannot be said". However, the truly grave mistake would be to forget 
that the say-show distinction is itself an elucidation and treat it as a substantive 
doctrine that will solve all the problems of philosophy by itself. I have argued that 
the say-show distinction is the basis for Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, 
and concluded that this conception of philosophy has at its heart a commitment to 
clarity, but this thesis does not represent the end result of my research. Rather, it is 
just the start of the hard work. Clarity is not something that can be captured and 
put into words, it is something that requires ongoing activity. The say-show 
distinction reminds us that philosophy is about doing something rather than saying 
something. 
9 The module description is as follows: "Students will gain a clearer understanding of the concept 
of responsibility by comparing the role it plays in various different contexts including philosophy, 
science and art. The module will explore how responsibility is related to concepts such as freedom, 
intention, chance, accountability and anonymity. This will provide the basis for critical discussion 
of issues such as the difference between personal and collective responsibility, the question of 
posthumous responsibility and the possibility of disclaiming responsibility". 
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